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Taliban peace talks come to a halt
Asia Times By Syed Saleem Shahzad 31/10/2010
Efforts to begin a process of reconciliation with the Taliban have completely failed as Washington has refused to give any of the guarantees demanded by the Taliban as a prerequisite to sitting at the negotiation table, a Taliban representative has told Asia Times Online.
Eight armed militants join gov't in N Afghanistan
PUL-E-KHUMRI, Afghanistan, Oct. 31 (Xinhua) -- Police in northern Baghlan province say that eight Taliban militants laid down arms and resumed normal life on Sunday.
15 militants lay down arms in W. Afghanistan
HERAT, Afghanistan, Oct. 31 (Xinhua) -- Fifteen Taliban insurgents laid down arms and joined government in the western Herat province on Sunday, provincial governor Mohammad Daud Saba said. "A 15-member group armed anti-government militants handed over their arms to authorities in Pashtun Zarghon district today and vowed to defend peace in the country," Saba told newsmen at a press conference.
NATO confirms killing Taliban senior commander in S Afghanistan
KABUL, Oct. 31 (Xinhua) -- The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on Sunday confirmed eliminating a senior Taliban commander in south Afghanistan.
Senators Warn of Bad Consequences of Nato-Russia Raid
October 31, 2010 Tolo news
Some Afghan senators urged the Afghan government to react seriously against the joint Nato-Russia attack and warned of bad consequences of the operation
Russia confounded over Afghan reaction on anti-drug operation
MOSCOW, Oct. 31 (Xinhua) -- Russia's federal anti-drug service (FSKN) has been puzzled by reactions from the Afghan authorities concerning the recent international anti-drug operation conducted in Afghanistan, the Itar-Tass news agency reported Sunday.
The looming challenges in Pak-U.S. relations
By Wajahat Ali, October 29, 2010 Friday, October 29, 2010 – Foreign policy
To mark the end of the United States-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue talks last Friday, the Obama administration announced a $2 billion military aid package for Islamabad, the culmination of a negotiation process institutionalized in recent years by the two countries to broaden and strengthen their relationship.
India in Afghanistan, part I: strategic interests, regional concerns
BY CHRISTINE FAIR, OCTOBER 26, 2010 - – Foreign policy
India's profile in Afghanistan has been a quiet but looming concern for New Delhi, Washington, Brussels and of course Islamabad with all wondering what is the optimal role for India in Afghanistan's reconstruction in light of the enduring security competition between India and Pakistan.
India in Afghanistan, part II: Indo-U.S. relations in the lengthening AfPak shadow
By Christine Fair, October 27, 2010 _ – Foreign policy
Despite deepening security threats from both the Taliban and other Pakistan-based proxies operating against Indian personnel and institutions in Afghanistan, thus far India has remained committed to staying in Afghanistan. India has its own concerns about the ultimate settlement in Afghanistan
ANALYSIS: Is Orakzai Agency cleared of the Taliban? —Farhat Taj
– Foreign policy - The IDPs say that both the Taliban and the Pakistan Army have bombed their empty houses in Orakzai. The authorities are now handing them tents so that they go back and erect tents on the sites of their bombed out homes
How is Pakistan doing?
Ashraf Jehangir Qazi – Opinion – The News Int. (Pak)
How is Pakistan doing? What are the facts? Pakistan has a population of around 180 million which has trebled over the past 50 years and is slated to grow by another 85 million in the next 20 years, making it roughly 265 million – equivalent to adding five more Karachis! In another twenty years
UNHCR suspends Afghans' repatriation from Pakistan
ISLAMABAD, Oct. 31 (Xinhua) -- The UN refugee agency Sunday said it has suspended repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan.
An Afghan Minister to be Brought to Justice
October 31, 2010 Tolo news
A top official in Afghan Attorney General's Office said Sunday that the former transportation minister will be introduced to ministers' special court in three days
Smooth transition will be key to bringing troops home from Afghanistan
CNN International By Barbara Starr, October 31, 2010
Kabul, Afghanistan - They call it "Inteqal" -- it means "transition" in both Dari and Pashtu, according to NATO -- but going down that road is a bit slower than first expected. Still, succeeding at Inteqal will be the road home for U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
Memoirs, mistakes converge as CIA promises reform
Spies-turned-authors say the agency's admitted 'systemic failures' in an Afghanistan suicide attack prove their allegations of myriad problems. But one veteran is being sued over his unapproved book.
Los Angeles Times By Ken Dilanian October 30, 2010
Reporting from Washington - When CIA Director Leon Panetta gathered reporters recently to discuss mistakes that allowed a suicide bomber to kill seven personnel in Afghanistan, he didn't mention a separate disclosure the agency made that day: that it had sued a retired officer who wrote an unapproved memoir.
Khadr 'scared' of jail rape threat
Guantanamo's youngest prisoner tells military tribunal that interrogators warned he could face gang rape.
Al Jazeera October 30, 2010
A young Canadian held in Guantanamo Bay has spoken about his fears after his US captors threatened him with gang rape and death while quizzing him over his suspected involvement with al-Qaeda.
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Taliban peace talks come to a halt
Asia Times By Syed Saleem Shahzad 31/10/2010
Efforts to begin a process of reconciliation with the Taliban have completely failed as Washington has refused to give any of the guarantees demanded by the Taliban as a prerequisite to sitting at the negotiation table, a Taliban representative has told Asia Times Online.
Should the breakdown prove permanent, the coming year promises to be a very tough one in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan's tribal areas, home to militants and al-Qaeda.
The recent strategic dialogue between the United States and Pakistan that renewed a US$2 billion five-year security assistance package for the Pakistani army is aimed specifically at effectively fighting against al-Qaeda bases situated in the tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The al-Qaeda response, Asia Times Online has learned, will be to activate sleeper cells around the world, orchestrated by a fresh team in place in border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Talks fall flat The moves towards reconciliation with the Taliban began in late 2008. Saudi Arabia was named in the Western media as the main component of the process; it invited some former Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan members for dinner during the annual hajj (pilgrimage).
This became the first regular process of indirect American and Taliban interaction, with messages conveyed through various third parties. Interestingly, this period saw the beginning of the US's stepped-up drone war against al-Qaeda's sanctuaries in the tribal areas, with almost daily missile strikes, especially in North Waziristan.
By this October, at least two dozen important al-Qaeda members had been killed, as well as a sizeable number of newly recruited and trained European nationals. Regional franchises of al-Qaeda, including the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban), also suffered losses, as did the Uzbek militia.
Extensive spy networks in the tribal areas ensured that the Americans fully understood the dynamics of al-Qaeda and the ground situation in North Waziristan. A case in point is Nasrullah Khan, a former member of the Laskhar-e-Taiba jihadi group who joined forces with Ilyas Kashmiri's al-Qaeda-linked 313 Brigade.
Before the beginning of the Commonwealth Games that ended on October 14 in Delhi, Khan had been selected to head a unit of the brigade to carry out an operation against the Games.
However, on September 20, he and five other men were killed in a drone attack in the town of Mir Ali in North Waziristan. Khan had an extensive network of operatives in India and Indian-administered Kashmir and his death disrupted the ground operations in India to such an extent that no operation could be undertaken.
Similar drone missile attacks in September and October brought al-Qaeda's European operational branches in North Waziristan to a halt.
