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Afghanistan Taliban attack Hamid Karzai's 'peace jirga'
President Hamid Karzai's speech was interrupted by gunfire and nearby rocket explosions. He called for the Afghanistan Taliban to disassociate themselves with Al Qaeda and join the government.
By Kristen Chick, The Christian Science Monitor Correspondent June 2, 2010 at 8:41 am EDT
Gunfire and rocket attacks launched by the Afghanistan Taliban targeted the opening session of an assembly Wednesday in Kabul to discuss how to end the nine-year war in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan: why US changed its mind about Karzai's 'jirga'
US officials initially had concerns about Karzai’s peace jirga, which is taking place in Kabul, Afghanistan. But with no Taliban representation at the event, the US shifted its stance.
By Howard LaFranchi, The Christian Science Monitor Staff writer June 2, 2010
Washington - Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s jirga, or national-consensus dialogue, is taking place with American blessings as much because of what it isn’t as for what it is.
Afghanistan peace conference debates talking to Taliban
Afghanistan's three-day national peace jirga, or conference opened with delegates divided over how best to deal with the Taliban. Some suggest implementing more Islamic laws.
By Anand Gopal, The Christian Science Monitor Correspondent / June 2, 2010
Kabul, Afghanistan - Afghanistan's much-awaited national peace conference opened Wednesday with nearly 1,500 tribal elders, government officials, and civil society representatives divided on how best to approach the insurgency and convince militants to lay down their arms.
Afghans talk, Taliban shoot
By Aunohita Mojumdar Asia Times Online
KABUL - The three-day peace jirga (council) that began on Wednesday is being projected by the international community - at least officially - as a critical moment in Afghanistan's history. The Taliban, it seems, also gave the event priority, launching a three-man suicide squad armed with rockets at the opening ceremony.
Cautious Optimism Greets Afghan Peace Council
By Abubakar Siddique Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty June 2, 2010
To some, the rumblings of reason have been echoing across the mountainous Afghanistan for weeks as delegates made their way to the Consultative Peace Jirga that began today in Kabul.
Afghan Reconciliation Jirga Set to Convene amid Skepticism
June 1, 2010 - 12:04pm, by Aunohita Mojumdar Eurasianet
The checkpoint at the entrance to the Loya Jirga complex in Kabul highlights the challenge facing President Hamid Karzai as his administration strives to reconcile with moderate Taliban elements. Security at the Jirga is perhaps heavier than at a major
For Karzai, Afghan peace meeting presents a key chance for legitimacy
The Washington Post By Karin Brulliard 01/06/2010
KABUL - Afghan President Hamid Karzai is to kick off a peace meeting here Wednesday, at which delegates from across this battle-scarred nation are expected to discuss a path to ending the war by bringing Taliban fighters into the mainstream.
Strategy vs. Tactics in Afghanistan
Good counterinsurgency can't make up for the lack of a political plan.
Wall Street Journal By ANN MARLOWE JUNE 2, 2010
Gen. Stanley McChrystal has embraced Hamid Karzai as part of the Obama administration's startling about-face on the Afghan president. Until recently, the Obama team seemed to understand that Mr. Karzai was "not an adequate strategic partner,
Proselytizing charges “need fair investigation
KABUL, 2 June 2010 (IRIN) - Two international NGOs facing accusations of religious proselytizing in Afghanistan have rejected the charges and an umbrella body has demanded a fair and impartial inquiry into the case.
Al Qaeda Again Forced to Fill Risky No. 3 Post
Wall Street Journal By SIOBHAN GORMAN JUNE 2, 2010
WASHINGTON - The strike that killed al Qaeda's operations chief last month deprives the group of a critical link to its affiliates as well as a crucial connection between its top leaders and foot soldiers.
Afghan president takes 'personal interest' in suspended NGOs
Tue Jun 1, 11:59 am ET
KABUL (AFP) – Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai is taking a personal interest in the case of two Western aid organisations at the centre of a controversy over Christian proselytising, his spokesman said Tuesday.
Iran rejects US accusation it is training, arming with Taliban
By Slobodan Lekic Canadian Press June 2, 2010
BRUSSELS — Iran dismissed on Wednesday accusations by the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan Gen. Stanley McChrystal that Tehran has helped train and arm Taliban insurgents.
Afghan Police Earn Poor Grade for Mission in Marja
The New York Times - Technology By C. J. CHIVERS June 1, 2010
MARJA, Afghanistan - Three months after arriving in the most dangerous area of Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, a contingent of specialized Afghan police officers has logged a mediocre performance while being almost wholly dependent on American supervision and support, Westerners who work with the officers said.
First hearing opens for Afghans detained by US
The Associated Press By HEIDI VOGT 01/06/2010
BAGRAM AIR FIELD, Afghanistan - Four Afghans accused in bombing attacks appeared Tuesday for a preliminary hearing — the start of a legal procedure which U.S. officials say will lead to the first trial of detainees held by American forces in Afghanistan.
