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October 23, 2011 

Afghan suicide attack targets interior minister
By Emal Haidary | AFP
Security guards shot dead a suicide bomber on Sunday who tried to assassinate Afghan Interior Minister Bismullah Khan in an area north of Kabul, a spokesman for the ministry told AFP.

Karzai Urges Haqqani Talks, Says Afghans Would Back Pakistan In U.S. War
October 23, 2011 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai has called for peace talks with extremists in Pakistan.
In an interview with Pakistan's Geo television, Karzai also indicated that if the United States and Pakistan ever went to war, Afghanistan would support Pakistan.

Clinton Promotes Afghan Border Security, ’New Silk Road,’ in Central Asia
By Indira A.R. Lakshmanan - Oct 23, 2011 Bloomberg
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pressed Afghanistan’s neighbors to halt the flow of militants and drugs across their borders and to support regional trade and a peace process to end a conflict tying up 100,000 U.S. forces.

She came, she saw, she confounded: Clinton in Pakistan
By Myra MacDonald Sat Oct 22, 2011 9:27pm EDT Reuters
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recently concluded visit to Pakistan has left us none the wiser about how the United States and its allies will end the Afghan war. In her public comments, she spoke of action "over the next days and weeks – not months and years, but days and weeks". She promised the United States would tackle Taliban militants in eastern Afghanistan

Spy Agency in Kabul Denies Claim of Abuse
By JACK HEALY and SHARIFULLAH SAHAK The New York Times October 22, 2011
KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghanistan’s embattled spy agency absolved itself of any wrongdoing on Saturday in the case of a wandering Islamic preacher detained by intelligence officials who ended up in a hospital this month, fading in and out of consciousness and seemingly near death.

US shifts demands from Pakistani military action to peace talks with armed groups
By Associated Press,
ISLAMABAD — Despite some tough talk, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s recent visit to Pakistan seemed to subtly soften Washington’s stand on a key point of contention between the two countries: whether Islamabad should take military action against Pakistan-based insurgents fighting American troops in Afghanistan, or try to engage them in peace talks.

Pak Taliban demands Rs 400 mn from oil firms, threatens attack
October 23, 2011 18:04 IST rediff.com
The Pakistani Taliban have threatened to attack installations of Shell Pakistan and the state-run Pakistan State Oil if the two firms do not pay a total of Rs 400 million within 20 days as extortion money, a media report said on Sunday.

Army commander takes swipe at Afghan muddle
The Age By Tom Hyland October 23, 2011
A SENIOR army officer has questioned the federal government's lack of a coherent strategy in Afghanistan, implicitly criticised the Rudd cabinet's handling of troop deployments, and warned of ''a long way to go'' before our role in the war ends.

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Afghan suicide attack targets interior minister
By Emal Haidary | AFP
Security guards shot dead a suicide bomber on Sunday who tried to assassinate Afghan Interior Minister Bismullah Khan in an area north of Kabul, a spokesman for the ministry told AFP.

The failed attempt on Khan, who once fought against the Taliban, comes as the north of Afghanistan -- an area over the past decade relatively insulated from the insurgency -- has seen an uptick in violence.

The attacker attempted to detonate his explosives on a convoy of cars sent in advance of the minister's vehicle, perhaps thinking Khan was inside, as he was being taken to visit the Panjshir valley, said spokesman Siddiq Siddiqui.

"I can confirm a failed assassination attempt on the minister, a suicide bomber was involved, no casualties," said Siddiqui.

He said the minister had wanted to go to Panjshir -- a stronghold of anti-Taliban resistance hit by its first suicide attack in the war last week -- and a convoy of four cars had been sent in advance as a security measure.

"In Sayed Khail (a district of Parwan province) a suicide attacker runs toward this convoy, but gets shot by bodyguards before being able to detonate himself," said Siddiqui.

"The minister was in another convoy around 15 or 20 minutes behind the first convoy."

The spokesman said the attacker was in his early 20s and was injured in the shooting, and later died from his wounds.

Khan is an ethnic Tajik former anti-Soviet commander who fought the Taliban alongside Afghanistan's northern hero Ahmad Shah Masood and was appointed to the interior ministry post in June last year.