Even as death was raining from the skies in the tribal areas, the peace process with the Taliban was gathering pace, with fresh overtures in August. For the first time, all parties noted some flexibility in the Taliban's approach, and it appeared they would at least sit down for negotiations with the Americans or with the Afghan government.
The process drew on all international players to solicit the student militia to resolve the nearly 10-year conflict. (See Taliban soften as talks gain speed Asia Times Online, September 15, 2010.) To establish rapport with the Taliban and further the process of dialogue, the Taliban's commander in Afghanistan, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, was released.
The US's top man in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, while saying that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would remain tough in Afghanistan against the Taliban, said the peace process was welcomed. He also disclosed that NATO had even gave safe passage to a senior Taliban commander to go to Kabul for talks - a hint over the release in Pakistan of Baradar.
Publicly, though, the Taliban did not acknowledge that talks were taking place. A recent handout read:
No Taliban official has spoken to the Americans or their puppet Afghan government ... those who were arrested [Baradar], those who changed their loyalties [former Taliban foreign minister Abdul Wakeel Muttawakil and Senator Arsala Rahmani] or those who are living under Afghan government surveillance [former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan Mullah Zaeef] are not Taliban representatives. Their interaction does not have any meaning for the Taliban. Due to the extraordinary surveillance against the Taliban, no senior leader would agreed to come forward to give the real Taliban side of the story; however, eventually a middle-cadre member was sent to meet with Asia Times Online, and he confirmed the public statement.
"The much-hyped reconciliation strategy was a trap and we never actually considered it as an option," the Taliban envoy - who had traveled from Kandahar in Afghanistan - said.
"The Americans never wanted reconciliation with the Taliban. They never approached us directly. If we were approached by third parties, like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or the UAE [United Arab Emirates], we did not consider it anything serious," the envoy said.
This did not fit with a general understanding that Naseeruddin Haqqani, the son of commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani of the most powerful Taliban network, had been at the Saudi Embassy in Islamabad in September. Further, the embassy had arranged for him and his family to go on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. (Naseeruddin Haqqani had been arrested in 2009 by the Pakistani security forces and then released in exchange for Pakistani soldiers. The swap was brokered by now slain Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud.)
I gave my understanding, "That was the real clandestine interaction of the Haqqani network with the American or the Afghan government through Saudi Arabia, not the contacts mentioned in the Western media."
I continued, challenging the envoy's version of events, "The fact of the matter is that the Taliban did show flexibility for talks, so I wonder why they abruptly failed?"
The Talib responded, "On the one hand they were offering an olive branch and from the another hand they were tightening the noose around us. We could see that the whole game of reconciliation was not aimed at offering us power, but on inflicting serious damage on us."
He explained, "On the one side they were looking to establish a channel of communication with the Haqqanis, yet now [in October] they are gathering troops in Khost [province in Afghanistan across the border from North Waziristan]. There has been extraordinary troop mobilization in Khost. For what?" he asked, then answered the question.
"Pressure is mounting on Pakistan to carry out a military operation in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network. It is clearly evident that they want to place the Haqqani network between a hammer and a hard rock [NATO forces in Khost and the Pakistan army in North Waziristan]."
The Talib concluded, "There is more. For the first time, we see extraordinary movement in Chaman [a border town in Pakistan's Balochistan province across from the Spin Boldak-Kandahar area in Afghanistan]. This makes us wonder what the reconciliation process is really all about. In this whole situation, Pakistan's role is central. If it takes NATO's side, the Taliban will have a tough time as we see a serious battle ahead behind this smokescreen of the reconciliation process."
Ali al-Shamsi, a special envoy of the UAE for Pakistan and Afghanistan and the main person who arranged high-profile Taliban meetings in Dubai at the US's behest to initiate the dialogue process, submitted his resignation this month. (Shamsi was the UAE's ambassador to Pakistan during Taliban rule in Afghanistan - 1996-2001.)
However, the UAE government requested him to continue his assignment until a peace conference in Dubai on Afghanistan scheduled for late next month. The conference is an initiative by the Afghan government.
Shamsi's move followed the Americans stating that Washington could not give any guarantees for meeting any conditions set by the Taliban in the leadup to dialogue and that it backed out of earlier promises.
Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, realizing all along that it is the US's main target, is regrouping after all the losses it has sustained.
Early this year, al-Qaeda finally had 16 of its members released by Iran. (See How Iran and al-Qaeda made a deal Asia Times Online, April 30, 2010. Prominent among them were Saad bin Laden (one of Osama bin Laden's sons), Saiful Adil, Suleman al-Gaith and Abu Hafs al-Mauritani.
They settled in the tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, since they had spent almost eight years in detention in Iran, al-Qaeda kept them away from operations, they were not even allowed to attend shura (council) meetings.
In the face of al-Qaeda's losses, though, al-Qaeda decided to embrace them for operations. Saiful Adil is likely to be the new face of al-Qaeda in 2011, with operations emanating in Pakistan and spreading to Somalia, Yemen and Turkey to pitch operations in Europe and India.
As matters stand now, going into 2011, the Taliban will continue the struggle in Afghanistan with the help of al-Qaeda's new team, which in turn will also plan attacks in Europe and India.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com
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Eight armed militants join gov't in N Afghanistan
PUL-E-KHUMRI, Afghanistan, Oct. 31 (Xinhua) -- Police in northern Baghlan province say that eight Taliban militants laid down arms and resumed normal life on Sunday.
"An eight-member armed group of Taliban under the command of Jumadin handed over their arms to authorities in provincial capital Pul-e-Khumri on Sunday and resumed their normal life," provincial police chief Abdul Rahman Rahimi told journalists here.
These people were involved in anti-government activities in Dand-e-Shabudin and their joining to government would strengthen peace there, he added.
Taliban militants have yet to make comment.
This is the second butch of armed militants surrendered to government in a single day on Sunday.
Previously 15 armed militants laid down arms and joined government in the western Herat province.
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15 militants lay down arms in W. Afghanistan
HERAT, Afghanistan, Oct. 31 (Xinhua) -- Fifteen Taliban insurgents laid down arms and joined government in the western Herat province on Sunday, provincial governor Mohammad Daud Saba said. "A 15-member group armed anti-government militants handed over their arms to authorities in Pashtun Zarghon district today and vowed to defend peace in the country," Saba told newsmen at a press conference.
However, he did not say if there were any senior Taliban commander among those surrendered, adding with joining these armed men to government the security in Pashtun Zarghon district will be stabilized, he added.
Taliban militants fighting Afghan and NATO-led troops have yet to comment.
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NATO confirms killing Taliban senior commander in S Afghanistan
KABUL, Oct. 31 (Xinhua) -- The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on Sunday confirmed eliminating a senior Taliban commander in south Afghanistan.
"The International Security Assistance Force confirmed Mullah Abdullah Kakar, a senior Taliban leader who planned attacks against Afghan and coalition forces and facilitated the movement of foreign fighters, was killed during a precision air strike in Zabul province Thursday," a press release issued by the alliance said.
Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked Mullah Abdullah Kakar, who was recently linked to an improvised explosive device attack, with his vehicle in a remote area in Shah Joy district and after verifying insurgent activity and ensuring no civilians were present, coalition forces conducted the precision air strike on the vehicle, destroying it and killing Mullah Abdullah Kakar along with one of his associates, the press release noted.
Taliban militants have yet to make comment.