Khalili says Kuchis need to get off land in Wardak
Pajhwok By Abdul Qadir Siddique 01/06/2010
KABUL - Mohammad Karim Khalili, Afghanistan's second vice president, on Monday declared all decrees granting land to nomadic Kuchis in central Maidan Wardak province to be null and void.
Australian Military Chief Says Steady Progress Made in Afghanistan
Voice of America Phil Mercer 01 June 2010
Sydney - Australian defense officials say more amored vehicles will soon be deployed to Afghanistan.
After two days of parliamentary testimony Tuesday, Defense Minister John Faulkner said that the government will spend $255 million on new armored vehicles to protect troops fighting a resurgent Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
Number of drug addicts on the rise in Kabul
Pajhwok By Niamatullah Zafarzoi 01/06/2010
KABUL - Close to the presidential palace in Afghanistans capital, Kabul, 22-year-old Dawood Jan sits staring listlessly into space.
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Afghanistan Taliban attack Hamid Karzai's 'peace jirga'
President Hamid Karzai's speech was interrupted by gunfire and nearby rocket explosions. He called for the Afghanistan Taliban to disassociate themselves with Al Qaeda and join the government.
By Kristen Chick, The Christian Science Monitor Correspondent June 2, 2010 at 8:41 am EDT
Gunfire and rocket attacks launched by the Afghanistan Taliban targeted the opening session of an assembly Wednesday in Kabul to discuss how to end the nine-year war in Afghanistan.
The attacks were another blow to the jirga, which was billed as an attempt to gain national consensus on how to approach peace talks with insurgents, but had already met skepticism and even boycotts from some Afghan leaders.
It was the third such conference since 2001, when the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom and ousted the Taliban. The Taliban had publicly rejected this latest jirga and last month announced it would launch a new offensive against foreign and Afghan troops, diplomats, and government workers.
The Washington Post reports that the first rocket attack struck near the jirga site as Afghan President Hamid Karzai gave his opening address. A gunfight then ensued as police attacked suspected suicide bombers the government said were attempting to detonate explosives near the tent where the assembly was held, and a second rocket was later launched.
There were no reported casualties among the approximately 1,600 delegates who attended the jirga, but police said they had shot and killed two suspected suicide bombers and taken a third into custody. At least two of the suspected bombers were wearing burqas to conceal their explosives, according to government officials.
The Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. Agence France-Presse reports that a Taliban spokesman claimed the group had sent four suicide bombers to target the assembly, and said they were shooting rockets into the tent from the roof of a nearby building. As The New York Times reports, the attacks marked a major failure of the security effort for the meeting. Police had blocked off access to the assembly area for a week before the meeting. According to the Times, the Taliban established a safe house inside the perimeter from which they launched their attacks.
Even as Taliban attacked the assembly, Mr. Karzai called on the insurgents to give up their arms:
In Mr. Karzai’s speech to the jirga, he called the Taliban “brothers” and “dear Talibs,” and he described their flight to Pakistan and their fighting as a reaction to injustices done by local Afghans who had “disturbed them “ and by foreign troops.
“To those Taliban compelled to flee by the government’s and foreign troops’ mistakes, they are welcome and can come and join us,” Mr. Karzai said.
Not welcome, he noted, were those connected to Al Qaeda and those who have harmed innocent Afghans.
Karzai said continued fighting would only prevent the withdrawal of foreign forces, according to the Associated Press. "Make peace with me and there will be no need for foreigners here. As long as you are not talking to us, not making peace with us, we will not let the foreigners leave," Karzai said.
At the sound of a rocket explosion, Karzai reportedly said: "Don't worry. We've heard this kind of thing before."
But The Christian Science Monitor reports that many were skeptical that the jirga would change the situation in Afghanistan, in part because it is not legally binding and its delegates do not include any of the insurgents the government wants to persuade to stop fighting.
Even with limited goals, many Afghans question the timing and legitimacy of the three-day event that starts Wednesday. The gathering does not meet delegate requirements for a loya jirga, or grand council, that would have a fuller representation and thus authority under the Constitution. Instead, aside from some high-profile figures such as parliamentarians and civil society leaders, the guests have been selected by the government.
"To have peace in a country you have to involve all different bodies of the nation," says Fawzia Kofi, a leading female member of parliament (MP). "The people who are hand-picked are not enough. You need people in the international community and the people who are actually fighting."
The attacks came a day after Al Qaeda's top commander in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, was reported killed from a May 22 drone strike in neighboring Pakistan's tribal area. And on Sunday, Coalition and Afghan forces reportedly killed one of the top two Taliban commanders in Kandahar, where NATO is set to launch a major offensive this summer.
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Afghanistan: why US changed its mind about Karzai's 'jirga'
US officials initially had concerns about Karzai’s peace jirga, which is taking place in Kabul, Afghanistan. But with no Taliban representation at the event, the US shifted its stance.