He is a member of the Jamiat-e-Islami political party that was led by the former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, the chief broker for peace in the 10-year Afghan war until he was killed at his home in Kabul last month.

Governor of Parwan Abdul Basir Salangi said the latest attack took place in mid-afternoon when the convoy had parked for prayers on the road between Sayed Khail and Gulbahar districts.

"A suicide attacker hiding under a bridge approached the convoy. The bodyguards saw him and shot him. He had a suicide vest on, but the explosives didn't explode," Salangi said.

Police chief of Parwan Sher Ahmad Maladani said the bomber's body was in police custody and "we are trying to untie his explosives-filled vest from his body".

Last weekend four suicide bombers struck at the gates of Panjshir's Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), a civil-military NATO outfit, targeting the only foreign military presence in the province, in the first suicide attack in the area since the war began in late 2001.

Panjshir, a predominantly ethnic Tajik area handed from NATO control to Afghan forces in July, was never controlled by the Taliban during their 1996-2001 rule over Afghanistan.
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Karzai Urges Haqqani Talks, Says Afghans Would Back Pakistan In U.S. War
October 23, 2011 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai has called for peace talks with extremists in Pakistan.

In an interview with Pakistan's Geo television, Karzai also indicated that if the United States and Pakistan ever went to war, Afghanistan would support Pakistan.

"God forbid, if ever there is a war between Pakistan and America, Afghanistan will side with Pakistan," he said.

Karzai's remarks follow a visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan last week by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during which she called for strengthened cooperation against militants, as well as moves toward a negotiated settlement of the regional conflict.

Reports say that despite frequent tensions between Washington and Islamabad, the prospect of a war between the United States and Pakistan seems unlikely at the current time.

Regarding peace talks with the Haqqani network -- blamed for launching a series of attacks in Afghanistan from sanctuaries in Pakistan -- Karzai said in the television interview that such negotiations should take place in Pakistan.

Karzai also reiterated conditions for a strategic agreement with the United States due to be worked out next month, insisting that U.S. forces must stop raiding Afghan homes.

He also said foreign-operated prisons must be closed, and that arrests of Afghans by foreign forces and operations of private security companies must end.

compiled from agency reports
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Clinton Promotes Afghan Border Security, ’New Silk Road,’ in Central Asia
By Indira A.R. Lakshmanan - Oct 23, 2011 Bloomberg
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pressed Afghanistan’s neighbors to halt the flow of militants and drugs across their borders and to support regional trade and a peace process to end a conflict tying up 100,000 U.S. forces.

“Instead of Afghanistan being the crossroads for terrorism and insurgency,” Clinton said yesterday in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe, “we want Afghanistan to be at the crossroads of economic opportunities going north and south and east and west, which is why it’s so critical to more fully integrate the economies of the countries in this region in South and Central Asia.”

Clinton urged Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and Uzbek President Islam Karimov yesterday to ensure that insurgents from Afghanistan and Pakistan don’t establish sanctuaries in their countries, according to a State Department official who spoke on condition of anonymity since the talks were private.

Clinton’s visit to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan this weekend also is a chance to bolster relations with two nations along a northern supply route used for about half of all non-lethal provisions for American troops in Afghanistan.

Strained Relations

While the overland supply route from Pakistan to Afghanistan is cheaper, the Pentagon is boosting traffic through the rail, air and truck routes of what is referred to as the Northern Distribution Network as an alternative at a time of strained relations between the Obama administration and the government in Islamabad.

On an earlier stop in Islamabad on Oct. 20 and 21, Clinton, along with Central Intelligence Agency Director David Petraeus and General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged Pakistan to move against extremists who are attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

In Kabul on Oct. 20, Clinton stood alongside President Hamid Karzai and warned that Pakistan will pay “a very big price” if it fails to crack down on militants staging cross- border attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

The U.S. has sought closer ties with Uzbekistan over the past decade to win support for the war in Afghanistan and to press for a crackdown on Uzbek militants linked to al-Qaeda. Uzbekistan hosted a U.S. airbase that was a supply route to Afghanistan when the war began, then shut down the base in 2005 after the Bush administration condemned Karimov’s attacks on protesters that year that rights groups said claimed hundreds of lives.