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Senators Warn of Bad Consequences of Nato-Russia Raid
October 31, 2010 Tolo news
Some Afghan senators urged the Afghan government to react seriously against the joint Nato-Russia attack and warned of bad consequences of the operation
Nato forces Friday included four Russian anti-drug soldiers in their operation that was conducted to target a number of drug laboratories in eastern parts of the country.
The Afghan senators criticised the joint offensive and called for more details about the operation.
The Afghan Defence Ministry said conducting such operations is a violation of Afghanistan's national sovereignty.
Deputy Minister of Defence, Enayatullah Nazari said: "We were not informed of the operation in advance and we object it as a violation of national sovereignty."
"We could call it the failure of police or Ministry of Defence and this is because a lack of cooperation and joint efforts among government local organisations and police forces," said an Afghan senator, Shahnaz Ghawsi.
"Nato has failed in Afghanistan, that is why it has sought help from Russia in the operation. As Russians were defeated in Afghanistan, Nato will also be defeated," said Deputy for Afghan Senate House, Abdul Hadi Muslimyar.
Following the operation, Afghan President's Office in a statement strongly slammed the operation and called it an obvious violation of Afghan sovereignty.
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Russia confounded over Afghan reaction on anti-drug operation
MOSCOW, Oct. 31 (Xinhua) -- Russia's federal anti-drug service (FSKN) has been puzzled by reactions from the Afghan authorities concerning the recent international anti-drug operation conducted in Afghanistan, the Itar-Tass news agency reported Sunday.
A source from the agency's media department said Afghan authorities had been informed about the operation and some Afghan special forces also took part in the operation, so it was not clear why the Afghan authorities had reacted in such a way.
On Saturday, the Deputy to Afghan Interior Minister on Counter-narcotics Baz Mohammad Ahmadi denied the reported involvement of Russian forces in an operation that led to seizure of nearly one ton of heroin in east Afghanistan, saying the operation was rather conducted by Afghan anti-drug police and NATO-led forces.
Ahmadi confirmed that two Russian drug specialists from Russian embassy in Afghanistan had taken part in the raid to observe and monitor the operation.
Earlier in the day Afghan President Hamid Karzai also sought explanation from NATO over the reported joint NATO-Russian anti-drug operation.
However, according to FSKN head Victor Ivanov, the operation was conducted jointly by Russian and U.S. troops in a first ever coordinated ambush in the Afghan province of Nangarkhar near the border with Pakistan.
It resulted in the bust of four clandestine laboratories, the seizure of 932 kg of high quality heroin and 156 kg of opium, or 200 million doses with an estimated value of 250 million U.S. dollars.
The post-Taliban Afghanistan with producing more than 3,600 tons of opium poppy in 2010 has once again topped the poppy producing nations in the world.
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The looming challenges in Pak-U.S. relations
By Wajahat Ali, October 29, 2010 Friday, October 29, 2010 – Foreign policy
To mark the end of the United States-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue talks last Friday, the Obama administration announced a $2 billion military aid package for Islamabad, the culmination of a negotiation process institutionalized in recent years by the two countries to broaden and strengthen their relationship. Yet skepticism about the viability and effectiveness of the process and the broader relationship continues to dog both sides.
Ironically, despite mutual suspicion, both sides are well-aware of the benefits of working together: Washington's search for an endgame in Afghanistan makes it important for both sides to work together toward a settlement that can restore a modicum of stability to the war-torn country.
Pakistan and the United States have confluences of interest in other areas as well. So, what's the problem?
From Washington's perspective, Pakistan bristles with anti-Americanism. This is despite the fact that the U.S. has helped Pakistan on several occasions, notably in the wake of the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. It has pledged to increase economic assistance to Islamabad in recent years and is helping the latter with its flood relief efforts.
But experts in Washington believe Pakistan is working against U.S. interests by sheltering the Afghan Taliban and not doing enough to secure the NATO supply lines from Pakistani ports and supply depots across the border. Recently, CNN quoted an unnamed NATO official in Afghanistan as saying that Osama bin Laden and his cohort were out of the caves and enjoying a comfortable life in Pakistan.
All this implies that Islamabad is, at best, a frenemy of the United States. According to this thinking Pakistan is playing a double game with Washington, and there is little the United States can do to reverse this behavior.
Yet this view ignores concrete steps that can be taken to turn the U.S.-Pakistan relationship around.
Pakistan and the United States have a common interest in fighting religious militancy. While the United States today is arguably much safer than nine years ago, Pakistan continues to suffer indiscriminate terrorist violence on a daily basis. Religious extremism has also hit the economy badly and foreign investors are staying away from Pakistan. Prolonged violent extremism will only damage Pakistan further in the long run.
Secondly, Pakistan needs more than just economic assistance. Like other states, it has a national security perspective dealing with regional realities. Pakistanis think that Islamabad has put Pakistan's security at risk to protect American interests in the region. They argue that the U.S. has not done much about the Kashmir dispute or even addressed Pakistan's concerns about growing Indian influence in Afghanistan.
For its part, Pakistan needs to evaluate the cost of anti-Americanism. The sentiment has not only narrowed down the country's foreign policy options but has also pushed it toward greater international isolation. It has also generated a false hope that things will drastically improve when American forces leave the region. However, Pakistan cannot afford a new round of factional fighting in Afghanistan and another refugee influx from that country.
The Pakistani establishment must discuss these issues publicly. It must tell the people about the gains it has made by dealing with Washington and how it is likely to benefit from this relationship in the future. It is a fact that Pakistan was not always anti-American even when Pakistanis were not always in agreement with U.S. foreign policy.
Pakistan also needs to address the U.S. concern about various Afghan militant factions that are believed to be hiding in its northwestern tribal territories and parts of Baluchistan, a key sticking point between the two countries.
At the same time, Islamabad cannot fight every militant outfit at this stage. There are too many of them in the region and it makes ample sense for it to go after those groups that are primarily threatening Pakistani state and society. This should also explain why Pakistan has not taken on the Afghan Taliban. Just like the United States did not target Baitullah Mehsud, the popular leader of the Pakistani Taliban, until he openly threatened to launch attacks on the U.S. soil, Pakistanis see little reason to go after the Afghan Taliban who have not attacked their country, including the Haqqanis in North Waziristan.
It will immensely benefit the Pak-U.S. relationship, however, to wean these groups from Al Qaeda and make them renounce violence. The good news is that the international community has finally begun to understand that the Afghan problem is too complex to be resolved through use of force only. Negotiations are imperative at this stage and Pakistan can play a useful role.
The Taliban movement is deeply divided in Afghanistan. Indeed, many Taliban leaders are quite pragmatic and are likely to watch their own interest if they get a chance to enter their country's political mainstream. This is likely to reduce violence and considerably help the international community's movement toward the post-conflict stage in Afghanistan.
It is vital to offer proper political incentives to these groups and let the Afghan-led reconciliation process gain momentum in Kabul. But it would become more meaningful if Pakistan's security concerns are addressed as well.
Political progress in Kabul will benefit Pakistan-U.S. relations more than anything else. Movement toward that goal would require a continuous and transparent dialogue and the need to rescue ties from falling prey to popular emotions in both countries.