By Howard LaFranchi, The Christian Science Monitor Staff writer June 2, 2010
Washington - Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s jirga, or national-consensus dialogue, is taking place with American blessings as much because of what it isn’t as for what it is.
Billed by Mr. Karzai as a national assembly of peace and reconciliation, the three-day event in Kabul is bereft of any political opposition, let alone Taliban representation. So there is no danger of concessions to the Taliban leadership – a concern that led US officials to press for the postponement of the jirga for several months.
The jirga now appears to be little more than an exercise in bolstering the political support of a tainted leader whom the United States has decided it has no choice but to work with. As a result, the US has shifted to accepting the jirga, Afghanistan analysts say, with relative certainty that it no longer presents drawbacks for American goals in the war with the Afghan Taliban.
“Basically, we’re giving Karzai a pass on this, and after some earlier concerns, we’re saying, ‘Go in good health,’ and we’ll see what comes of it,” says Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department intelligence specialist now at the Middle East Institute in Washington.
The Obama administration used Karzai’s visit to Washington last month to spell out to the Afghan leader what the jirga should and shouldn’t do.
At a public appearance with Karzai during his visit, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton alluded to a national-reconciliation dialogue that would begin with this week’s jirga. While suggesting US support for a process aimed at reintegrating low- and mid-level Taliban fighters into Afghan society, she also laid down a set of conditions that any reformed insurgents would have to meet.
What Karzai described as “countryside boys” in the fight simply for the pay would have to renounce violence, Secretary Clinton said. Also, they and mid-level leaders would have to cut any ties to Al Qaeda and adhere to the laws and rights set forth in Afghanistan’s Constitution – including women’s rights.
Karzai’s May visit to Washington did not resolve all the differences between the two governments on the Taliban issue, in particular the question of a dialogue with senior Taliban leaders. But this week’s jirga won’t address that issue anyway, some Afghanistan analysts note.
“Karzai’s government really does want to engage the Taliban senior leadership, but Obama and [US Gen. Stanley] McChrystal say they want to weaken the Taliban on the ground first in order to bring them to the table,” says Malou Innocent, an Afghanistan-Pakistan specialist at the Cato Institute in Washington.
US officials are reluctant about instituting the kind of cash-for-loyalty program that helped turn the tide in Iraq because they fear Afghanistan may not be ready for it.
“Winning over the low-level Taliban fighters is part of our COIN [counterinsurgency] policy, but we also know that before people can make the jump, they have to feel secure about it. And the reality is we’re not there yet,” Mr. Weinbaum says. “It you start handing out money now, it’s just money down the drain, or could even backfire,” he adds, if the money simply ended up in Taliban hands.
In Iraq, the Sons of Iraq – Sunni Iraqis in the insurgent stronghold of Anbar who were wooed with cash to support the government – were a crucial component in weakening the insurgency. But, Weinbaum notes, the Iraqi movement started with powerful sheikhs who were able to deliver large numbers of Iraqis.
“That scenario just doesn’t exist in Afghanistan right now,” he says.
The Afghan government, says Ms. Innocent of the Cato Institute, has already shown that it is unable to secure and hold areas of the country that coalition forces have cleared – something average Afghans and Taliban fighters alike would be looking for.
That means the jirga in the end may have little to do with boosting Afghanistan’s reconciliation process. “A better barometer” of Afghanistan’s future path may be this fall’s planned parliamentary elections, Innocent says. Successful elections demonstrating popular support for the government would be very likely to have a stronger impact on Taliban calculations.
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Afghanistan peace conference debates talking to Taliban
Afghanistan's three-day national peace jirga, or conference opened with delegates divided over how best to deal with the Taliban. Some suggest implementing more Islamic laws.
By Anand Gopal, The Christian Science Monitor Correspondent / June 2, 2010
Kabul, Afghanistan - Afghanistan's much-awaited national peace conference opened Wednesday with nearly 1,500 tribal elders, government officials, and civil society representatives divided on how best to approach the insurgency and convince militants to lay down their arms.
They have three days to reach consensus. At issue is whether there should be talks with the Taliban's leadership and whether the Afghan constitution should be revised to implement more Islamic laws.
President Hamid Karzai opened the three-day conference, known here as a jirga, by reaching out to insurgents. "My dear Taliban, you are welcome in your own soil," he told participants gathered under a massive, air-conditioned tent in the capital. "Do not hurt this country or kill yourselves."
The conference is one the largest gatherings of its kind in Afghanistan since 2001. But many Afghans doubt it will mark a significant step towards peace. Most delegates were handpicked by the Afghan government, leading to concern that the jirga isn't really representative or independent.
Delegates were divided into 28 working groups, which will spend the next two days attempting to come to a consensus and draft a proposal to the Afghan government. The government is not obligated to implement the jirga's recommendations.
While Mr. Karzai and other government officials made clear that the nature of the Afghan constitution or the Afghan government was not up for negotiation, some jirga delegates say a revised constitution could help convince insurgents to lay down their arms.
