 |
||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Serving you since 1998 | ||||||||||||
|
|
No One Can Interfere in Electoral Affairs: MPs
TOLOnews.com Saturday, 09 July 2011
Members of the Coalition to Support Law Enforcement stressed at a gathering on Friday that no organisation had the right to interfere in the electoral affairs.
UN Welcomes Parliamentary Vote Results Announced by IEC
Tolo news July 9, 2011
Ban Ki-moon's special representative to Afghanistan has once again welcomed the former results of parliamentary elections announced by Independent Election Commission (IEC).
Karzai's Court
By Jed Ober, July 7, 2011 Foreign Policy
In January of this year, Afghan President Hamid Karzai yielded to domestic and international pressure and endorsed the seating of the new Afghan parliament against the recommendation of a Special Court he created to evaluate election fraud claims. Few would have predicted then that six months later Karzai's Court would bring the country to the brink of complete political collapse.
Afghan Guard Kills 2 NATO Troops
VOA News July 9, 2011
Afghan police say a rogue Afghan guard has shot dead two NATO troops and wounded a third in a northern province.
Afghanistan: The Trouble With The Transition
Commentary July 09, 2011 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty By Muhammad Tahir
“We cannot assume security responsibility for this province.”
The man who said this is General Mohammad Qasim Jangalbagh, the security commander of the Panjshir province of northern Afghanistan. He went on to explain that “because our province is bordered by insecure provinces, we need a huge force.”
Suicide bombing attack against police in Afghanistan, bomber killed, 9 injured
By Abdul Haleem, Zhang Jianhua
KABUL, July 9 (Xinhua) -- In the latest waves of insurgency against government interests in Afghanistan, nine civilians sustained injuries and a suicide bomber was killed as anti- government militants launched twin attacks against police in Taliban-hotbed the troubled southern region on Saturday, officials confirmed.
Instead of Exiting Afghanistan, it's Time to Re-Engage
Huffington Post By Glen Pearson 08/07/2011
A few days ago I spoke with a highly placed individual in the Canadian Department of Defence who made the following troubling observation: "Glen, with the drawing down of Canadian forces out of Afghanistan, it will be inevitable that long-term development will follow suit. Nothing can be done about it."
Night Raids Curbing Taliban, but Afghans Cite Civilian Toll
New York Times By CARLOTTA GALL July 8, 2011
KABUL, Afghanistan - United States Special Operations forces have carried out an extraordinary number of night raids over the past year, turning them into one of their most effective tools against the insurgents even as they stir accusations of abuse, resentment among Afghans and divisions with the government.
Panetta: Strategic Defeat Of Al-Qaeda Within Reach
July 9, 2011 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta says the "strategic defeat" of Al-Qaeda is "within reach."
Panetta made the statement today as he arrived on a surprise visit to Afghanistan.
Afghan, Pakistan forces agree on more border talks
July 9, 2011
KABUL — (AFP) - Military officials from Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to hold more high-level talks to defuse a row over a series of attacks across their porous border, the Afghan defence ministry said Saturday.
A Political Solution to the Afghan War
By Daniel Serwer The Atlantic Jul 7 2011, 7:00 AM ET4
The U.S. wants a negotiated peace with the Taliban. Here are the issues we'll face, and how they might be resolved
The timeline for U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is now clear: 10,000 troops out by the end of this year and 23,000 more out by the end of next summer. That will leave 67,000 troops, who, if all goes according to plan, will be withdrawn before the end of 2014, with a possible residual assistance force of unspecified size thereafter.
ACCI Urges End of Trade Relations with Pakistan
Tolo news July 9, 2011
Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (ACCI) on Saturday asked all the Afghan merchants to end their trade relations with Pakistan.
Tribal skirmish threatens broader coalition campaign in Afghanistan
ByMartin Kuz Stars and Stripes July 8, 2011
NARAI, Afghanistan — The kidnappers made a demand of their captive that was at once straightforward and impossible to fulfill: return control of the district of Ghaziabad in northeastern Kunar province to neighboring Nuristan province.
U.S.-Pakistan relations sink to new low
The Globe and mail By PAUL KORING Friday, Jul. 08, 2011
WASHINGTON - Just when it seemed already frayed Pakistani-American relations couldn’t get any worse, the Obama administration’s top soldier publicly accused Pakistan’s powerful security agency of murdering a journalist who dared to probe the Islamabad government’s murky dealings.
Back to Top
No One Can Interfere in Electoral Affairs: MPs
TOLOnews.com Saturday, 09 July 2011
Members of the Coalition to Support Law Enforcement stressed at a gathering on Friday that no organisation had the right to interfere in the electoral affairs.
The Coalition announced that the decision made by the Special Tribunal was against the law.
Mohammad Yonus Qanooni, a parliamentarian and member of the Coalition said the Afghan nation and the International Community expect the Afghan parliament not to be used in political games and not to be used against the Afghan constitution.
"If the constitution was respected from the very beginning, we would not have faced such a crisis now," Mr Qanooni said.
Mr Qanooni said the Afghan government is facing crisis of legitimacy.
"As one of your friends, I will never let the Afghan government to change people's determination," Mr Qanooni told the gathering.
Meanwhile, Afghan MP Hajji Mohammad Mohaqeq, said the Special Electoral Tribunal established by President Karzai was illegal and unconstitutional, adding that such a thing has never been witnessed in any part of the world.
"In no part of the world MPs who have been announced winners have ever been announced as losers after two months of starting their work," Mr Mohaqeq told the gathering.
Hajji Abdul Zaher Qadir, Head of the Coalition to Support Law Enforcement said he would never accept any deal.
"I will not accept any kind of political deal against the will of the Afghan people and against the constitution," Mr Qadir said.
Mr Yonus Qanooni expressed concern about the formation of the newly established commission by President Karzai to look into the issue, and called on the members of the commission not to allow any decision against the Afghan constitution.
Back to Top
Back to Top
UN Welcomes Parliamentary Vote Results Announced by IEC
Tolo news July 9, 2011
Ban Ki-moon's special representative to Afghanistan has once again welcomed the former results of parliamentary elections announced by Independent Election Commission (IEC).
In response to a letter from Afghan House of Representatives, UN Special envoy to Afghanistan Staffan de Mistura wrote that the UN once again welcomes the final results of parliamentary elections that were announced by IEC.
De Mistura announced his support to democratic institutions, suggesting tensions between parliament and legislative branches should be resolved through legal ways.