Supply Route

Clinton met with Karimov yesterday and expressed appreciation for Uzbekistan’s support for the supply route for U.S. troops and for building a rail line to connect northern Afghanistan to its Central Asian neighbors.

Last month, President Barack Obama spoke with Karimov about possibly expanding the northern supply route for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Congress is reviewing a law that restricts military aid to Uzbekistan because of its poor human rights record.

Tajikistan allows overflights for U.S. aircraft supplying the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan. The Tajik government has also granted permission for ground transit routes.

Clinton said she was visiting Uzbek leader Karimov, who has wielded autocratic power for 22 years, because “if you have no contact, you will have no influence, and other countries will fill that vacuum who do not care about human rights.”

‘Balancing Act’

Clinton called it “a balancing act” to engage with authoritarian governments while pressing them to respect human rights.

In Clinton’s talks with Karimov, she urged him to respect political and religious freedom and end forced labor in the cotton industry. He assured her he wanted to make progress on liberalization and democracy to leave a legacy for his children and grandchildren, a State Department official who participated in the meeting told reporters traveling with Clinton.

Clinton also raised U.S. concerns about religious and media freedom in Tajikistan.

“We encouraged the Tajik government to take concrete steps” toward greater civil and religious freedom, she said at a press conference after meeting with Rahmon and Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi.

Religious Expression

Restrictions on religious expression, such as Tajik rules against Muslims wearing veils or beards, “could build up discontent,” she said.

“We don’t want to do anything to breed extremism,” she said, adding that she urged the Tajik leaders to rethink “any restrictions going forward, because we think they could increase sympathy for extremist views.”

Speaking at a gathering of Tajik civic leaders, women and youth, Clinton said Afghanistan’s neighbors have suffered economically from regional instability caused by the war. She promoted the concept of a “New Silk Road” linking Central Asian nations as a way to boost economies and living standards throughout the region.

Clinton urged both the Tajik and Uzbek leaders to support transit connections to promote regional trade in raw materials, energy and agricultural products as part of the vision for economic integration of South and Central Asia. The Tajik and Uzbek leaders have poor relations and few links between their countries.

GM Visit

Today in Tashkent, Clinton visited a new General Motors Co. plant that next month will begin commercial production of more than 200,000 engines annually, officials said. GM has a 97 percent market share of cars sold in Uzbekistan, the highest of any GM market, the company said.

Clinton highlighted the joint venture with state-owned UzAvtosanoat as the kind of collaboration that creates jobs in both countries. GM Uzbekistan employs 6,600 people and imported $34 million of American parts and supplies in the past two years, officials said.

“GM’s presence in Uzbekistan also adds to our efforts to build closer economic connections between the countries of South and Central Asia,” Clinton told workers at the plant. “We are seeking to build a New Silk Road that integrates markets from Mumbai to Karachi to Kabul, and on to Tashkent and Astana and beyond.”

The original Silk Road was more than 4,000 miles (6,400 kilometers) of trade routes crossing Asia and into southern Europe and northern Africa. Based on China’s silk industry, the commerce it enabled also helped the growth of civilizations from Egypt to Rome.

To contact the reporter on this story: Indira Lakshmanan in Tashkent, Uzbekistan at ilakshmanan@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Mark Silva at msilva34@bloomberg.net
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She came, she saw, she confounded: Clinton in Pakistan
By Myra MacDonald Sat Oct 22, 2011 9:27pm EDT Reuters
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recently concluded visit to Pakistan has left us none the wiser about how the United States and its allies will end the Afghan war. In her public comments, she spoke of action "over the next days and weeks – not months and years, but days and weeks". She promised the United States would tackle Taliban militants in eastern Afghanistan in response to a long-standing Pakistani complaint that Washington had neglected the region when it decided to concentrate its forces in population centres in southern Afghanistan in 2010 (remember "government in a box"?).

She called, in return, for cooperation on the Pakistani side of the border to "squeeze these terrorists so that they cannot attack and kill any Pakistani, any Afghan, any American, or anyone." Between the two countries, they would tackle the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban.