Debate over Islamic laws
"Right now the Taliban are fighting because of the presence of the foreigners, and because some Islamic rules they want are not being applied," says Maulavi Asadullah, a religious cleric from Kunar and jirga delegate. "But if we make some changes and introduce Islamic rules, we may be able to convince some of them."
Such changes may be opposed, however, by civil society and women's groups who worry that their rights could come under threat.
Also at issue is whether the peace strategy should be limited to peeling away rank and file insurgents and mid-level leaders or opening negotiations with the Taliban leadership. "We know this jirga won't solve the whole problem, but hopefully it will be a start," says jirga delegate Gul Alam, a tribal elder from Kunar province. "We have to make sure we don't talk about fundamentalist Taliban and moderate Taliban, we should just figure out a way to address the whole movement."
Other delegates say the believe only the rank and file should be targeted, through reintegration programs and efforts to strengthen Afghan governance. "We need to hasten administrative reforms and the judiciary system needs to be built," says Ismat Baluch, a delegate from Zabul province.
Insurgents reject jirga, but Hizb-i-Islami hints at peace deal
President Karzai's opening remarks came as the Taliban fired a series of rockets near the jirga's grounds. Three suicide bombers attempted to breach the conference's security but police killed two and captured one before they could enter, Afghan officials said. No jirga participants were harmed.
The Taliban, who were not invited to the event, reject its legitimacy. Hizb-i-Islami, another main insurgent faction, also dismissed the meeting because “the participants consist of persons who are state favorites.”
But in a sign that some insurgents may be willing to work with the government, Hizb-i-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar told the Monitor in an exclusive e-mail interview that his group has decided to open talks with the Afghan government and is ready for a peace deal.
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Afghans talk, Taliban shoot
By Aunohita Mojumdar Asia Times Online
KABUL - The three-day peace jirga (council) that began on Wednesday is being projected by the international community - at least officially - as a critical moment in Afghanistan's history. The Taliban, it seems, also gave the event priority, launching a three-man suicide squad armed with rockets at the opening ceremony.
Two blasts and sporadic gunfire were heard in the air-conditioned tent as Karzai delivered his opening address, while a third took place just 200 meters from the venue. "Sit down, nothing will happen," said the Aghan president. "I have become used to this. Even my three-year-old son is used to it."
The attackers, armed with rifles and rocket launchers, had explosives strapped to their bodies under the women's burqas they had worn to slip past security staff. Two were reportedly killed and no delegates were hurt, according to local officials.
After calming delegates, Karzai said it was the Taliban's insurgency that was keeping the international occupiers they resent in the country.
"You should provide the opportunity for the foreign forces to leave," Karzai told the conference, according to the Associated Press. "Make peace with me and there will be no need for foreigners here. As long as you are not talking to us, not making peace with us, we will not let the foreigners leave."
Senior officials of Western donor countries have expressed hope that the jirga, the first concrete step in the process of "reconciliation" with armed opposition groups, including the Taliban, would provide the political impetus to bring the protracted conflict to an end. But these pronouncements smack of desperation, as the international community scrambles for the next big solution that will turn the situation around.
The three-day consultative mechanism may produce very little resolution to the insurgency. With between 1,400 to 1,600 participants expected to attend, criticism of inclusions and exclusions of participants and dissension within the government itself, an unclear agenda and threats of boycott, the peace jirga may be little more than a political endorsement mandating President Hamid Karzai to move forward toward the goal.
Najib Amin, a deputy on the meeting's organizing committee, said the jirga will aim to ''identify mechanisms based on which we can negotiate, identify categories of opposition with whom we can negotiate, mechanism on how to approach them, identify people who are not negotiable and what the government should do with them".
Any declaration would also likely to be shorn of real details in order to accommodate disparate views. Whatever process is set in motion this week, it is also likely that several major sections of the insurgency will remain outside the ambit of any reconciliation since they are ideologically opposed to the values represented by the incumbent government.
However, the real goal thrown up by the "reconciliation" plan is one that appears to have taken place already - rapprochement of the international community and the Karzai government.
Tired of the long military engagement, both have latched onto "reconciliation and reintegration" as the next big plan, and appear willing to subsume their differences to find a way out of the morass.
The panacea, however, is yet another refrain of the old song that a military solution alone cannot work. That song has been sung to different beats for several years now, though earlier versions included development, governance, rule of law and accountability as necessary measures to complement military achievements.
Now, apparently, those goals are being sidelined as the international community chooses to further curtail its ambitions regarding Afghanistan, reconciling itself with existing realities even when they subvert the goals of nation-building.
The goals, now pared down, are to ensure that Afghanistan does not pose a threat to Western nations, either as a staging post of international terrorist strikes or as a sanctuary for anti-Western groups to take hold.
While these aims have always been core to the Western intervention for a number of years, there was an understanding that in pursuit of those aims Afghanistan could and would be rebuilt with a new state structure, since this represented the best bet of making sure Afghanistan became a stable state, and not one vulnerable to being subverted by terrorist groups.