Last week at the UN Security Council the UN envoy to Afghanistan expressed concern about tensions between government branches and said the UN will make efforts to prevent the situation from further deepening into an institutional crisis.
"Back in 22 December, 2010 the UN Security Council welcomed the final results of the elections announced by IEC and called on all Afghan organisations to work to the extent of their authority and base on constitution and all laws enforced in Afghanistan," Abdul Qader Qalatwal said.
The letter was sent to the UN office based in Kabul seeking the body to intervene for an end to growing institutional tensions.
Meanwhile, the commission which was set up to review the initiative suggested by Independent Election Commission for an end to parliamentary tensions presented the result of its review to President Hamid Karzai.
The commission said the initiative has been approved by the president.
The President instructed the related organisations to follow the issue in the view of the initiative.
"The special tribunal which is a legal panel studied the legal aspect of the issue, but it hasn't reviewed the penal aspect of the issue," a Legal Advisor to President Karzai, Nasrullah Stanekzai, said.
Back to Top
Back to Top
Karzai's Court
By Jed Ober, July 7, 2011 Foreign Policy
In January of this year, Afghan President Hamid Karzai yielded to domestic and international pressure and endorsed the seating of the new Afghan parliament against the recommendation of a Special Court he created to evaluate election fraud claims. Few would have predicted then that six months later Karzai's Court would bring the country to the brink of complete political collapse.
Afghanistan's 2010 parliamentary elections were yet another reminder of the extraordinary difficulty of administering elections in the midst of a wide scale counter-insurgency effort. Like the 2009 presidential elections, the September 2010 Wolesi Jirga, or lower house of parliament, elections, were marred by widespread fraud, with more than a million votes ultimately invalidated. Despite the pervasiveness of fraud, the process did offer some hope for the nascent democracy. Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC) showed strong signs that despite enormous external pressure, it could exercise the necessary independence and impartiality that observers felt was lacking in 2009.
The results of the election were not favorable to Karzai, who fought throughout the process for ways to advantage his political allies. In the pre-election period this included unsuccessfully advocating, against the recommendation of the IEC, for the opening of 87 additional polling stations in some of the country's most insecure districts. After election day, President Karzai expressed his dissatisfaction with the results from Ghazni province, where Hazara candidates swept the seats despite the presence of a Pashtun majority. The Special Court would become President Karzai's favorite instrument to remind the new members of parliament that it was he who truly controlled their political fate.
Last year, after Afghanistan's Electoral Complains Commission (ECC) referred hundreds of cases to the attorney general (AG) to review whether candidates had committed criminal offenses, the AG decided to submit 232 candidates to Afghanistan's Supreme Court for adjudication, despite no provision in the electoral law authorizing it to do so. In the weeks that followed, it became clear that the AG was not guided by a legal framework but motivated by a preferred political outcome. Indeed, the AG's office was outspoken in voicing its desire that the results of the elections should be invalidated entirely.
On the 21st of December, the Supreme Court took the next step by recommending that President Karzai establish a Special Court to further investigate and adjudicate the claims of disaffected, defeated candidates. On the 26th of December, President Karzai approved the creation of a Special Court through presidential decree and named Sadiqullah Haqiq, head of the Kabul Court of Appeals, to lead the court. According to the president and the Supreme Court, the Special Court would begin investigating results, and would have the authority to make changes to the results of the September elections.
Shortly after the creation of the court both the IEC and ECC disavowed the court and reaffirmed their position that the authority to administer elections and announce results was the sole duty of the IEC and adjudication of complaints was that of the ECC. The international community publically supported the independence of the country's legitimate electoral institutions and called on all actors to respect their decisions.
Often, it is ambiguity in the Afghan legal framework that causes such political impasses. In this instance, however, the law is clear. The constitution, through Article 156, establishes the IEC as the sole authority for the administration of elections and grants it exclusive authority for the announcement and certification of election results. Neither the constitution nor the electoral law sanctions the creation of a special court to review election results. Nor does either document grant the Supreme Court or Attorney General the authority to engage in electoral affairs.
The idea for the creation of the court likely did not originate with the Supreme Court, but directly from within the president's office; rather, during Democracy International's observation of the process, many well-connected Afghans reported to us that the idea came from two of President Karzai's own legal advisors, who were seeking out ways to alter the results of the September elections that had strengthened opposition to Karzai in the parliament.
After months of the Special Court reportedly conducting re-counts and investigations throughout the provinces, it finally announced a ruling on June 22 in which it declared that 62 sitting members of the parliament should be replaced. The decision launched the country into a political crisis and elicited an immediate reaction from parliament, which voted for the removal of the attorney general and six members of the Supreme Court. The crisis reached new proportions last Wednesday, when the parliament began debating the impeachment of the president, who has reportedly proposed his own list of 17 candidates to the IEC who should be immediately certified as winners. The instability has, according to Afghan news sources, motivated members of parliament to begin carrying firearms into sessions of parliament, and has resulted in physical altercations between MPs.
The authority to arbitrate constitutionality lies with Afghanistan's Independent Commission for the Oversight of the Constitution. In this instance, however, the commission has only contributed to the confusion. In January, the commission reportedly met with a group of MPs and expressed its opinion that the establishment of the Special Court was illegal. This was reported widely at the time in Afghan newspapers. Just last week, in an apparent about face, the constitutional commission issued a decision stating that the IEC should cooperate with any bodies investigating election issues. To complicate matters further, a member of the constitutional commission appeared on TOLO television (the nation's most popular political news outlet) the next day and declared the Special Court illegal and explained that the decision of the commission had been misunderstood.
The implications of the Special Court's ruling are serious, and the willingness of the president to embrace its legitimacy threatens to undermine more than just the parliament. If the court's decision is ultimately respected and the makeup of the parliament is altered, the legitimacy and credibility of the IEC and future Afghan elections will forever be tainted. Candidates and their supporters are unlikely to respect the authority of an election commission whose decisions they know can be trumped by ad-hoc courts. In addition, if the Special Court brings criminal charges against sitting parliamentarians, it will also undermine the authority of Afghanistan's legitimate judicial bodies. At a time when a country struggling to establish robust democratic institutions needs support from its executive, that executive seems all too willing to endorse the defanging of those institutions.