Wajahat Ali is The Asia Foundation's William P. Fuller Fellow. Currently, he is working with the New America Foundation as their South Asia Research Fellow. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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India in Afghanistan, part I: strategic interests, regional concerns
BY CHRISTINE FAIR, OCTOBER 26, 2010 - – Foreign policy
India's profile in Afghanistan has been a quiet but looming concern for New Delhi, Washington, Brussels and of course Islamabad with all wondering what is the optimal role for India in Afghanistan's reconstruction in light of the enduring security competition between India and Pakistan. On the one hand are those who want to expand India's presence in Afghanistan through increased Indian training of Afghan civilian and military personnel, development projects, and expanded economic ties. These observers are aware of India's long-standing and robust ties with Kabul and Afghans' generally positive public opinion towards Indians and India. Notably, in late August 2010, Afghanistan's National Security Adviser Rangin Spanta told an Indian journalist, "We would like to expand cooperation with India in order to strengthen Kabul's ability to secure itself."
On the other hand are those that caution against such involvement. This view was articulated forcefully by then-top NATO commander in Afghanistan Gen. Stanley McChrystal in his August 2009 "COMISAF's Initial Assessment." McChrystal opined:
Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, including significant development efforts and financial investment. In addition, the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian. While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India.
Other analysts see Indian and Pakistani competition in Afghanistan as a new "Great Game" and argue that Afghanistan can be pacified only through a regional solution that resolves once and for all the intractable Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir.
Despite the seeming importance of India's interests in Afghanistan and the regional impacts of the same, there have been few recent studies of these issues. I recently authored a report that analyzes India's current interests in Afghanistan, how it has sought to achieve its aims, and the consequences of its actions for India, Pakistan, and the international efforts to stabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan.
India rising
India's interests in Afghanistan are not only Pakistan-specific but equally, if not more importantly, tied to India's desire to be and to be seen as an extra-regional power moving toward great power status. India has long bristled at the tendency among international analysts to hitch India to Pakistan. India is keen to throw off any comparison to Pakistan -- a state it views as its diminutive and less consequential neighbor. Thus while India's presence in Afghanistan has Pakistan-specific utility it is also about India's emergent ability to influence its extended strategic neighborhood.
American officials are often unaware of how Indians conceive of their neighborhood. Indian policy analysts claim that India's strategic environment stretches to the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf in the west (some will even claim the eastern coast of Africa as the western-most border of this strategic space); to the east, it includes the Strait of Malacca and extends up to the South China Sea; to the north, it is comprised of Central Asia; and to the south, it reaches out to Antarctica.
Raja Mohan, a doyen of Indian security analysis, explains in compa¬rable terms that India's grand strategy:
Divides the world into three concentric circles. In the first, which encom¬passes the immediate neighborhood, India has sought primacy and a veto over the actions of outside powers. In the second, which encom¬passes the so-called extended neighborhood stretching across Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral, India has sought to balance the influence of other powers and prevent them from undercutting its interests. In the third, which includes the entire global stage, India has tried to take its place as one of the great powers, a key player in international peace and security.
Thus, in many regards, India's interests in Afghanistan can be seen as merely one element within India's larger desire to be able to project its interests well beyond South Asia.
Why India cares about Afghanistan
There are at least three principle reasons why India has direct interests in Afghanistan. First, India has had to contend with many significant security chal¬lenges that stem from the Taliban's regime in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Pakistan has raised and supported several militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen/Harkat-ul-Ansar, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami among others, which operate in India. However, all of these groups have trained in Afghanistan, with varying proximity to the Taliban and by extension al-Qaeda. Thus India is absolutely adamant that Afghanistan should not again become a terrorist safe haven.
Second, India is interested in retaining Afghanistan as a friendly state from which it has the capacity to monitor Pakistan and even, where possible, cultivate assets to influence activities in Pakistan. While India is keenly inter¬ested in cultivating a significant partnership with Afghanistan, Pakistan busies itself trying to deny India these very opportunities.
Third, devel¬opments in Afghanistan and Pakistan have important and usually deleterious effects upon India's domestic social fabric as well as its internal security apart from the well-known problems in and over Kashmir. Indian interlocutors have explained to me that Islamist militancy coexists with a burgeoning Hindu nationalist movement that seeks to re-craft India as a Hindu state. Hindu nation¬alists and their militant counterparts live in a violent symbiosis with Islamist militant groups operating in and around India. Islamist terrorism in India and the region provides grist for the mill of Hindu nationalism and its violent offshoots.
How India can achieve these aims
India has sought to establish its presence in Afghanistan from the early days of its independence from Britain in 1947. In 1950, Afghanistan and India signed a "Friendship Treaty." India had robust ties with Afghan King Zahir Shah's regime. Prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, New Delhi continued to formalized agreements and protocols with various pro-Soviet regimes in Kabul.
While India's role in Afghanistan was constrained during the anti-Soviet jihad, between 1979 and 1989 India reportedly expanded its development activities in Afghanistan, focusing upon industrial, irrigation, and hydroelectric projects. That India was able to sustain this presence attests to the importance that India attached to this relationship and India's willingness to persevere.
After the Taliban consolidated their hold on Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, India struggled to maintain its presence and to support anti-Taliban forces. However, Indian objectives in Afghanistan remained necessarily modest given the constrained environment. India aimed to undermine, as best it could, the ability of the Taliban to consolidate its power over Afghanistan, principally by supporting the Northern Alliance in tandem with other regional actors.
Working with Iran, Russia, and Tajikistan, India provided important (but not fully detailed) resources to the Northern Alliance, the only meaningful challenge to the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to journalist Rahul Bedi, India also ran a twenty-five-bed hospital at Farkhor (Ayni), Tajikistan, for more than a year. The Northern Alliance military commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, died in that hospital after he was attacked by al-Qaeda suicide bombers on September 9, 2001. Through Tajikistan, India supplied the Northern Alliance with high altitude warfare equipment worth around $8 million. India also based several "defense advisers," including an officer of a brigadier rank, in Tajikistan to advise the Northern Alliance in their operations against the Taliban.
Since 2001, India has relied upon development projects and other forms of humanitarian assistance. To facilitate these projects and to collect intelligence (as all embassies and consulates do), India also now has consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif, in addition to its embassy in Kabul. There also are a number of smaller-scale activities throughout Afghanistan. According to U.S., British, and Afghan officials I interviewed over the last several years, India's activities are not isolated to the north, where it has had traditional ties, but also include efforts in the southern provinces and in the northeast, abutting the Pakistani border.
Christine Fair is an assistant professor at Georgetown University and the author of Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States. In part two of this post, she will explore the future of Indian interests in Afghanistan
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India in Afghanistan, part II: Indo-U.S. relations in the lengthening AfPak shadow
By Christine Fair, October 27, 2010 _ – Foreign policy
Despite deepening security threats from both the Taliban and other Pakistan-based proxies operating against Indian personnel and institutions in Afghanistan, thus far India has remained committed to staying in Afghanistan. India has its own concerns about the ultimate settlement in Afghanistan given that such a political settlement will likely come about through some sort of a twinned process of reconciliation and reintegration of former Taliban fighters back into Afghanistan's political landscape.
Surely this will be a prominent matter of discussion when U.S. President Barack Obama undertakes a state visit to India next month. As one Indian commentator recently wrote:
The real criterion for measuring success [of the Obama visit] would lie in assessing whether or not the two leaders have reached consensus on defining the dangers that their, and other, countries face from the Af-Pak area and how they intend to tackle it. They must agree on a mechanism for arriving at such assessment and there is only one way of doing it. What is needed is a trilateral forum of consultations consisting of the U.S., India, and Afghanistan.