The safety of Afghans and internal cohesion within Afghanistan were therefore seen as being coterminous with the goal of security for the West. However, somewhere along the way the goals have diverged as the costs of the intervention have steadily risen in Western capitals.
These costs have not been inconsiderable. Ever growing casualties among Western forces, billions of dollars diverted to Afghanistan (which seem more questionable at a time of Western recession and job losses) and political prices, ranging from ministers losing their jobs in Germany, to the fall of a government in the Netherlands over the issue of Afghanistan. In the midst of this chaos, reconciliation has emerged as a way to match Western goals with existing realities in the Asian nation.
The reconciliation plan has halted, for the moment, the spectacular unraveling of relations between Karzai and the Western compact. Whatever misgivings Western nations had earlier regarding the viability of Karzai as a trusted partner - and a spate of stories in the Western media testify to this - these have now been shed in the mutual warm embrace of the reconciliation strategy. In a matter of weeks Karzai has gone from being a weak, indecisive, incapable leader burdened by an unscrupulous family to the man who will bring together the disparate interests of Afghans with exemplary leadership.
Along the way the international community appears to have swallowed several of its goals and professed commitments. Whatever the jirga may or may not discuss - it is already clear what will not be included in the discussions.
Jirga czar Farooq Wardak told a gathering of civil society representatives that "justice" and "human rights" were not on the agenda and would not be discussed. Despite the shock of the participants, Wardak was at least being honest. The issues had been sidelined long back.
Earlier this year it became clear that the government had passed an amnesty law that protected all those engaged in hostilities in the past and the present from prosecution. The law makes no distinction about the kind of crimes, whether war crimes, crimes against humanity or rape. It also makes no mention of a cut-off date.
The law was passed with scarcely a murmur from the international community even as it violates Afghanistan's commitments to international treaties, according to the country's Independent Human Rights Commission, and treads on the millions of Afghan citizens who have been victims of brutality and war crimes while also strengthening the culture of impunity.
The same international community had kicked up a fuss when the law was first introduced in 2007, but in the changed climate, the law was accepted since it had been projected as a necessary first step in the process of reconciliation.
Representatives of the millions of Afghanistan's victims have come together with the commission to present a united demand for the implementation of the transitional justice plan, under which the perpetrators of crimes - including those in the government and in powerful positions - would be held accountable.
In its eagerness not to antagonize the government and Karzai further at this juncture, the international community has failed to endorse the plan and also subverted its own proclaimed goals of strengthening Afghan institutions. The same international community, following the controversial 2009 presidential polls, had predicated its support to future elections on the government carrying out necessary electoral reforms.
However, not only were reforms not carried out, but the president introduced a new electoral law that further erodes the independence of the electoral mechanisms. While the international community had sought an independent appointment mechanism for the Independent Election Commission to prevent electoral malpractices, in actuality Karzai's new law also subverted the independence of yet another body, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), which was the only institution that stood up against the electoral fraud in 2009.
Focusing purely on the international members of the ECC, the international community led by the United Nations, put all its weight behind securing the UN's right to nominate two members to the commission. This right, won through hard negotiations, was presented as an achievement but no mention was made of the fact that the new law also took away the right of independent Afghan institutions, namely the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Supreme Court, to appoint members to this body.
Moreover, it institutionalized the right of Karzai, as president, to appoint members to this body, thus compromising an independent appointment mechanism. Despite the clear challenge to the process of institutional building to which the donor nations committed themselves, they accepted this erosion of independence and the forthcoming parliamentary election has received the requisite funding from the international community.
While building of institutions, rule of law, governance and support for human rights are processes which require time, resources and energy, the international community's accommodation of political expediency is not limited to this. Senior officials of the donor nations and international organizations are now saying publicly and repeatedly that they cannot afford to challenge the existing power structures in Afghanistan but must work with them.
Tackling the power structures would necessitate that the international community remain in Afghanistan for the next 20 years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization senior civilian representative Mark Sedwill stated last month, while expressing hope that individuals with power and influence would support the endeavors of the government and the international community.
This hope, however, overlooks the fact that the international community, through its practice of delivering aid without adequate checks and balances, has enriched a small section of people by allowing them to acquire power disproportionate to their role, authority and legitimacy within Afghan institutions and within the community.
Sufficient levels of well-documented data have established clearly that commanders, leaders of armed militia and power-brokers have been empowered through contracts worth billions of dollars given by the international community in exchange for security, land, services and goods provided to the international community.
Moreover, the bulk of aid distributed for development and humanitarian purposes has also been channeled without sufficient oversight allowing some of its distribution to be mediated by power-brokers.
In doing so, the international community has created a clear conflict of interest. Many officials and politicians in roles of authority have profited directly from the ongoing conflict and have a direct stake in its continuation, an interest that conflicts with their expressed commitment to building a secure and stable Afghanistan.
This contradiction has been encouraged and even utilized by donor nations who, in their own domestic arena, take a dim view of a conflict of interests and have legal redress.