But squeeze them to what end? To weaken all but the hard-core leadership of the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network so that they agree to lay down arms and rejoin the political process in Afghanistan? Or to entice them into serious negotiations through which they might be offered a share of power in Kabul, or accommodated in a "soft partition" of Afghanistan (an idea deeply unpopular among Afghans) which leaves them in control of the south and the east?

As Pakistani columnist Ejaz Haider wrote in Pakistan Today just before Clinton arrived, the current U.S. policy looks a bit like the dialogue between Alice and the Cheshire Cat. "‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’ asked Alice. ‘That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,’ said the Cat. ‘I don’t much care where—’ said Alice. ‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,’ said the Cat."

True, Clinton stressed the need for a peace process to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan. But that idea has been on the diplomatic agenda for nearly two years. By the second half of last year, we were hearing that the United States had endorsed talkswith all of Afghanistan's main insurgent groups, including the Haqqani network. By January this year, western countries said there would be no preconditions set for insurgents entering peace talks - only end-conditions that they sever ties with al Qaeda, renounce violence and agree to respect the Afghan constitution. In February, Clinton stressed the need for negotiations in a landmark speech to the Asia Society which coincided with reports the United States had begun direct talks with the Taliban.

In other words, we have heard a lot about talk about talks without any explanation as to why these have achieved so little so far (some blame U.S. military strategy, others Pakistani interference, others Taliban intransigence, others poor Afghan governance). And the danger is that as long as these talks about talks continue without yielding results, all parties to the Afghan conflict arm themselves up in readiness for an escalating civil war.

True, Clinton admitted in public during her visit to Islamabad that the United States had held a preliminary meeting with representatives of the Haqqani network. But we already knew that. According to The Washington Post, U.S. officials met Ibrahim Haqqani, the brother of the group’s patriarch, Jalaluddin Haqqani, in a Gulf kingdom in August. The meeting was arranged by the head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who also attended, it reported.

But that meeting does not seem to have gone well. It was followed by an attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul which the United States blamed on the Haqqani network and which prompted outgoing chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen to describe the group as a "veritable arm" of the ISI.

Clinton has made clear the U.S. strategy will continue. " We're going to be fighting, we're going to be talking and we're going to be building," she told reporters in Afghanistan. And even if that carries a ring of "if at first you don't succeed, try, try and try again", that is no reason to dismiss it out of hand.

However much the United States and its allies are looking for a way out of the Afghan war, pressure is also mounting on Pakistan. Washington is stepping up efforts to bring supplies to Afghanistan through Central Asia - Clinton flew from Pakistan to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan - thereby reducing U.S. dependence on Islamabad/Rawalpindi even as Pakistan's own deteriorating economic health is making it harder for it to risk losing international and U.S. financial support.

And more importantly India this month signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan - one unlikely to have been reached without U.S. approval -- which gives India the capability, if not the intention, to put Pakistan under pressure on both its western and eastern borders.

Yet even as the United States doubles down, do also consider two quite different approaches, both of which have the merit of greater clarity but which are also diametrically opposed.

One of them I heard presented this month by Amrullah Saleh, the Tajik former head of the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) and a fierce critic of talks with the Taliban. At a conference organised by the Asia-Pacific Foundation in London, he argued there was no reason to believe Pakistan would be any more inclined to cooperate with the United States now than it was when Washington sent in more troops to Afghanistan. "With that escalation, Pakistan did not cooperate. Why would Pakistan cooperate with de-escalation?" he said.

Rather than rely on Pakistan, he argued that the Afghan government must implement reforms to restore the trust of the Afghan people so they would at least have a state by 2014, when U.S.-led troops are meant to hand over responsibility for security to Afghan forces. And Kabul should change its policy of talks with the Taliban which had "blurred the narrative" for Afghans about who they were fighting, looking instead at reintegrating all but the 200 or so in the inner circle of the insurgency's leadership..

But a scenario which led to a ceasefire and a political deal which left Pakistan and what he called its proxies with control over eastern and southern Afghanistan would offer only "a temporary, deceptive, stability". The Taliban would remain militant in order to put pressure on Kabul and extort further concessions from the west. Such a deal might provide cover for a withdrawal of western troops, but would also lead to "massive civil strife".