The political implications are even more serious. If Karzai's Court is successful at shaking up the composition of the lower house, the effects could be felt far beyond the body's votes on the president's initiatives. The president would then likely have a parliament more amenable to his call for a Loya Jirga, a powerful traditional body that has the authority to amend the constitution. The current parliament has called the president's plans for a Loya Jirga unconstitutional, on the basis that chairpersons of district councils, who are constitutionally mandated delegates to a Loya Jirga, have not yet been elected. Not only would President Karzai likely have the support in the lower house to move forward with his plans, he would also have 62 more votes in favor of whatever agenda he decides to pursue within the jirga, including a possible constitutional amendment to allow him to seek a third term.
With no clear ending in sight, the president, by supporting the actions of a Special Court with no legal authority, has brought the country to the brink of political collapse. What happens next is anyone's guess. The IEC has so far shown resolve against Karzai and has reportedly presented him a plan to solve the impasse. While details of the plan have yet to be released, there are rumors circulating that it would require President Karzai to declare the Special Court illegal and to honor the independence of the IEC and the credibility of its decisions. In return, the IEC would agree to review some previous decisions of the ECC, which it believes is allowed under Article 65 of Afghanistan's Electoral Law.
If the president disagrees with the IEC's plan, he could always attempt to replace the leadership of the IEC, which is within his constitutional rights, and thus pave the way for the implementation of the Special Court's decision. This would not, however, prevent the likely violent backlash from the 62 parliamentarians the Special Court is threatening to remove. Perhaps a more likely outcome is for the AG to circumvent the IEC altogether and begin implementing the Court's decisions himself, as he has promised recently to do. This would likely entail arrests of sitting MPs and would undoubtedly lead to political chaos and possibly violence.
The crisis created by Karzai's Court underscores the necessity for a genuine Afghan led dialogue on democratic reform. Options must be explored to strengthen the independence and resilience of Afghanistan's democratic institutions. To achieve any level of democratic sustainability, Afghan politicians must operate on a stronger democratic foundation, one developed with the support of civil society and the very institutions President Karzai is attempting to delegitimize (the IEC, the ECC, and the lower house of parliament). If the international community and the Government of Afghanistan do not begin to take democratic reform seriously, a strong democratic Afghanistan will become even more of a fantasy than it is now.
Jed Ober is Director of Programs at Democracy International. Throughout 2010, he served as Democracy International's Chief of Staff in Kabul where he oversaw the largest international election observation mission to Afghanistan's 2010 parliamentary elections. Democracy International's final observation report can be downloaded at www.democracyinternational.com.
Back to Top
Back to Top
Afghan Guard Kills 2 NATO Troops
VOA News July 9, 2011
Afghan police say a rogue Afghan guard has shot dead two NATO troops and wounded a third in a northern province.
The police chief of Panjshir province, General Qasim Jangalbagh, said the guard opened fired on the NATO soldiers Saturday as they were traveling with a reconstruction convoy in the province. A NATO service member fired back and killed the guard.
NATO has said more than 280 of its service members have died in Afghanistan this year.
The latest shooting of NATO personnel by Afghan forces is one of several that have hindered the war effort in the country. A rogue Afghan solider killed an Australian soldier in late May.
Also Saturday, NATO says Afghan and international forces detained an explosives expert from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, along with one of his associates. The two were detained in Kunduz province during an overnight operation.
NATO also said one of its service members and one civilian working with the alliance died Saturday following an attack in eastern Afghanistan. NATO says it is investigating the incident. \
Back to Top
Back to Top
Afghanistan: The Trouble With The Transition
Commentary July 09, 2011 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty By Muhammad Tahir
“We cannot assume security responsibility for this province.”
The man who said this is General Mohammad Qasim Jangalbagh, the security commander of the Panjshir province of northern Afghanistan. He went on to explain that “because our province is bordered by insecure provinces, we need a huge force.”
This alarming statement completely undercuts the premises of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in the coming year. It wasn’t that long ago – June 22, to be precise – that President Barack Obama announced that U.S. troops would start pulling out of the country before the end of this year. It was doable, he said. After all, “in some provinces and municipalities, we have already begun to transition responsibility for security to the Afghan people.”
U.S. generals, testifying recently before the U.S. Congress, have given all sorts of optimistic data about the progress made in training Afghan security forces. In March, Afghan President Hamid Karzai declared with great fanfare that a select group of seven Afghan districts would soon begin taking over responsibility for their own security. Most of the areas in question were considered to be safe bets, places where the Taliban has the most trouble getting traction.
One of those districts was Panjshir. It is important to understand why.
Panjshir is the birthplace of Ahmad Shah Masood, the heroic Tajik commander who was the most successful opposition commander against the Soviet occupation of the 1980s. That was part of a long local tradition of successful resistance to outsiders.
Panjshir is the only region in the country that never succumbed to Taliban control nor embraced its extreme ideology. Most of Panjshir is a deep valley surrounded by high mountains, and almost its entire population is Tajik. Afghan Tajiks have always been suspicious of the Taliban, who tend to be dominated by members of the Pashtun ethnic group. This has made Panjshir much less vulnerable to Taliban infiltration, and as a result it has almost always been an area that was of least concern to the government in Kabul.
But the local administration’s reluctance to take charge of its own security should come as a wake-up call to the Karzai administration – and its protectors in Washington.
Suddenly Dangerous
Obama’s plan to pull U.S. troops out of the country is based on the assumption that Afghan security forces are prepared to fend for themselves.
America’s allies have accepted that logic. With every passing day, it seems, more members of the international coalition are announcing their own troop withdrawal plans.
Yet Panjshir isn’t the only region that seems to be having problems. Mazar-e Sharif, another one of the regions on Karzai’s handover list, seems to have suddenly become a lot more dangerous.
Mazar had always been considered a relatively peaceful and prosperous place until April 1, when an attack on a UN compound in the city center killed 12 people. That was the first indication that not all is well with the security situation there.
Further signs of trouble emerged last week, when the populist governor of Balkh, the Tajik warlord Atta Mohammad Noor, failed to appear in public during an official visit to Mazar-e Sharif by the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry.
Later, the governor’s spokesperson, Muneer Farhad, shed some light on the governor’s absence, saying that an unspecified threat had prompted the cancellation of all public events on his schedule. “The governor will not attend any event outside his residence or his office,” Farhad announced.
According to the newspaper "Afghanistan Today," these extra security measures appear to be connected with the May 28 assassination of General Mohammad Daud Daud. Daud, whose assassination sent shockwaves through the north, was the police commander of the northern zone of Afghanistan.
Before that killing, Noor often left his compound accompanied by a handful of soldiers. Since then, he no longer goes anywhere without an escort of dozens of vehicle-borne security forces. In many cases, it would seem, he just doesn’t go anywhere at all.