However, rather than tackling the contradictions, donor nations are now reconciling themselves to the existence of structural and institutional imbalances of power that they have either introduced, allowed or ignored. If that represents a contradiction between their professed word and deed, the reconciliation strategy is certainly a good way of subsuming all inconsistencies.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for the past 19 years.
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Cautious Optimism Greets Afghan Peace Council
By Abubakar Siddique Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty June 2, 2010
To some, the rumblings of reason have been echoing across the mountainous Afghanistan for weeks as delegates made their way to the Consultative Peace Jirga that began today in Kabul.
Earlier this week, some 1,000 elders and local notables gathered in Farah, a remote desert province in western Afghanistan, in a show of support for the jirga, or grand council.
It's a centuries-old tribal institution that Afghans rely on to find consensus, discuss issues of the day, and resolve disputes.
Local tribal leader Ghulam Jillani expressed hope that this gathering would help reach out to recalcitrant "brothers." In this case, that is a euphemism for Afghans who are fighting against President Hamid Karzai's administration and its international allies, often within various Taliban factions or under the banner of the Hezb-e Islami led by fugitive Islamist leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
"We want our brothers to reconcile with us so we are spared further destruction and can rebuild our homeland," Jillani says. "We express 100 percent support for the gathering in Kabul, and we hope it will have good results for promoting Islam and reconstruction of our homeland."
'Beginning A Process'
Some 1,600 delegates, nearly one-fifth of them women, are expected to participate in the three-day jirga. There, they will debate President Karzai's proposals to reintegrate insurgent foot soldiers into Afghan society by offering them amnesty, jobs, and security. According to a draft peace plan seen by RFE/RL, leaders of the insurgency would be offered political roles or exile to a friendly Muslim nation, in exchange for dropping their weapons.
Armed opponents have already made their presence known, with a rocket attack near the site of the jirga in the opening minutes of Karzai's welcome speech to delegates, followed by gun battles and an apparent suicide attack within 200 meters of the main tent. Two attackers were reported killed, but no delegates were hurt.
Speaking to RFE/RL, Vygaudas Usackas, the European Union's special envoy to Afghanistan, says that the event enjoys broad support from the European Union, the United States, NATO, and its international allies.
Usackas, a former Lithuanian foreign minister, says the jirga will pave the way for a "new page" in Afghanistan's struggle for a peaceful settlement. "Having in mind the complexity of problems and challenges the Afghan nation is facing, the peace jirga will not produce immediate results," Usackas says.
He argues that it will "earmark the beginning of the process, which will provide the framework and the mechanism for the future peace settlement," adding, "In that respect, we wholeheartedly support the Afghan-led initiative of future peace settlement."
Independent Afghan experts, however, raise critical questions about the event.
Kabul-based Afghan analyst Mohammad Yunos Fakur tells RFE/RL that although a vast majority of his compatriots are eager for peace, they have doubts about the participants and proceedings of the peace jirga. "All invited delegates are people liked by the government or are part of institutions that make up the current political system," he says.
"Independent-minded critics who disapprove of some government policies have not been invited to this jirga," he says.
Fakur insists Afghans are confused about the agenda of this jirga, saying the absence of a clear Afghan government plan or road map for peace undermines the idea of consulting the nation about peace. Moreover, any discussion of making reforms to the government and political system, whose flaws he views as partly fueling the insurgency, is off the agenda.
Too Narrow?
Fakur suggests that the jirga should have concentrated on all critical questions that his country faces. "Its [priorities] should have been to pressure Karzai to bring about a good government in place. And on the other hand it should come up with a clear plan on how to deal with the armed opposition," he says.
He thinks it should answer questions such as: Are they ready to share power with the opponents? Are they ready to change the constitution? Are they ready to delay the parliamentary elections?
"In the absence of such clear plans, the jirga will turn into a mere government sponsored event," Fakur warns.
Fakur and other Afghan experts suggest that the jirga is expected to deliver greater political legitimacy to Karzai, whose reputation was bruised by last year's presidential election.
They suggest that the event is likely to reassure support from Afghanistan's disparate minority ethnic groups, most of whom have opposed reconciliation with the Taliban, which is still remembered for its atrocities of the 1990s. Some minority leaders fear that Karzai dealings with the Taliban and Hezb-e Islami -- which like Karzai are ethnic Pashtuns, the majority ethnic group in the country -- would undermine their power and influence in the post 9/11 political system.
In an effort to woo opposition lawmakers to end their boycott of peace jirga, Karzai on June 1 appointed a six-member commission to rule on constitutional disputes. His spokesman also promised to nominate 11 ministers for parliamentary approval next week, a sign that the Karzai administration is prepared to give in to the demands of legislators who have held up the formation of his cabinet.
Prominent opposition leader and Karzai's opponent in the first round of last year's presidential election, Abdullah Abdullah, responded by saying on June 1 that neither he nor his supporters would join the jirga. He stopped short of a boycott, but said "we will not participate in it," agencies reported.