The opposite approach is the one advocated by Pakistan, which - in somewhat unfortunately chosen words - is to "give peace a chance". Articulated in detail in a report produced jointly by the Jinnah Institute and the United States Institute of Peace, it aims for a negotiated settlement giving Afghan Pashtun a bigger say in the political process and possibly including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network.

According to this version, the U.S. position of fight, talk and build cannot work because the insurgents will not trust the Americans to negotiate sincerely as long as they reserve the right to use their very considerable force. Only a ceasefire on all sides would pave the way for meaningful talks on a political settlement.

The report, criticised to some extent within Pakistan, also notes what is perhaps one of the trickiest issues in the whole approach to Taliban talks: this is not just about Afghanistan. Whatever Pakistan really wants to happen in Afghanistan, and whatever it support it does or does not give to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, it is also dependent on them to keep control of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP).

According to this excerpt, those who contributed to the Jinnah Institute report questioned "the mis-perception that the Pakistani security establishment is unaware of the growing linkages between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani militant groups."

" However, they argue that while the current links remain limited, it is precisely the fear of these growing into full blown operational cooperation and coordination that prevents the Pakistani state from targeting Afghan insurgent groups on its soil. Moreover, the security establishment is able to take advantage of the present linkages between these groups from time to time by persuading the Afghan Taliban to pressure the TTP and other North Waziristan-based militants to curtail their activities."

Stretch that argument out further and you could make a case that Pakistan needs to get a reasonable deal for the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqanis in Afghanistan if it wants them, in return, to bring the Pakistani Taliban to heel.

So to get back to Clinton and the Afghan settlement. We have three possible approaches, with various permutations. The one currently favoured by the United States is to keep fighting, to keep the door open for talks, and to keep piling pressure on Pakistan in the hope that it yields results. The second - as expressed by Amrullah Saleh - is to take the idea of talks with insurgent leaders off the table altogether, end the confusion and build up governance within Afghanistan in the years that are left before 2014. The third is to seek a ceasefire, so that in the absence of violence, talks might take place in a more conducive atmosphere.

Any one of those approaches has its merits. But as long as all these conflicting ideas remain out there, we will see a lot of different groups lining up to argue with the Cheshire Cat.
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Spy Agency in Kabul Denies Claim of Abuse
By JACK HEALY and SHARIFULLAH SAHAK The New York Times October 22, 2011
KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghanistan’s embattled spy agency absolved itself of any wrongdoing on Saturday in the case of a wandering Islamic preacher detained by intelligence officials who ended up in a hospital this month, fading in and out of consciousness and seemingly near death.

Ten days ago, doctors in the eastern province of Khost reported that the preacher, Maulavi Abdullah, had been held for 12 days by the intelligence service and arrived at the hospital badly beaten, unable to drink fluids and with failing kidneys. Afghan intelligence agents prevented doctors and reporters from talking to the patient, except for two doctors who were treating him.

The allegations of his mistreatment surfaced just days after the United Nations office here released a withering report that detailed widespread mistreatment in detention centers run by the Afghan National Police and the intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security. Khost, a mountainous border area where insurgents are active, was one of five provinces where human rights investigators found “compelling evidence” that intelligence agents employed torture to elicit confessions.

On Saturday, government investigators gave Mr. Abdullah a clean bill of health, concluding that he had concocted the accusations of torture “to escape from the law, show himself innocent and hide his crimes.”

“The claim by the accused is baseless,” the National Directorate of Security summarized in its findings. “There was no torture and no beating at all.”

It was impossible to verify the agency’s conclusions. A doctor in Khost said that Mr. Abdullah had been taken from the hospital there several days ago by government officials and security guards. He was believed to be at a military hospital in Kabul, doctors said, but officials have not said where and the intelligence agency did not respond to requests for comment on Saturday.

After the grim descriptions by the preacher’s doctors and accusations from his family became public, threatening to undercut the government’s claims that it was making reforms to eliminate mistreatment at its detention centers, President Hamid Karzai ordered an investigation.