You Call This Safe?
And then there was last week’s insurgent attack on a high-profile Kabul hotel that resulted in the deaths of 10 civilians and two police officers. The fight went on for several hours after Afghan police fled the scene and ended only when coalition forces intervened with a helicopter gunship. The sheer audacity of the attack on the heavily guarded hotel sent shockwaves through the Afghan capital and left many Afghans wondering how their troops can be expected to take charge of the country so soon.
Kabul, Panjsher, and Mazar-e Sharif are the towns with the safest security records in Afghanistan. If things are this bad there, the situation in the rest of the country can only be described as frightening. Elsewhere in Afghanistan, suicide attacks, jail breaks, and militant attacks on security posts are regular occurrences.
To add insult to injury, "Afghanistan Today" reported this week that, in the eastern province of Paktika, around 80 percent of administrative posts are vacant. This might seem odd, given the sky-high unemployment rates around the nation. According to the report, it is fear of the Taliban that keeps educated professionals from working for the government.
When 10,000 U.S. troops and thousands of British and French forces start leaving Afghanistan this month, what will they be leaving behind?
A fragile country with major security concerns. A country where insurgent militias run rampant and are not willing to sit down with the government for talks. A country where people face huge economic and social problems, where corruption and lawlessness remain a challenge, institutions are weak, and the authority of the central government extends only to a few areas.
After 10 years of engagement, the international community seems ready to leave at any cost, and Karzai seems happy to go along with them. The president wants to prove his leadership and show that he is the sole leader of the nation, so he is happy that international troops are leaving the country.
It is equally understandable that the international community wants to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible. Yet a precipitous withdrawal could wipe out all the gains for which so many coalition soldiers have sacrificed their lives.
Muhammad Tahir is a Washington correspondent for RFE/RL and former correspondent of the IHA Turkish News Agency in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL
Back to Top
Back to Top
Suicide bombing attack against police in Afghanistan, bomber killed, 9 injured
By Abdul Haleem, Zhang Jianhua
KABUL, July 9 (Xinhua) -- In the latest waves of insurgency against government interests in Afghanistan, nine civilians sustained injuries and a suicide bomber was killed as anti- government militants launched twin attacks against police in Taliban-hotbed the troubled southern region on Saturday, officials confirmed.
The first attack, conducted in the shape of remote-controlled bomb blast against police in Helmand's provincial capital Lashkar Gah, 555 km south of capital city Kabul, the explosive device was planted inside a police check point and went off at 06:30 a.m. ( 0200 GMT) causing no loss of life, a press release of Helmand provincial administration said.
Meantime, spokesman for Helmand's provincial government Daud Ahmadi in talks with Xinhua contended that no police or civilian were injured in the blast since the explosion took place before morning rush hour.
Although Taliban outfit as the main armed opposition group is active in parts of Helmand and the neighboring Zabul, Kandahar and Uruzgan provinces, no group has claimed responsibility for the attack so far.
Lashkar Gah city is among seven areas where Afghan security forces are to take full security control from NATO-led forces later this month.
In the second attack conducted in a span of three hours, also against police in the southern region, a suicide bomber riding a motorbike detonated his explosive device in Zabul province 340 km south of Afghan injuring nine non-combatants.
"A suicide bomber riding a motorbike blew his explosive device up next to police in Qalat city the capital of Zabul province at around 09:30 a.m. local time (0500 GMT) leaving nine civilians injured," Interior Ministry said in a statement released here in Afghan capital Kabul.
A 10-year-old child is also among those received injuries in the blast, the statement further said.
The suicide bomber was also killed in the blast, police said.
Deputy to Zabul's provincial administration Mohammad Jan Rasoulyar in talks with Xinhua said the blast happened when provincial police chief Mohammad Nabi Ilham was on way to office.
However, he insisted that the police chief Ilham escaped unhurt and all the nine people, all innocent passers-by, received injuries due to the suicide blast.
Meantime, Taliban outfit fighting Afghan and NATO-led troops based in Afghanistan have yet to make comment.
Back to Top
Back to Top
Instead of Exiting Afghanistan, it's Time to Re-Engage
Huffington Post By Glen Pearson 08/07/2011
A few days ago I spoke with a highly placed individual in the Canadian Department of Defence who made the following troubling observation: "Glen, with the drawing down of Canadian forces out of Afghanistan, it will be inevitable that long-term development will follow suit. Nothing can be done about it."
One supposes it was inevitable that the Canadian war effort would come down to this kind of "zero-sum" logic. At one point there were 150,000 foreign troops from 47 countries deployed in the Afghan conflict, with the Canadian component adding up to roughly 3,000 personnel. Yet what had began as an all-out effort to remove the Taliban has evolved into a complex maze of counterinsurgency -- all of this occurring amid the backdrop of tens of thousands killed.
It's hard to believe that billions upon billions of dollars have been poured into a country that some are now assuming will become more devoid of the effective delivery of aid. This has been standard reasoning because Western leaders have repeatedly justified military intervention as a means for providing security for community-building development efforts. Perhaps it's time we revisited that construct.
We continue to underestimate the desire of the Afghan people to rid themselves of the rigors and punishments of the Taliban movement. A reduction in the number of security forces will surely have a negative impact, yet the people themselves still desire schooling for their children, along with medical institutions, clean water, and a women's institute for the training of female leaders with promise.
One example of how to break out of the "no development without security" paradigm is the concept of "Community-Driven Reconstruction" -- a promising new model for conflict areas like Afghanistan. In his book Adapt, author Tim Harford writes of a partnership between development researchers and the International Rescue Committee. It works like this. A non-governmental organization persuades a local community to form a community democratic council, elected by citizens, whose job it is to prioritize and assist in overseeing needed projects in its region, as well as watching out for corruption which they could spot far more easily than any aid worker.
In Liberia, for instance, grants of up to $17,000 (US) were secured if the councils were successful. Such a sum represented hundreds of times the annual income of the average Liberian. It was a gambit that paid off.
A key innovation in this approach was the villages were offered five dollars along with a choice: they could keep all of it for family needs or they could contribute some or all to the overall community requirements. And here was the kicker: for every dollar they donated, the village would receive twice or five times as much. To everyone's surprise (it was a field test after all), 60 per cent of the participants gave up everything -- a remarkable development that spoke to the generosity of the local people despite their own personal needs.
This model has been so successful that the World Bank has already donated some $2 billion (US) to its ongoing evolution since 2003. Liberia had been one of Africa's more war-torn regions -- a lesson that has now prompted partners to begin a similar process in conflict-ridden Congo.