In some measure, India should be assured that the Obama administration's assessment of the "Pakistan challenge" more closely mirrors that of India than that of the Bush administration, which remained doggedly committed to its Panglossian assessments of Pakistani President Parvez Musharraf's various promises to contend with the terrorism menaces based in and from Pakistan. However, as Bob Woodward lays bare in Obama's Wars, while the Obama White House has a better appreciation of the challenges with Pakistan it lacks any significant strategy to contend with them.
Moreover, Obama has much to prove to the Indians following a shaky start. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went to China first -- not India. Both Obama and Clinton made various statements attesting to the primacy of China in the U.S.'s Asia strategy. India was piqued by the Obama administration's lack of attention, having become habituated to the incessant wooing of the Bush administration, which urged the United States to alter its entire nonproliferation regime to accommodate the controversial Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal. The deal was important to Washington ostensibly to constrain China. Ashley Tellis, the architect of the deal, explained the importance of such a move in 2005:
If the United States is serious about advancing its geopolitical objectives in Asia, it would almost by definition help New Delhi develop its strategic capabilities such that India's nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems could deter against the growing and utterly more capable nuclear forces Beijing is likely to possess by 2025.
Any U.S. retrenchment from this position on China would leave India exposed.
India continues to watch with concern as Washington continues to ply military assistance to Pakistan while remaining unable or unwilling to compel Pakistan to abandon militancy as a tool of foreign policy and to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure that has inflicted such harm upon India and other countries the region. Worse, India fears that Washington will provide funds and access to weapon systems that are more appropriate to target India than Pakistani insurgents. In the wake of the recently concluded U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue, more defense wares will be on their way to Pakistan. India's Defense Minister A.K. Antony summarized India's concerns during a September 2010 trip to Washington: "We feel that even though the U.S. is giving arms to Pakistan to fight terrorism, our practical experience is (that) it is always being misused. They are diverting a portion against India," Antony had said during his visit here.
Will India stay the course in Afghanistan? Planning for the "day after"
Obama's (largely misconstrued) announcement that U.S. troops will begin drawing down military forces from Afghanistan in a conditions-based fashion in July 2011 has been widely read as "sever and saunter," or perhaps even "cut and run" among Afghanistan's neighbors. The Obama administration's assurances that the United States will remain committed to Afghanistan's development and transition have had little palliative impacts upon these calculations. India is no exception. Obama's commitment to ending the military commitment to Afghanistan has triggered a vigorous domestic debate within India about its future role in Afghanistan.
Indians are right to worry about how they will continue their programs and initiatives in Afghanistan as the United States and other international military forces reconfigure their posture away from active military operations in the future. Indian personnel have been under steady attack in Afghanistan.
After the 2008 attack on India's Embassy in Kabul, the Indian Express ran a poignant editorial that captured this dilemma. The author wrote:
After the Kabul bombing, India must come to terms with an important question that it has avoided debating so far. New Delhi cannot continue to expand its economic and diplomatic activity in Afghanistan, while avoiding a commensurate increase in its military presence there. For too long, New Delhi has deferred to Pakistani and American sensitivities about raising India's strategic profile in Afghanistan.
Some Indian analysts have articulated an explicitly military option for India in Afghanistan. Dr. Subhash Kapila, writing in December 2009, explains, "India has wrongly shied away from a military commitment in Afghanistan for two major reasons. The first was the American reluctance to permit Indian military involvement in Afghanistan out of deference to Pakistan Army sensitivities. The second reason was the political and strategic timidity of India's political leadership who have yet to recognize that being a big power would involve shouldering military responsibilities to reorder in India's favor the security environment in South Asia." He argues that since the U.S. exit is a question of when not if, India must begin preparing extensive contingency planning for the "day after" of the U.S. exit from Afghanistan.
In August of 2008, Pragati (an online, independent Indian defense publication) dedicated an entire issue to debating whether or not India should send troops to Afghanistan. One author argued that India should expand its civilian effort as well as forge a military option. Shushant T. Singh, one of the contributors to that issue, explains, "A significant Indian military presence in Afghanistan will alter the geo-strategic landscape in the extended neighborhood, by expanding India's power projection in Central Asia."
Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, in the same issue of Pragati, urges India to stay the course and push to train Afghan National Security Forces over the objections of the United States, NATO, and Pakistan. At the other extreme are those who worry that the benefits of any Indian presence in Afghanistan are outweighed by the cost. (India has already been forced to expand its security forces' presence in Afghanistan to secure the civilian efforts underway.) Proponents of scaling back argue that India should do so when the United States and other coalition partners reduce their kinetic operations and retract their military footprints beginning in July 2011.
The stakes for India are higher than some may appreciate. India's efforts to shape the outcome in Afghanistan with its own security interests will be important evidence that India has what it takes to be a power of any consequence outside of South Asia -- much less globally. If India cannot effectively shape the course of events in its own "immediate neighborhood," how can it credibly lay claim to its great power aspirations at home or abroad?
Christine Fair is an assistant professor at Georgetown University and the author of Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States. In part one of this post, she considered India's historical interests in Afghanistan.
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ANALYSIS: Is Orakzai Agency cleared of the Taliban? —Farhat Taj
– Foreign policy - The IDPs say that both the Taliban and the Pakistan Army have bombed their empty houses in Orakzai. The authorities are now handing them tents so that they go back and erect tents on the sites of their bombed out homes
Recently, the Pakistani media reported that security forces have cleared 90 percent of Orakzai Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Frontier Corps Inspector General Nadir Zeb reportedly said that a limited operation would continue in Mamuzai area, the stronghold of the Taliban in the Agency. He further said that clues pertaining to al Qaeda’s presence were found in Orakzai, but most of their operatives had been killed and others had fled the area. Moreover, he also said that internally displaced people (IDPs) from the area would start coming home in a few days.
Any notion of Orakzai being cleared of the Taliban without the elimination of the Taliban leadership in the area is meaningless. All the prominent commanders in Orakzai are still alive. None of them have even been arrested so far. They include Hakimullah, Toofan Mullah, Aslam Farooqi, Tariq Afridi, Gul Zaman Mullah, Salam Mullah, Zia-ur-Rehman, Nabi Mullah, Hafiz Saeed and Saif-ur-Rehman. The military spokesmen are not explaining how Orakzai can be secured without the elimination of the Taliban leadership.
A viewpoint of the Orakzai IDPs is that the military leadership does not wish to eliminate these Taliban commanders. The commanders are the ‘strategic assets’ of the intelligence authorities and will be used for terrorism in Afghanistan and the ‘managed chaos’ engineered by the intelligence agencies in FATA. To counter this perception, the military will have to eliminate the entire Taliban leadership. The people of Orakzai, who have suffered human rights violations at the hands of the commanders, want to see them killed. There seems to be no one in Pakistan willing to grill the military authorities over their failure to eliminate the Taliban leadership.
There are Taliban in the area between Ghiljo and Shahu Khel, who kill and kidnap people from Hangu and its surrounding areas. The area from Ghiljo to Yakh Kandaw has also not been cleared and, only a few days ago, some soldiers were killed there. Mamuzia is still under the control of the Taliban. Feroz Khel, Utman Khel and Bezot, the areas supposedly cleared several weeks ago, are still under the influence of the Taliban.
Only three areas, Mishti Khel, Shaikhan and Kalaya can be viewed as cleared of the Taliban. Kalaya is a Shia area in Orakzai and has never suffered Taliban occupation, therefore the army cannot claim to have cleared it of the Taliban.