Complex Reconciliation
The potential prize the administration can gain from the jirga, observers suggest, is being able to walk away with support for inviting hard-line Islamist leader Hekmatyar to join the political mainstream. Discussing Hekmatyar's fate was reportedly high on Karzai's agenda as he toured Washington last month. In March, his representatives met with Karzai and senior UN officials and offered to support Kabul's government if Western troops were to gradually withdraw. Hekmatyar has also distanced himself from Al-Qaeda, whose leaders he has known for decades.
Briefly a prime minister in a failed postcommunist factional government in the 1990s, Hekmatyar joined hands with the Taliban after the U.S.-led military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. But as he led part of the insurgency, many of his past associates joined with Karzai to become cabinet members, advisers, provincial governors, and lawmakers.
Reconciliation with Hekmatyar, though significant, would not end the insurgency, and delegates to the peace jirga are well aware of their country's complexities.
Qari Abdul Rahman Ahmadi, a member of the Parwan provincial council north of Kabul, says that the Afghan government and its international partners should commit to implementing the jirga's decisions and proposals. "The opponents of the government, people that we are trying to make peace with, they should accept our peace proposals and they should put forward their particular plans and mechanisms for peace," Ahmadi says.
The Taliban have already dismissed the jirga, saying in a statement attributed to them that the event is aimed at "securing the interests of foreigners," according to AP. But the Taliban's major demand -- the withdrawal of all foreign forces -- is no easy sell among average Afghans and their government.
RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan contributed to this report
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Afghan Reconciliation Jirga Set to Convene amid Skepticism
June 1, 2010 - 12:04pm, by Aunohita Mojumdar Eurasianet
The checkpoint at the entrance to the Loya Jirga complex in Kabul highlights the challenge facing President Hamid Karzai as his administration strives to reconcile with moderate Taliban elements. Security at the Jirga is perhaps heavier than at a major Western airport, with all vehicles and equipment being swabbed and checked for evidence of bomb-making residue. The government’s fear of a car bombing appears to be just as great as its desire to win insurgents back over to its side.
The three-day loya jirga, or grand council, which will mull Karzai’s reconciliation and reintegration plan, is scheduled to open June 2. Taliban representatives have not been explicitly invited to participate in the debates, said Najib Amin, a deputy on the meeting’s organizing committee. But, Amin added, the Taliban will have sympathizers among the participants who can represent the Islamic militants’ interests.
The approximately 1,600 delegates to the National Consultative Peace Jirga will aim to “identify mechanisms based on which we can negotiate, identify categories of opposition with whom we can negotiate, mechanism on how to approach them, identify people who are not negotiable and what the government should do with them,” Amin said.
To keep the proceedings manageable, delegates will be divided into 28 groups. Technical facilitators have undergone training in order to keep debates efficient and orderly. At the end of the three days of discussions, it is hoped that the entire jirga will be able to produce a declaration of intent. However, distilling the decisions of the 28 groups into one common position promises to be difficult. Local Afghan media outlets in recent days have highlighted policy differences among the country’s top leaders, suggesting that the jirga could be contentious and have trouble harmonizing disparate views.
Regardless of the jirga’s outcome, its decisions and declarations will be non-binding on the government. The word “consultative” was added to the jirga’s official title after members of parliament criticized what they saw as an administration attempt to circumvent legislative authority. As a result, all jirga decisions will require the endorsement of either the cabinet or the legislature.
On the eve of the jirga, there remained the possibility that a significant number of MPs would boycott the event. Legislators had demanded that Karzai fill out his cabinet before the convocation of the jirga. Already, Abdullah Abdullah, the main opposition leader and unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2009, has announced he will stay away from the gathering, contending that it will not be adequately representative of the Afghan nation. “This jirga started with the government, and will end with the government,” Abdullah said during a news conference.
Since Karzai unveiled his plans during a donor conference in January, the reconciliation idea has faced skepticism from several Afghan constituencies. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Human rights activists have expressed concerns that Karzai was willing to make sacrifices on Afghanistan’s democratization in order to cut a deal with moderate Taliban elements. “Reconciliation should not be a reconciliation behind curtains, just a political reconciliation,” Nader Nadery, a commissioner on the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, told a gathering of civil society groups who have been working together to demand transitional justice.
An essential factor for securing a stable future for Afghanistan is an honest accounting of past actions during the country’s past 30-plus years of strife. Those who committed atrocities must be held accountable, Nadery has asserted, adding that the implementation of Karzai’s reconciliation plan could become an obstacle toward this end. In early May, some rights advocates organized their own “victims’” jirga, during which they questioned whether reconciliation without justice could bring peace.