All this has implications for Afghanistan and the Canadian effort, perhaps the most important being that such an arrangement can work with or without security forces. It empowers communities in stressed environments to take charge of their own fate through targeted investments not just in the communities themselves, but by unleashing the sacrificial and generous impulses of the people themselves.
Canadian troops pulling out should never cause this country to close the doors to what Canadian NGOs and the government's Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) can accomplish. A difficult and complex chapter of our history is drawing to a close, but the relationships established with Afghan civilians and communities for over a decade mustn't be severed but rather evolve into more long-term partnerships that can defy war and thrive in peace because of the noble aspirations of the Afghans themselves. Our participation in war is ending; our commitment to peace and development is now presented with new and exciting opportunities.
Back to Top
Back to Top
Night Raids Curbing Taliban, but Afghans Cite Civilian Toll
New York Times By CARLOTTA GALL July 8, 2011
KABUL, Afghanistan - United States Special Operations forces have carried out an extraordinary number of night raids over the past year, turning them into one of their most effective tools against the insurgents even as they stir accusations of abuse, resentment among Afghans and divisions with the government.
Last year’s influx of coalition forces brought with it the kind of intelligence and surveillance that have enhanced the military’s ability to conduct the night raids, which now average 300 a month, NATO and Afghan officials said. Hundreds of people have been killed and thousands detained in the raids over the past 18 months, they said.
There is no doubt that the raids have been devastating to the Taliban insurgency. Afghan officials and community elders in almost every frontline province say that known Taliban commanders and even whole groups of fighters have been killed or captured, and that the raids have forced the Taliban to operate in smaller cells and have shrunk their capacity.
Military officials say the campaign has disrupted whole insurgent networks in rural districts and along infiltration routes, thereby reducing large-scale attacks in the cities.
“Those night raids have broken the back of the Taliban,” said Abdul Satar Mirzokhel, deputy governor of Helmand Province for three years until this spring. “Most of their targets were very precise, aimed at the right people in the right places. If there were mistakes, they were very few.”
Yet complaints from Afghans persist about the raids, which are almost invariably carried out under a veil of secrecy by Special Operations forces, often accompanied by Afghan commandos. The raids remain one of the greatest sources of contention with President Hamid Karzai, who has shown growing signs of distress over their use and has repeatedly called for them to end.
Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, has defended the raids in sometimes heated exchanges with Mr. Karzai. In May, apparently in recognition of the anger the raids had provoked, General Petraeus ordered reviews of all tactical guidance for coalition troops and the causes of civilian casualties, and later of the conduct of night operations.
But neither General Petraeus, who has overseen a steep increase in the use of the raids since taking command about a year ago, nor his successor is unlikely to slow the pace of the raids. If anything, the military’s dependence on the night raids, which use relatively small teams of Special Forces, may only increase as the United States reduces its troops over the next three years.
Accounts of the raids from the military and Afghan civilians often differ widely. In one example, family members and an Afghan investigator said that two clerics were among eight civilians killed in a raid last November by American Special Operations forces in Mian, a village in a remote district of the southern province of Kandahar.
Muhammad Younus, 60, said in an interview that he was so badly beaten by American soldiers that he could not walk for 20 days. Villagers carried him out in a wheelbarrow and took him the next morning to see the bodies of his two brothers, the clerics: Maulavi Abdul Kabir, 72, and Maulavi Abdul Rauf, 65.
They had been burned so badly, they were barely recognizable, and they bore bullet wounds, he said.
Lt. Cmdr. Ron Flesvig, a spokesman for the International Security Assistance Force, confirmed the raid and that eight people had been killed. He forwarded comments from the Special Operations public affairs office, dismissing the allegations as “unfounded and without merit.”
An investigation “was unable to locate anyone who could or would provide a name of any civilian alleged to have been wounded or killed during the operation,” the public affairs office statement said.
The American forces’ actions in Mian over a 24-hour period nonetheless incensed the wider community and raised questions about the veracity of the military’s reporting.
Military officials say that they get their target 80 percent of the time, and that less than 1 percent of the raids lead to civilian casualties. Yet there is no way to independently verify those figures, since the raids are conducted in great secrecy and are underreported. Any investigations by the military into the raids are not made public.
The United Nations examined a number of night raids from 2010 in four districts in Kandahar, where the insurgency was intense. Elders and local Afghans said the raids were generally precise and caused fewer civilian casualties than before, according to Georgette Gagnon, director of the human rights unit of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan.
But the mission also noted in its 2010 annual report that “excessive use of force, ill treatment, death and injury to civilians and damage to property has occurred in some cases involving Special Forces.”
The method of the raids, especially the forced entry of houses and invasion of women’s quarters, let alone killing of women, is deeply offensive culturally to Afghans. Although coalition forces say most raids are conducted using a “soft knock” — calling by loudspeaker for people to come out — there are still numerous accounts of forced entry and cases of men being shot in their beds next to their wives.
The raids and attendant sweeping arrests have become the primary complaint of rural communities, human rights officials say. When Lt. Col. Aziz Ahmad took up a new job as police chief of Shah Joy District in the southeastern province of Zabul, townspeople asked immediately what he could do to stop the night raids.
Just two weeks earlier American forces had raided the house of a Taliban member at night and killed him and his wife, leaving four small children alone. “We are trying to find relatives to take care of them,” the police chief said.
“It turns people against the government and the foreign forces,” he said.
Erica Gaston of the Open Society Institute, who is compiling a new report on night raids, said that while in general night raids had become more accurate, and that the conduct of forces had improved, she still encountered cases of unarmed people being shot in the head, or being shot when doing things like picking up a cellphone, running away or rushing to help a wounded relative.
“People in the villages are more scared of the Americans than of the Taliban because of these raids,” said Gul Badshah Majidi, a legislator from the eastern province of Paktia. In Zabul Province, to the south, the Afghan Army commander, Gen. Jamaluddin Sayed, said that one of the reasons villagers were joining the local police program was not just to keep the Taliban out, but also to prevent raids on their houses.
NATO officials have dismissed many of the allegations from Afghans as Taliban propaganda. They cite cases of Taliban members ordering local elders to call officials and even President Karzai with fictitious reports of civilian casualties.
But the military is intent on mitigating political fallout and training Afghans to take over leadership of the raids.
The task of reviewing the raids and civilian casualties was given to Maj. Gen. John W. Nicholson, deputy chief of staff for operations in Afghanistan, who said that coalition forces were already revising procedures and retraining troops. On night operations they are now using Afghan soldiers to call people out of their homes, and female soldiers to safeguard women and children, he said.