The military authorities are putting pressure on the Orakzai IDPs in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to go back to their areas. The IDPs are apprehensive because they believe that upon return they might be trapped in clashes between the Taliban and the army. They believe that clashes between the two are inevitable since the Taliban leadership is intact.
Moreover, the IDPs are afraid that the Taliban will assault them with a vengeance upon their return. The Taliban, they argue, are more dangerous than before. They consider the IDPs to be their enemies because they fled and left the Taliban alone in Orakzai to fight the army. The Taliban wanted the IDPs — especially the able-bodied men — to fight on their side against the army. The men refused the Taliban request and preferred to flee.
The IDPs say that both the Taliban and the Pakistan Army have bombed their empty houses in Orakzai. The authorities are now handing them tents so that they go back and erect tents on the sites of their bombed out homes. They complain that first they were forced to live in homelessness in the scorching heat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and now they are being forced to spend the snowy winter of Orakzai on the debris of their destroyed homes. Moreover, both the Taliban and the Pakistan Army have bombed schools, healthcare centres and the electricity system. People’s businesses have been destroyed. How do the authorities expect the IDPs to live a normal life in such conditions? There seem to be no arrangements in place to rebuild the necessary infrastructure in Orakzai.
The military authorities should share with the nation the ‘clues’ related to al Qaeda that they found in Orakzai. They should release the information about al Qaeda militants killed in Orakzai. They must also explain why and how the other al Qaeda militants fled from Orakzai, whether or not the military chased them, where they are now and whether the authorities have any plan to kill them in the areas to where they fled. Above all, they must inform the nation about when are they going to kill or capture the Taliban leadership in Orakzai. They must also inform the masses about what security arrangements have been made for those Orakzai residents who offered armed resistance to the Taliban before the army’s arrival in the area.
Similarly, the political authorities in Orakzai must elaborate what compensation they intend to make to the IDPs for the damage to their properties caused by the Taliban and Pakistan Army and what arrangements have been made to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure in Orakzai.
The writer is a PhD Research Fellow with the University of Oslo and currently writing a book, Taliban and Anti-Taliban
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How is Pakistan doing?
Ashraf Jehangir Qazi – Opinion – The News Int. (Pak)
How is Pakistan doing? What are the facts? Pakistan has a population of around 180 million which has trebled over the past 50 years and is slated to grow by another 85 million in the next 20 years, making it roughly 265 million – equivalent to adding five more Karachis! In another twenty years the population will be 335 million! With more than half of the population living in towns and cities imagine the lethal tensions over land, water, power, housing, jobs and services. Imagine the scale of investment and materials that will be required in infrastructure and services. The economy will need to grow at a minimum of six per cent per year over the next ten years to generate 36 million new productive jobs to meet the needs of the growing population.
Currently, the growth rate is not even keeping pace with the population expansion rate. Moreover, with only 50 per cent of children going to primary school, 25 per cent to secondary school, and only 5 per cent receiving higher education the qualifications required for productive employment and self-employment are just not going to be there. In fact, taking into account the deplorable quality of education available to the overwhelming majority of our children the situation is in fact much worse than what the deplorable figures suggest.
The situation in other basic services sectors, indeed in social and gender protection systems and human resource development as a whole, is arguably even more dismal. Roughly 40 per cent of all households have no electricity and 80 per cent of all household energy use comes from firewood, dung and crop residue. Industrial and transport growth without assured energy supplies at affordable prices will be a pipe-dream. Pakistan is already one of the most water-stressed countries in the world as a result of its population growth. Rising consumption expectations in a globally connected world will exacerbate current frustrations. Climate change will further exacerbate water and food shortages which, if not addressed on a national and regional scale, will massively undermine the country’s growth and productive employment prospects. It will threaten the peace within Pakistan and with neighbours.
Around 110 million of Pakistan’s population live on $2 a day which may be technically above poverty line but apart from a bare, miserable and uncertain survival it allows for little. Even before the recent floods it was estimated that due to inflation in general and food inflation in particular roughly seven per cent of the population (over 12 million) who had barely risen above the poverty line during the previous decade sank below it again.
In the aftermath of the floods millions more will sink into this pitiless pit where no rights or hope can exist. Transparency International’s report that Pakistan is today more corrupt than ever explains why there is a growing disillusionment with democracy among the youth. The horror stories one hears about brazenly deliberate corruption at an unimaginably massive scale are soul-destroying.
The youth, accordingly, look for a strong but just hand, even an Islamic fundamentalist hand, to help them out of the pit they find themselves dug in. They do not want to be dependent. They are willing to work their butts off. They need to be enabled and given a reasonably level playing field. That is a fundamental right that is denied them because they are not a priority. And then we wonder: Why do they have such violent thoughts? Who is brainwashing them? Are they vulnerable to recruitment by bad guys? Well, ask them who the bad guys are. And the bitter irony is that these betrayed young people adore their country.
A riveting study of Pakistan’s “next generation” (18 to 29 year-olds) compiled by a whole range of Pakistani scholars, experts, activists etc, with the help of contributions from over a thousand young Pakistanis from all over Pakistan and a range of backgrounds, funded by the British Council, depicts a grim but not hopeless picture of Pakistan’s future. Provided the right priorities and policy measures are urgently put in place. According to the study, the “next generation” sees injustice as the prime reason for violence and terror in Pakistan.
But according to the leaders of the west their security is threatened by terrorism the root causes of which are not even open to discussion. To suggest that injustice might have something to do with terrorism is seen as an attempt to condone it. Their acolytes among the political and power elite in Pakistan have a similar distaste for any discussion on injustice or other root causes of violence and terror. These include, according to the next generation, poor economic conditions and lack of education and awareness.
Our children are in effect telling us: make progress in removing injustice, provide better economic conditions and make decent education available and violence and terror will become manageable. There is so much more truth and practical wisdom in this than in all the counter-terror and counter-insurgency strategies that, according to Bob Woodward, are furiously debated in White House video-conferences with apparently little regard for the opinions and sufferings of those who are directly and indirectly impacted by them. In fact whole societies are in danger of being destroyed by these continuous war strategies.
The next generation study talks about a window of opportunity of a “demographic dividend” for Pakistan between the 1990s and 2045. During this period the potentially productively employed youth as a proportion of the whole population will be at a maximum. Hence if all the enabling policies are put in place the country can receive a massive “one-time boost” over several decades. This could be a real socio-economic game-changer in terms of increased economic growth, savings, investment in children and social transformation. The East Asian Miracle was largely a result of exploiting this dividend. Conversely, a failure to avail of these opportunities could lead to a “demographic disaster” involving spiralling poverty, increased crime and conflict, and a “crippled next generation”. The stakes are extraordinarily high.
We have already wasted two decades of the demographic window of opportunity because, among many reasons, little progress has been made towards achieving Millennium Development Goals. The population has not been stabilised because women have yet to enter the work force in significant numbers. Health and education remain woefully under-resourced. As a result, we are not even poised to begin moving towards a demographic dividend. On the contrary, we are headed towards a demographic disaster. Failure to take appropriate action will set us back for decades to come. This is euphemism for ‘State Failure’.
So whatever our current security or other pre-occupations may be, they pale by comparison to the demographic threat we face, and time is running out to save our country from an impending absolute disaster. Will the present government surprise us and do what is essential starting NOW? It does not look likely. The government and civil society, of course, could have a deeply satisfying experience empowering the next generation and rendering the kind of transforming, indeed life-saving, service no one has yet provided the country.