The intelligence agency said it sent a team of investigators to Khost, where they met with doctors, reviewed detention records and worked “in cooperation” with the regional United Nations office. Georgette Gagnon, director of the United Nations’ human rights unit here, said her office was conducting “an independent investigation into this incident, which is not yet completed.”

Little is clear about what happened to Mr. Abdullah during his time in jail, and whether he ended up in the hospital because of chronic kidney problems, abuse, or perhaps both or neither.

Afghan intelligence officials said that Mr. Abdullah had been arrested on suspicion of terrorism and had been in their custody until Oct. 9, when he was transferred to the province’s general prison. They said he was healthy when he left the intelligence detention center. They did not say how long he had been detained, but doctors said he had been held for 12 days.

On Oct. 4, observers from the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission visited the Khost intelligence facility and spoke to Mr. Abdullah, among other prisoners. He reported that his kidneys hurt but did not complain about any abuse, said Ahmad Nader Nadery, a commissioner for the rights group.

Intelligence officials quoted an ultrasound specialist, named Dr. Mohammed Ayub, who later examined Mr. Abdullah and determined that he was in “good health.” But medical reports from an internist in Khost who examined Mr. Abdullah on Oct. 13 cast doubts on that conclusion. The internist, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he feared antagonizing the intelligence service, found a laceration on Mr. Abdullah’s left kidney and fresh blood in his bladder, symptoms consistent with trauma. He said any problem-free diagnosis would have to have been almost willfully shoddy.
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US shifts demands from Pakistani military action to peace talks with armed groups
By Associated Press,
ISLAMABAD — Despite some tough talk, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s recent visit to Pakistan seemed to subtly soften Washington’s stand on a key point of contention between the two countries: whether Islamabad should take military action against Pakistan-based insurgents fighting American troops in Afghanistan, or try to engage them in peace talks.

Clinton seemed to acknowledge during her two-day visit that ended Friday that help with a negotiated settlement is perhaps the best the U.S. can hope for from Pakistan. This shift in the U.S. stance could give Washington and Islamabad new room to cooperate on ending the Afghan war.

But serious barriers to negotiations remain. The U.S. believes that military force is still needed to push the Taliban and their allies to make concessions. Pakistan, which Washington alleges supports some of the militant groups, prefers on the other hand to reduce violence to induce the insurgents to come to the table.

Islamabad is also worried about being blamed if peace talks fail. It has long-standing ties with the armed groups, but the militants are unpredictable and resistant to pressure. Pakistan is furthermore unsure of exactly what kind of deal the U.S. and Afghan governments might strike with the insurgents, and the atmosphere is permeated by feelings of distrust on all sides.

The U.S. has long demanded that Pakistan take greater military action against Taliban militants and their allies who use Pakistani territory to regroup and to send fighters to attack forces in Afghanistan. Recently, the U.S. has pushed for an assault on the Haqqani militant network, which the U.S. alleges is supported by the Pakistan military’s spy agency, the ISI. The U.S. deems the Haqqanis the greatest threat to American troops in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has denied supporting the Haqqanis, but has also made clear that it will not conduct an offensive against the group’s safe haven in the North Waziristan tribal area, a position that has not changed despite the two-day visit by Clinton and other senior national security officials, including CIA chief David Petraeus and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey.

Many analysts believe Pakistan’s refusal is driven by its belief that the Haqqanis could be key allies in Afghanistan after foreign forces withdraw, especially in countering the influence of archenemy India.

The Pakistani military, however, says that its failure to act against the Haqqanis is just a question of limited resources. It claims its troops are stretched too thin by operations in other parts of the tribal region of northwest Pakistan that are deemed a higher priority — a stance reiterated by the Pakistanis following talks with Clinton’s delegation.

“There is limited capacity, and if the organization is overstretched and starts to develop cracks, that is counterproductive,” said a senior Pakistani security official, speaking on condition of anonymity to comment on the outcome of the closed-door talks.

Clinton seemed to soften the U.S. stance during a town hall meeting in Islamabad. When asked whether the U.S. expects Pakistan to militarily tackle the Haqqani network or force them to the negotiating table, she said, “It’s more the latter.”