There was no sign of such practices during the raid by Special Operations forces and Afghan forces in late November in Mian.
The American and Afghan forces arrived by helicopters at 11 p.m. and stayed for 24 hours, detaining all the men in one house and interrogating and beating a number of them, people in the village said.
“Before they asked me a question, they started kicking and beating me,” Mr. Younus, the 60-year-old, said, adding that Americans did the beating and interrogation.
Mr. Younus, a diabetic who walks with a cane, said he was beaten on and off through the night and fainted four times. “Don’t tell us about your sickness, we are going to kill you and your brothers and destroy your houses,” he recalls being told through a translator.
An adviser minister to President Karzai on tribal affairs, Muhammad Siddique Aziz, who headed the Afghan investigation into the episode, said that none of those killed had been Taliban and that he had had bitter discussions with an American Special Forces general over his findings.
“We told him that the activities you are doing are not in the interest of you nor of the Karzai government,” he said. “Whoever did this raid, why do they have to kill people? Why did they not just arrest them?”
Back to Top
Back to Top
Panetta: Strategic Defeat Of Al-Qaeda Within Reach
July 9, 2011 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta says the "strategic defeat" of Al-Qaeda is "within reach."
Panetta made the statement today as he arrived on a surprise visit to Afghanistan.
He told reporters in Kabul "the key is that, having gotten [Osama] bin Laden, we've now identified some of the key leadership within Al-Qaeda, both in Pakistan as well as in Yemen and other areas."
He added, "If we can be successful at going after them, I think we can really undermine their ability to do any kind of planning."
Panetta, who took office on July 1 to replace Robert Gates, arrived in Kabul for a trip that will include talks with President Hamid Karzai over the transition of some NATO-held areas to Afghan control starting in mid-July.
compiled from agency reports
Back to Top
Back to Top
Afghan, Pakistan forces agree on more border talks
July 9, 2011
KABUL — (AFP) - Military officials from Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to hold more high-level talks to defuse a row over a series of attacks across their porous border, the Afghan defence ministry said Saturday.
Officials from both militaries and from the United States met Thursday in the northwest Pakistani city of Peshawar to discuss a spike in tensions on the lawless border that has allegedly killed dozens of villagers in recent weeks.
Afghan and Pakistani delegations agreed to do what they could "to stop and prevent repetition of the attacks, and to pave the ground for further strengthening of mutual, friendly relations" said ministry spokesman Mohammad Zahir Azimi in a statement.
"There should be more coordination and high level talks between the authorities of the two countries to seek solutions for the present problems and future issues," he said.
".... Higher delegations will hold talks with each other in the near future."
On Friday the Pakistan army said it had proposed a hotline to create one single point of contact with all Afghan security forces, including the border police.
Regular meetings between commanders from both sides would also take place to diffuse tensions, along with interaction between tribal elders.
The escalating border war has inflamed tensions at a key juncture as Afghans and Americans reach out to the Taliban for peace talks.
For weeks, security forces on both sides of the unmarked border have issued claim and counter-claim over cross-border rocket and guerilla attacks that have reportedly killed dozens of residents and forced hundreds of others to flee.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has told Pakistan's army chief Ashfaq Kayani the attacks must stop, while the Pakistanis summoned the Afghan ambassador and Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani has complained back to Karzai.
For years the neighbours have traded accusations over the Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants embedded in both countries, who criss cross the porous, unmarked border and fight security forces from both governments.
The row is exacerbated by the fact that Afghanistan disputes the 2,400-kilometre (1,500-mile) Durrand Line, the 19th century demarcation of the border that separates Pashtun families and tribes.
Back to Top
Back to Top
A Political Solution to the Afghan War
By Daniel Serwer The Atlantic Jul 7 2011, 7:00 AM ET4
The U.S. wants a negotiated peace with the Taliban. Here are the issues we'll face, and how they might be resolved
The timeline for U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is now clear: 10,000 troops out by the end of this year and 23,000 more out by the end of next summer. That will leave 67,000 troops, who, if all goes according to plan, will be withdrawn before the end of 2014, with a possible residual assistance force of unspecified size thereafter. That solves the military equation. But what about the political formula? How will Afghanistan be governed after we leave? Will it remain under its current constitution? What role will there be for the Taliban? How will power be shared between Kabul and the provinces? How about the most troublesome neighbor, Pakistan? What will its role be? And what can the United States do to make the answers these questions come out in a direction that does as little harm to our interests as possible?
President Obama in his withdrawal announcement last month was remarkably silent on these issues. While clear as usual that our primary interest in Afghanistan is to defeat Al Qaeda, on governance in Afghanistan he said only that it won't be "perfect." That is not much guidance for our diplomats and aid workers, who are looking ahead to an end-of-year international conference in Bonn expected to set the course for our coalition partners as well as the Afghans for the three years then remaining before completion of the withdrawal process.
The governments of Europe and of other coalition partners want to see political reconciliation, which has become a popular notion in the U.S. as well. Retiring Defense Secretary Robert Gates suggested that the end of this year is a reasonable timeframe for negotiations with the Taliban to begin yielding results. What can we hope for by way of a political settlement? What are the options? President Obama, in his June announcement on Afghanistan, reiterated his goals for reconciliation negotiations with the Taliban: they must break with Al Qaeda, foreswear violence, and accept the Afghan constitution. The insurgent leaderships -- most importantly the Haqqani network and Mullah Omar's Taliban Quetta Shura -- show little sign of feeling compelled to comply. A few days after the speech, and presumably in response, Taliban members attacked the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, targeting Afghan politicians gathered to discuss the impending turnover of security responsibility for Kabul and several provinces to the Afghan National Security Forces. It's clear that at least some of the Taliban will fight on for a long time, as insurgents in Iraq have done.
Some Taliban, however, may want a deal, and the German government has been hosting talks aimed at one. What might the Taliban hope to get in return for meeting something like the President's redlines? So far, the focus seems to have been on confidence-building measures like freeing prisoners and removing Taliban from terrorist lists. Washington does not like to discuss it, but an overall political settlement will only be possible if the Taliban get something more substantial in return for whatever we get.
The options are few (and not mutually exclusive): a share of political power in Kabul, control over territory, economic benefits, and guarantees of U.S. withdrawal.