The necessary measures are by and large known and their urgency is obvious in light of the dire implications of not taking them immediately. But this urgency has not yet translated into priority which is the measure of our tragedy. Indeed, much of the elite, including their next generation, have their exit options ready. The facts are pronouncing a death sentence upon us as a society and as a nation. Denial is betrayal. It is already very late. But, maybe, not too late. Blame-game time is over. All of us must now be in the same game.
The writer is Pakistan’s former envoy to the US and India
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UNHCR suspends Afghans' repatriation from Pakistan
ISLAMABAD, Oct. 31 (Xinhua) -- The UN refugee agency Sunday said it has suspended repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan.
The return process will take a winter recess after assisting 109,243 Afghans to return home this year, the UNHCR said. Assisted returns will continue until 2012.
The voluntary return program of Afghans started in 2002 and is the largest operation of the refugee agency around the world.
A total 3.7 million refugees have since returned home. Some 1.6 million registered Afghans are still in Pakistan.
"Repatriation is one of our preferred solutions in any post- conflict situation," UNHCR Representative in Pakistan Mengesha Kebede said, adding that "these returns prove that Afghans are eager to go back home only if better alternates were provided to them."
Kebede further noted that the UNHCR together with the host government is undertaking initiatives to support the government of Afghanistan to manage the Afghan population in a more efficient manner.
"The voluntary and gradual return of refugees remains our top priority," added Dr. Imran Zeb Khan, Joint Secretary in Pakistan's States and Frontier Regions, who deals with Afghan refugees.
This year of the total 109,383 returned Afghans, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa topped the list with some 72,641 Afghans going home from the province, another 19,768 returned from Balochistan, 5,156 individuals from Sindh and 11,818 from Punjab and Islamabad.
The majority 33.2 percent of the returning Afghans went back to the eastern region of Afghanistan, mainly to Kunar, Nangarhar and Laghman provinces. About 28.3 percent went back to Kabul, Logar and Parwan provinces in the central region, 21 percent to north and only 8 percent in the south of the country.
The number of returnees this year has increased by 51 percent in comparison with 2009 returns.
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An Afghan Minister to be Brought to Justice
October 31, 2010 Tolo news
A top official in Afghan Attorney General's Office said Sunday that the former transportation minister will be introduced to ministers' special court in three days
The Attorney General's Office accused the former transport minister, Hamidullah Qaderi, for huge corruption and the office said he has caused $11 million loss to the transport ministry during his office.
But calling himself innocent, the accused minister said the allegations are inaccurate.
Mr Qaderi said the Afghan government should prosecute the private companies that were responsible to take Hajj pilgrims to Hajj.
"The Attorney General has told the Senate that it is not a matter of embezzlement or misuse, and it's just a mistake," said Mr Qaderi. "So mistake is neither embezzlement nor crime."
Without accepting his aide's advices, he had signed the transportation contracts of Hajj pilgrims, Attorney General's Office said.
"The former minister of transport, Mr Hamidullah Qaderi, is accused of misuse and stealth by Attorney General and his case is completed" and during the week his case will be sent to ministers' special court, said Deputy Attorney General, Rahmatullah Nazari.
According to the Attorney General's Office, nearly thirty high profile Afghan government officials including two ministers in President Karzai's present cabinet are accused of corruption.
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Smooth transition will be key to bringing troops home from Afghanistan
CNN International By Barbara Starr, October 31, 2010
Kabul, Afghanistan - They call it "Inteqal" -- it means "transition" in both Dari and Pashtu, according to NATO -- but going down that road is a bit slower than first expected. Still, succeeding at Inteqal will be the road home for U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
At next month's NATO summit in Lisbon, Portugal, no announcements are likely about which specific areas of Afghanistan will be the first to be transitioned to Afghan control, according to several officials representing member nations of the alliance.
Instead, NATO will simply announce that the transition process is under way and reaffirm that Afghan security forces are expected to take the lead in conducting security operations across the country by the end of 2014. It's a process that will be very gradual.
In an exclusive interview with CNN, U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander in Afghanistan, said he expects to be able to recommend to President Barack Obama that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan could begin to be reduced in July 2011, but he declined to say how many troops might be headed home, adding that some could be reassigned to other jobs inside Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, the Taliban's momentum in Afghanistan has "broadly been arrested" in some locations in recent weeks, he said.
"My assessment is that the momentum that the Taliban enjoyed until probably late summer, has broadly been arrested in the country," Petraeus said. "It doesn't mean it's been arrested in every location in the country, but it means by and large that is the case, and moreover, more importantly, the ISAF and Afghan forces have achieved momentum in some very important areas."
One Western official confirmed to CNN that there were indications earlier this year that the alliance and the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai were ready to agree on the first provinces that would be part of the transition process, but delays in finalizing the deals are likely to mean now that no announcements will be made until early 2011.
Several months ago, U.S. military officials were privately indicating that some of the first to be turned over could include Parwan, Panjshir and Bamiyan, where violence has been relatively low. The French have also made it clear they would like to leave a district of Kabul province and turn it over to Afghan control.
NATO and the Afghan government have now established a joint process to assess which areas are ready for turnover based on several factors, according to the Western official who is familiar with the internal debate inside the alliance. A Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board is being set up, then provinces will be assessed and recommendations will be made to the Afghan Cabinet for final approval.
But the official made clear that while Karzai will be the public face of transition -- accepting control province by province--NATO will conduct detailed assessments of security, development and the ability of Afghans to govern in each area.
Once a province is turned over to Afghan control, that decision will be "irreversible," the official said. The reason: to make sure the Afghan government fully understands the serious implications of taking control and doesn't change its mind, which could result in NATO troops having to re-enter an area at a future date.
An assessment of security in each province and the ability of Afghan forces to take over those functions will clearly be the major factor in deciding to begin the turnover process. The actual factors in assessing security will include the number of attacks on civilians, government officials and security forces, as well as the freedom of movement by the local population.
The Western official emphasized that no one is waiting to meet a standard of "no violence," but rather an assessment that Afghan forces can control and deal with violence that occurs.
This entire NATO-Afghan process comes as Petraeus is both leading the NATO military assessment and preparing an end of the year U.S. assessment for Obama.
Petraeus has a highly detailed set of security assessment factors for 83 so-called "key terrain districts" mainly in the south and east where violence has been the heaviest, a senior ISAF official told CNN. While those areas may not be ready for transition, the detailed assessment will give Petraeus a sense of security on an almost village-by-village basis.
The official emphasized, however, that "no one believes there will be a tipping point before spring." ISAF wants to see if the gains made in recent weeks last through the winter. Petraeus is expressing the view that the recent increase in airstrikes has destroyed many Taliban safehavens, IED factories and weapon caches that the insurgency may not be able to regroup after this winter.
The official said Petraeus' goal for the December White House review is to be able to tell the president that the current war plan is working and continued progress can be made in 2011.
Petraeus declined to spell out what he specifically plans to tell Obama. But he offered CNN this assessment: "There is no day in Afghanistan that doesn't have some bad news. The question is how much bad news, relative to how much good news [is received]. As a general assessment right now, the trajectory of the roller coaster in Afghanistan is upward, and that is a change. We intend to maintain the pressure, to increase it."
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Memoirs, mistakes converge as CIA promises reform
Spies-turned-authors say the agency's admitted 'systemic failures' in an Afghanistan suicide attack prove their allegations of myriad problems. But one veteran is being sued over his unapproved book.