Clinton also confirmed that the U.S. had tried to reach out to the Haqqanis directly in peace efforts. She is the first U.S. official to publicly acknowledge the overtures, which were first reported by The Associated Press in August. She said the meeting was organized by the ISI.

The U.S. has not totally backed away from blunt public statements urging Pakistan to fight the Haqqanis. Clinton said Islamabad must rid the country “of terrorists who kill their own people and who cross the border to kill people in Afghanistan.”

The tough message may be intended to avoid making the U.S. look weak in its policy toward a militant group accused of attacking American civilians and soldiers in Afghanistan. It could also be meant to keep up perceived pressure on the Haqqanis to get them to negotiate.

Pakistan doesn’t believe the U.S. plan to use military action to force militants into peace talks will work — a disagreement that has bedeviled the process.

“In our culture, it may not work if you want to negotiate with the same adversary you are fighting,” said the Pakistani security official. “You have to declare a pause in fighting if you want to give peace a chance.”

Clinton made clear the U.S. feels otherwise, saying during the town hall meeting that experience has shown that only a combination of fighting and talking “will convince some to come to negotiations and will remove others who are totally opposed to peace and want to continue their violent attacks.”

Pakistan is open to approaching the Taliban and their allies about participating in peace talks, but can’t provide any guarantees that its efforts will succeed, said the security official.

“Contact does not mean that they are in our pockets,” said the official. “Contact means we will suggest to them that they participate.”

Both the Taliban and the Haqqanis have been difficult partners for Pakistan over the years.

In the late 1990s, the founder of the Haqqani network, Jalaluddin Haqqani, refused Islamabad’s demand to hand over militants in his camps in Afghanistan who had carried out attacks inside Pakistan. Following the Sept. 11 2001 attacks, Taliban leader Mullah Omar refused Pakistan’s plea to hand over al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden.

Perhaps the greatest barrier to a potential peace deal, however, is that nobody seems to have a clear idea whether the Taliban and their allies have any interest in negotiating.

“We’re not sure,” said Clinton. “There may be no appetite for talking on the other side for ideological reasons or whatever other motivations.”

After the U.S. met with a senior Haqqani official over the summer, the group allegedly carried out an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and staged a truck bombing days later that wounded 77 American soldiers.

The peace process also took a big blow with the assassination in Kabul of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was tasked with the government’s outreach to the Taliban. It’s still unclear who carried out the attack. The Afghan government has said it was planned in the Pakistani city of Quetta, the Taliban leadership’s suspected base, and the interior minister accused the ISI of being involved. But no evidence has been provided.

The allegations have soured relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as did a strategic partnership agreement that Kabul recently signed with India — the first of its kind that Afghanistan has reached with any country.

U.S. accusations that Pakistan has supported the Haqqani network have also increased feelings of mistrust on all sides.

“These kinds of public pronouncements don’t help enhance the space for cooperation,” said the Pakistani security official. “They badly affect the space, which is limited to begin with.”
__

Kathy Gannon, AP Special Regional Correspondent for Pakistan and Afghanistan, contributed to this report.
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Pak Taliban demands Rs 400 mn from oil firms, threatens attack
October 23, 2011 18:04 IST rediff.com
The Pakistani Taliban have threatened to attack installations of Shell Pakistan and the state-run Pakistan State Oil if the two firms do not pay a total of Rs 400 million within 20 days as extortion money, a media report said on Sunday.

"I had personally spoken to the managing directors of the Pakistan State Oil and Shell Pakistan and demanded that they arrange to pay us Rs 200 million each. Otherwise, I had warned them that we would start attacking their installations anywhere in the country," a senior Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan commander told The News on phone.

The unnamed commander claimed officials of the two oil companies had sought time to consider the Taliban's demand. The commander further claimed the Taliban had never warned the companies to halt supplying fuel to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces in Afghanistan. He said officials of the companies "wrongly linked" the Taliban's threat to ending oil supplies to the foreign forces.

The commander claimed the PSO had issued a statement to the media that said the the Taliban wanted the company to halt oil supplies to foreign forces in Afghanistan.