Sharing political power in Kabul is not an easy fix. The Taliban fought a ferocious civil war against Northern Alliance and other politicians who today govern in Kabul, having thrown the Taliban out of Kabul with U.S. assistance in 2001. The Islamist Taliban would want to reintroduce their version of strict religious practices, a move many in Kabul would resist. Northern Alliance, many women, secularists, and others would not want to see the Taliban back in power in Kabul. Former presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah and former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh have become the leaders of this rejectionist front. It won't be enough for the U.S. to approve Taliban political involvement -- these Afghan groups would also need to go along.
Another option would be sharing power at the provincial level, especially in the more Pashtun provinces of the south and east. Afghanistan has only rarely been effectively ruled from Kabul. The Taliban could dominate politics in Helmand, Kandahar, and other provinces along the border with Pakistan, thus allowing the group its long-desired role in government without handing over all of Afghanistan. This could, however, lead to a virtual partition of the country, with the Taliban-dominated provinces becoming a de facto part of Pakistan. Some might even say this is good: it would give Pakistan the strategic depth it seeks in Afghanistan -- reducing its incentives to continue meddling and promoting militancy -- and prevent New Delhi from exploiting its relationship with Kabul to the detriment of Islamabad, at least in the border provinces.
There are only three economic assets of real value in Afghanistan: control over drug production and trade, control over mineral resources, and control of border crossings and transport. The Taliban already exercise a good deal of control over all three in parts of the countryside where they are dominant. We are not likely to gain enough control over drugs to interest the Taliban, who know we would not want to return any control we do gain to them. Mineral resources, to be effectively exploited, require a national mining and export framework and guarantees to foreign investors that only the government in Kabul can provide. If Afghanistan is to prosper, border crossings and transport will also need to be mainly under national control.
Finally, the Taliban have sought withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. This is a problem. President Karzai has made it clear that he would like one or more American bases to remain in Afghanistan after 2014, and talks have begun on a strategic framework that would enable American forces to stay, provided the Afghan government asks them to do so. Washington wants such bases so that it will have the capability to strike against Al Qaeda, either in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The Taliban will fear that the Americans will use any residual presence to strike them as well as to shore up Karzai's government.
Bottom line: the Taliban may well feel that they can get more by fighting on than by negotiating, but if they get serious about negotiations they will likely seek a share of power in the south and east, along with some representation in Kabul. Political power is likely to bring some economic benefits as well, in particular control over border crossings and transport. The Taliban would also continue to control at least some drug production and trade where they are politically dominant.
This is an unattractive proposition, especially to Afghan women and the Northern Alliance. It would most likely resemble Hizbollah's role in Lebanon, which has been a source of regional instability in the Middle East for many years. Is there anything that could be done that would amount to more than putting lipstick on this pig?
The answer is "yes," but it requires the United States to worry about something it has studiously ignored for many years: the Durand line, which is the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan that Afghanistan accepts but Pakistan has not.
I don't know of any two countries without an agreed and demarcated border that live happily side by side. When I called on a national security advisor in Kabul years ago and asked why Afghanistan had not recognized the Durand line, he responded: "I wouldn't want to foreclose options for future generations." Pakistan is a country that lives with what it considers an "existential" threat from India to the south and east. It surely does not need another threat, however remote, on its western border. Ethnic Pashtun irredentism -- the Pashtuns live on both sides of the Durand line -- greatly complicates Islamabad's challenges.
Afghan recognition of the Durand line as part of a broader deal with the Taliban would provide Pakistan with an important benefit, without depriving it of "strategic depth" inside Afghanistan. This would have to be done in a way that allows a good deal of free movement across the border, since otherwise the Taliban and other locals, who have enjoyed relatively free movement for decades, would object. But agreeing to and demarcating the Durand line would markedly improve relations between Kabul and Islamabad, enabling them to collaborate on what really counts for the United States: ensuring that their border area does not become a haven for international terrorists.
Back to Top
Back to Top
ACCI Urges End of Trade Relations with Pakistan
Tolo news July 9, 2011
Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (ACCI) on Saturday asked all the Afghan merchants to end their trade relations with Pakistan.
Officials said although they have signed the transit agreement with Pakistan, but challenges for Afghan merchants have been doubled.
ACCI have also asked the Afghan government to retaliate and to ban Pakistan's transit convoys to Central Asia.
Deputy for ACCI, Khan Jan Alokozai, said that Pakistan refuses to respect the transit agreement which was signed between the two countries and has stopped Afghanistan's trade convoys for no acceptable reason.
"We urge the government to retaliate to Pakistan so that Pakistani merchants and private sectors also face some challenges. At least do not use your enemies' products." Mr Alokozai said.
Meanwhile, Afghan Exports Union accused the Afghan government for not paying attention to act upon transit agreement and making facilities to Afghan merchants.
"Today I want to submit the licence, it depends on you, whether you want to convey it to Parliament or Ministers' Council," a representative for Afghan Exports Union, Hajji Asan, said.
ACCI said besides those trade containers that were stopped by Pakistan before signing the transit agreement, now Pakistan has stopped another 5000 containers, and Afghan merchants will face a loss of around 500,000 dollars every day.
Back to Top
Back to Top
Tribal skirmish threatens broader coalition campaign in Afghanistan
ByMartin Kuz Stars and Stripes July 8, 2011
NARAI, Afghanistan — The kidnappers made a demand of their captive that was at once straightforward and impossible to fulfill: return control of the district of Ghaziabad in northeastern Kunar province to neighboring Nuristan province.
“Ghaziabad belongs to us,” one man said.
Musafir Khan Qayumzai, the district governor of Ghaziabad, could do little more than listen. On the evening of July 1, as he rode home from work with his son, son-in-law, two bodyguards and a driver, a band of a dozen or more men had stopped their car at gunpoint and ordered them to step out.
The hostages were driven to a mud-brick building on the outskirts of the village of Ghaziabad, the district center. One of the captors did most of the talking and told Qayumzai to stop cooperating with U.S. forces in the area.
“We will take Ghaziabad back if it is not given,” he said.
Qayumzai recalled his ordeal during an interview Friday at Forward Operating Base Bostick, located in the eastern Kunar village of Narai about 10 miles west of the Pakistan border. He had arrived at the base a few days earlier to recover from a gunshot wound to the big toe on his left foot.
Accounts vary as to how and when he and the others regained their freedom and the circumstances of his injury. What appears less ambiguous is that as the U.S. military seeks to fortify its presence in Kunar and other eastern provinces this summer to restrict the flow of insurgents from Pakistan, small border clashes inside Afghanistan threaten to complicate that broader campaign.