Los Angeles Times By Ken Dilanian October 30, 2010
Reporting from Washington - When CIA Director Leon Panetta gathered reporters recently to discuss mistakes that allowed a suicide bomber to kill seven personnel in Afghanistan, he didn't mention a separate disclosure the agency made that day: that it had sued a retired officer who wrote an unapproved memoir.
To some CIA veterans, the developments are related in ways that do not reflect well on the agency. An internal investigation blamed the December attack by an Al Qaeda double agent on "systemic failures" in CIA training, management, information sharing and vetting of sources. Former agents have publicly pointed out some of those problems for years, without response by the CIA.
But now, as it promises reforms in the wake of the bombing at an agency base in the eastern Khowst province, the CIA is seeking to punish a former agent for violating his secrecy agreement, which he says he did to blow the whistle on waste and incompetence.
The author of the 2008 book "The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture" writes under the pseudonym Ishmael Jones. A former Marine who served 15 years spying overseas under non-official cover before resigning in 2006, Jones describes a diminished agency that, even after 9/11, is stymied by a culture of careerism and lethargy. He argues that experienced spies in the field are routinely undercut and second-guessed by agency bureaucrats.
Jones' book has drawn relatively little attention. The same is true of two other books by former case officers, whose memoirs also portray the agency as inept and bureaucratic. The CIA's acknowledgement of failures in Khowst lends currency to these accounts.
"Khowst is not an aberration. It is a symptom of what is wrong with the CIA today," says Charles Faddis, a former Middle East station chief and author of "Beyond Repair: The Decline and Fall of the CIA," published last year. Both Jones and Faddis spent time in Iraq during the war.
Faddis argues the Khowst tragedy was a result of the "deprofessionalization" of the National Clandestine Service, the CIA's operations arm. The spy cadre is no longer comprised mostly of seasoned overseas operators as much as "new hires, former support personnel and headquarters-based desk officers," Faddis says.
Jones concurs. Ninety percent of CIA employees are stationed in the U.S., he says, embedded in a "Soviet-style bureaucracy" that relies on contracts with private firms run by former CIA officials.
The agency is "stiff, risk-averse and increasingly filled with individuals who see the CIA as simply another federal job," Faddis adds. His book mentions one support officer overseas who refused to work after 5 p.m.
Another post-9/11 memoir, the 2004 book "Blowing my Cover: My Life as a CIA Spy," by former case officer Lindsay Moran, who served for five years until 2003, draws a similar portrait.
Many current and former CIA officials object, saying field operatives don't see the big picture.
"Look at the breadth of activity post-9/11 — the rapid move into Afghanistan, the toppling of the Taliban regime; the degradation of Al Qaeda leadership with new techniques and novel operations not even in existence nine years ago," says Philip Mudd, who worked at the CIA for more than two decades, including a stint as deputy director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis. "Some high-risk operations fail because they're high risk."
Because of CIA officers, agency spokesman George Little said, "scores of terrorists have been taken off the battlefield, plots have been disrupted, and the lives of many coalition soldiers in Afghanistan have been saved."
The Khowst operation, however, was not the CIA's finest hour, critics say. The base was run by one of the agency's most knowledgeable Al Qaeda experts, Jennifer Matthews, but she had almost no experience recruiting informants or working in hostile environments.
"She was always meant to sit behind a desk," said Robert Baer, a former agent who wrote an article on the Khowst bombing for GQ magazine.
Matthews was killed in the suicide attack.
"Bob Baer's comment about our fallen colleague, Jennifer Matthews, is not only offensive but wrong," CIA spokesman George Little said.
One failure cited in the CIA's review pinpointed what critics say is endemic: No one at the base knew who was in charge. The agency also acknowledged that no one had searched the suicide bomber.
Unlike Faddis and other memoirists, Jones published his book without completing the CIA's prepublication review process.
Panetta said in a statement that the lawsuit reinforces that "CIA officers are duty-bound to observe the terms of their secrecy agreement with the agency."
The lawsuit seeks all royalties from the book and any potential film. Jones says he donates all profits to charities that support soldiers' families.
Jones says he disclosed no classified information, and the agency strung him along for a year.
"My options were either to scorn the censors or to keep quiet about fraud, waste and incompetence that put the American public at risk," he said.
But Baer and Faddis say their highly critical books were approved by the CIA's prepublication review board. "I've never seen them take criticism out," Baer says.
Jones argues that his book is more damaging.
In support of his allegations that that the CIA wasted billions appropriated after 9/11 that was intended to send more case officers abroad, he describes millions of dollars funneled to a network of "front companies, offices, residential apartments, corporate shell companies," with little discernable intelligence purpose. He visited one of these offices, he wrote, and found a single room with a man at a desk reading a novel.
The CIA's budget is classified, as is the work of its inspector general, so it's impossible to verify Jones' account. A U.S. intelligence official, responding Saturday to the misspending allegations, said the CIA "doesn't know what Jones is talking about."
A senior congressional staffer not authorized to speak by name said, "After 9/11, money was thrown at intelligence to prevent further attacks and support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq," said a senior congressional staffer who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the issue. "Cuts are coming."
ken.dilanian@latimes.com
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Khadr 'scared' of jail rape threat
Guantanamo's youngest prisoner tells military tribunal that interrogators warned he could face gang rape.
Al Jazeera October 30, 2010
A young Canadian held in Guantanamo Bay has spoken about his fears after his US captors threatened him with gang rape and death while quizzing him over his suspected involvement with al-Qaeda.
Omar Khadr told a US military tribunal, which is due to sentence him after he admitted killing an US soldier in Afghanistan, that his interrogators told him about another prisoner who had been transferred to a facility that held "big black guys" because he had lied to authorities.
"They caught him in the shower ... they raped him ... We think he ended up dying," Khadr quoted the interrogators as telling him shortly after he was captured.
"I know it does not change what I did, but I hope you will think about it when you punish me," Khadr said. "This story scared me very much, and made me cry."
In April, an interrogator who testified under oath admitted doing exactly what Khadr alleges - using indirect threats of gang rape and murder while questioning him at Bagram airbase in Afghanistan.
The interrogator who admitted making up the threat, Joshua Claus, was later court-martialed for abusing prisoners at Bagram, including one who died.
Guilty plea
Khadr pleaded guilty on Monday to charges including plotting bomb attacks with al-Qaeda and killing a US soldier in battle. In exchange for his guilty plea, the jury can sentence him to a maximum of eight years, including the time he has already served.
Human rights groups have said Khadr was the victim of abuse and mistreatment in US cusotody, and his defence team have argued for this to be taken into account when the jury considers his sentence.
Just 15 years old when he was captured in Afghanistan, Khadr is considered by many to have been a child soldier at the time of the firefight in which he threw a grenade, killing a US soldier.
Khadr had been taken to Afghanistan by his father, where he was sent to weapons training camp and is alleged to have joined a group of al-Qaeda bombmakers.
On Thursday, Khadr told the tribunal that he was "very, very sorry" for killing the soldier.
The UN special envoy for children in armed conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, sent a letter to the tribunal saying Khadr should be treated as a child soldier recruited by unscrupulous adults.
She urged the court to send him to a controlled rehabilitation programme in Canada instead of imposing a prison sentence.
A Pentagon spokeswoman would not say whether jurors would be allowed to see the letter.
The jury of seven military officers is expected to begin deliberating his sentence on Saturday.
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