"It isn't true. We never asked them to stop fuel supply to the United States or NATO forces in Afghanistan. We had nothing to do with whatever they are doing. I just asked them to pay us Rs 200 million within 20 days, otherwise we would target their installations," the commander was quoted as saying.

The commander said that instead of arranging the money, a managing director of one of the firms purchased a bulletproof vehicle for himself to avoid harm at the hands of Taliban. "We know whatever they are doing to dodge us. They need to know that bulletproof vehicles would not save them from our fighters," the commander threatened.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan too called The News from an undisclosed location and made a similar demand. He said the Taliban had gathered information about installations of the oil companies and would launch attacks if their demand was not met.

Government officials in Peshawar refused to comment on the issue, saying only that they had heard about the PSO receiving threats.
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Army commander takes swipe at Afghan muddle
The Age By Tom Hyland October 23, 2011
A SENIOR army officer has questioned the federal government's lack of a coherent strategy in Afghanistan, implicitly criticised the Rudd cabinet's handling of troop deployments, and warned of ''a long way to go'' before our role in the war ends.

His comments are at odds with the government's claims of a united strategy in Afghanistan, and contrast with its predictions that Australians will be able to hand over to Afghan forces by 2014.

Colonel Peter Connolly, who commanded more than 700 troops in Afghanistan in 2009, has provided a unique insight into Australia's role in the conflict, ranging from decision-making in Canberra to combat in Oruzgan province.

While he says the troops are making progress in a war worth fighting, he questions the government's resolve in a report published by the army's Land Warfare Studies Centre.

Colonel Connolly, now assigned to the Pentagon, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his leadership in Afghanistan. He says Australia lacks a united approach to the conflict. He argues it is essential that the military effort be supported by federal police, AusAid and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

''It would be very useful to have a strategy from Canberra to synchronise and prioritise whole-of-government efforts in delivering nation building effects, but no such strategy is apparent at this stage,'' he says.

''Australia has the capacity to marshal resources on an appropriate scale to achieve results in Oruzgan, but there needs to be sufficient appetite in government, a matured whole-of-government apparatus, and cohesive national direction to realise a meaningful outcome.''

He reveals that training for his troops was disrupted by a ''late decision'' of the Rudd government to dramatically increase troop numbers in May 2009.

His taskforce was assigned 120 extra soldiers just weeks before they were due to deploy. The new troops were still training in Townsville when the bulk of the force went to Afghanistan, ''making for a challenging first three months in both locations''.

While cabinet deliberated, essential equipment needed for training was withheld for three months. Troops sent to provide security for Afghan elections arrived only three weeks before the poll, leading to ''their rapid introduction to the area of operations at a critical time''. He points out that the first weeks of any deployment are the most dangerous.

Other troops arrived after the election, leaving them ''somewhat dislocated'' from the experiences of the remainder of the force. ''There was never a time where all members of the group were assembled in one location,'' Colonel Connolly writes.

While he says the Australians have made progress in mentoring Afghan troops, he cautions against imposing a timeline for the Afghans to take sole responsibility for security. The government insists it is on track to do this by 2014, but Colonel Connolly says the Australian mission ''has a long way to go before it is complete''.

''This will require considerable endurance, sacrifice and resolve from the Australian Defence Force along with understanding and support from the Australian people.'' He reveals how in mid-2009 the Taliban targeted the Australians with improvised explosive devices with a low metal content, making them hard to detect.

In just over a month they destroyed five armoured vehicles. A similar bomb killed Private Ben Ranaudo and the taskforce was ''extremely lucky'' not to suffer more casualties.

The bomb threat caused intense stress on soldiers. ''Hardest hit'' were combat engineers. ''The sheer frustration caused by the difficulty of finding the threat combined with the high tempo demanded of them by the situation resulted in exhaustion.''

Vehicle crews were ''stretched by the heightened expectation of the threat'', while soldiers on foot patrols were ''frustrated by taking casualties from this unseen threat and often being unable to retaliate''.

But he says the soldiers ''all took it in their stride, maintaining strong battle discipline''.

A spokesman for Defence Minister Stephen Smith said the government had increased Australia's civilian and military commitment in Oruzgan and ''those contributions are working well''.
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