“You have some differences between the provinces and between tribes,” said Lt. Col. Dan Wilson. He commands Task Force No Fear, the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 25th Infantry Division based at FOB Bostick. “That can make for difficult situations.”
Tribes loyal to Nuristan live on both sides of the disputed Nuristan-Kunar border, and some elders believe that Nuristan holds a historical claim to Ghaziabad.
The internecine fracas has ensnared the 50-year-old Qayumzai as he tries to work with the Army task force to build a cell phone tower in his village.
“Ghaziabad is part of Kunar, and there are people who don’t like that,” he said through an interpreter.
The district governor, who has dark eyes, a salt-and-pepper beard and a genteel manner, talked shortly before flying home from Bostick, where he received treatment for his wound.
Qayumzai claimed his son and the others were released soon after the abduction occurred, and that he escaped from his captors a night later, fleeing on foot amid gunfire.
“They shot at me and one (bullet) hit me,” he said. A purple bandage was wrapped around his toe. “But I was able to hide by a house and they went the other way.”
Kunar officials have offered a different story, saying the six men were freed as a result of tribal negotiations. Wilson theorized that one of the kidnappers may have shot Qayumzai in the foot to emphasize the demand for Kunar to cede Ghaziabad to Nuristan.
Yet Wilson doesn’t regard the provincial border quarrel as unsolvable.
“Afghans can have a blood feud for 200 years, but even during that time, they’ll talk to each other,” he said. “Then one day they negotiate a settlement.”
Qayumzai stayed in an air-conditioned room at Bostick that included a flat-screen TV, microwave and a small refrigerator, and some U.S. soldiers speculated that the amenities made him reluctant to leave. When Wilson dropped by to bid farewell, Qayumzai offered thanks while clutching his hands to his heart.
Later, he boarded a helicopter for his return to Ghaziabad, and as the chopper lifted off, Wilson mentioned that, due to Qayumzai’s recent absence, the Afghan government might appoint another district governor.
Either way, and regardless of which province claims Ghaziabad, Wilson takes a pragmatic view of the work his unit faces this summer.
“If he’s the governor, I’ll work with him; if it’s another guy, I’ll work with him,” Wilson said. “What’s important is that we try to make progress.”
E-mail: kuzm@estripes.osd.mil
Back to Top
Back to Top
U.S.-Pakistan relations sink to new low
The Globe and mail By PAUL KORING Friday, Jul. 08, 2011
WASHINGTON - Just when it seemed already frayed Pakistani-American relations couldn’t get any worse, the Obama administration’s top soldier publicly accused Pakistan’s powerful security agency of murdering a journalist who dared to probe the Islamabad government’s murky dealings.
After nasty spats over gun-happy CIA agents killing Pakistani pedestrians, the humiliating American attack deep inside Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden and a long-running duplicitous game over assassination strikes by U.S. Predator drones, the latest sniping takes relations to a new low.
Admiral Mike Mullen’s accusation was stunning – not for what he said, the brutal murder of the crusading Pakistani journalist was widely blamed on the nation’s notorious and bloodstained Inter-Service Intelligence agents – but because the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said it so plainly and publicly.
Syed Saleem Shahzad’s disappearance, torture and murder was only the latest in a long series of “accidents” that have befallen those who probed into the dark corners of the ISI.
The torture and murder “was sanctioned by the government,” Adm. Mullen told the Pentagon Press Association at an on-the-record luncheon, although he said he had no evidence trail that implicated the ISI. As a veteran Beltway warrior, there can be no doubt Adm. Mullen knew exactly the sort of diplomatic damage his bombshell would cause.
The admiral didn’t stop there. He suggested the killing was part of a pattern and added that Pakistan was continuing “to, quite frankly, spiral in the wrong direction.”
Not surprising, Pakistan, supposedly America’s key ally in the war against violent Islamic extremism in the region, responded with barely suppressed outrage.
Information Minister Firdous Ashiq Awan denounced Adm. Mullen’s comments as “extremely irresponsible and unfortunate,” adding America’s most senior military commander was creating “problems and difficulties for the bilateral relations between Pakistan and America” and would damage the joint campaign against al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders believed hiding in Pakistan.
There is growing disquiet in Washington that it may not be too hard to hide in Pakistan where – it is widely believed – at least some elements of the ISI maintain close links with radical Islamic groups.
That view was reinforced by the U.S. raid that killed al-Qaeda’s paramount leader, who had been living comfortably – if not quite openly – in the Pakistani military garrison town of Abbottabad at a compound barely a rifle shot from the nation’s elite army officer academy.
Pakistan insisted it had no clue that Mr. bin Laden had been living less than an hour’s drive from Islamabad for five years.
After the raid, Islamabad kicked hundreds of U.S. military trainers out of the country, just as it kicked out an unspecified number of covert U.S. intelligence agents after one of them killed a pair of Pakistan citizens in Lahore earlier this year.
Pakistan also halted U.S. drone flights from air bases inside the country – although the missile-firing Predators and Reapers continue to fly from Kandahar in Afghanistan to target Taliban and al-Qaeda suspects.
Adm. Mullen, who steps down this summer after four years and spent much of that time trying to foster and develop a working alliance with Pakistan’s military, admits the relationship is a mess. “We’ve been through a very, very rough time,” he said. “We are committed to sustaining that relationship because we think it’s vital to the region and, actually, globally. But we recognize that it’s under great stress right now.”
In Pakistan, anti-American feeling runs high. The drone attacks and rumours of CIA agents and huge convoys of war materiel rolling toward Afghanistan only feed a larger fear.
U.S. President Barack Obama has said he views Afghanistan-Pakistan as a single theatre in the struggle against Islamic terrorism and has pledged to concentrate on what he calls “the right war.”
But the President’s recent decision to hasten the troop pullout from Afghanistan has rekindled fears in Pakistan that – once again – it will be left to cope with armed radical groups, as happened when the United States abandoned the region after the Soviets were driven out in the late 1980s.
Radical groups have already staged daring attacks on Pakistani military installations – including burning aircraft at an air force base in Karachi and storming the high command’s headquarters compound.
Although U.S. officials say they accept the assurance that Pakistan’s 100-plus arsenal of nuclear warheads is safe from internal attack or theft, that remains the nightmare scenario.
Back to Top
Disclaimer:
This news site is mostly a compilation of publicly accessible articles
on the Web in the form of a link or saved news item. The news articles
and commentaries/editorials are protected under international copyright
laws. All credit goes to the original respective source(s).