Also skeptical about the reconciliation initiative are women’s advocacy groups. Amid intense lobbying in recent months, approximately 20 percent of the jirga’s delegates will be women. Originally, only 30 women had been slated to participate in the debates. While women will still be vastly underrepresented at the gathering in relation to their percentage of the population, observers view the expansion of female delegates as a significant development. How influential the female delegates will be in defending women’s rights remains to be seen. Some advocates worry that the small gains made in recent years in the sphere of women’s rights will be rolled back. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive]. While reconciliation as a means of shortening, or even ending the war has been supported by most donor states publicly, many Westerners in Kabul express doubts in private. “The Karzai government’s plan does not seem like a political plan at all,” said a Western diplomat. “It resembles a project proposal.”
To many Western policymakers, the reconciliation route seems to be the best option among an array of unappetizing choices. Perhaps the top priority should be improving the Afghan government’s responsiveness to popular needs and concerns. But many international observers emphasize that bringing about such a transformation would take decades. “We can’t reconstruct Afghanistan’s power structure from scratch, so we have to co-opt the power brokers by making clear that their only future lies in becoming part of the solution,” NATO Senior Civilian Representative Mark Sedwill said recently. Sedwill added that an attempt to remake the power structure would require an international community presence in Afghanistan for perhaps the next 20 years.
Editor's note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for the past 19 years.
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For Karzai, Afghan peace meeting presents a key chance for legitimacy
The Washington Post By Karin Brulliard 01/06/2010
KABUL - Afghan President Hamid Karzai is to kick off a peace meeting here Wednesday, at which delegates from across this battle-scarred nation are expected to discuss a path to ending the war by bringing Taliban fighters into the mainstream.
The start of the much-anticipated meeting, called a jirga, comes after several delays and amid great skepticism about its agenda. As preparations were completed this week, many Afghans said their hopes for the jirga were low, while organizers played down its aims by emphasizing that it was just one step in a long process to pacify an insurgency still raging after nine years.
In any event, the 1,500-person gathering might end up being more about politics than peace. Karzai announced plans for the meeting when he was inaugurated after a fraud-riddled election seven months ago, and he has struggled since for credibility. The jirga is a key moment for Karzai to try to unite a divided nation and regain legitimacy, Afghan and Western officials said this week -- or, if it goes badly, to lose even more of it.
"This jirga will only benefit the president," said Hanif Shah, a member of parliament from Khost province, who said he plans to attend. "The jirga is a political one. It is not a jirga for the peace process."
Officially, organizers say, the idea is to bring together representatives who span Afghan society -- including lawmakers, tribal leaders, civil society activists, clerics and entrepreneurs -- to define their enemies and craft ground rules for making peace with them. Those ideas will then be used to "enrich or drastically change" the government's draft plan for reintegrating foot soldiers and reconciling with Taliban leaders, said Waheed Omer, a Karzai spokesman.
But critics say the government has micromanaged the design of what is supposed to be a community-based meeting, and that the list of invited delegates is stacked with Karzai backers who are not representative of Afghanistan. They say the purpose is not clear, and that talks of peace-making mean nothing if the Taliban are not on board.
The main Taliban factions were not invited, and their leaders have repeatedly nixed the idea of negotiations. But the delegation, which includes tribal leaders from insurgent-plagued swaths of Afghanistan, is likely to include Taliban sympathizers and confidants.
Various groups of parliamentarians have threatened to boycott the event, including some who are demanding that Karzai appoint nominees for 11 cabinet positions that remain unfilled. The main political opposition bloc, the National Front, has complained that its members were intentionally left off the list of invitees.
"This sounds like a PR exercise to show that we are making an effort to achieve peace in this country," Abdullah Abdullah, the bloc's presidential candidate in last year's elections, said at a news conference on Tuesday. "This has started with the government and it will end with the government."
Despite the concerns, Western officials -- who generally do not back the idea of deal-making with top Taliban leaders -- lined up this week to support the peace jirga. NATO officials characterized it as one in a series of landmark events this year, including an international conference in Kabul in July and parliamentary elections in the fall. Yet they suggested that might not mean it will deliver concrete results.
The jirga "is one of the most important political events that has happened in Afghanistan over the past few years," Mark Sedwill, NATO's senior civilian representative in Afghanistan, said this week. He added that "it's the beginning of the process, and the opportunity for the insurgents to join the process will come later."
A bigger question, Afghan and Western officials said, was how Karzai would deal with a topic that is not officially on the agenda but is almost certain to come up: the presence of international troops, which both Taliban leaders and many ordinary Afghans disdain.
Shah, the member of parliament, said he expects Karzai to play the populist by condemning civilian casualties caused by the U.S.-led coalition, a hot-button issue. Others said he is likely to address those themes but assure the crowd that he had made Afghans' opinions known during his recent trip to Washington.
"The logic of this jirga is not to bring immediate peace," said Mohammed Noor Akbari, a member of parliament from Daikundi province and Karzai supporter. "Now we are proceeding to meet each other, and to exchange ideas, and find some way to deal with this problem which we have in Afghanistan.
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Strategy vs. Tactics in Afghanistan
Good counterinsurgency can't make up for the lack of a political plan.
Wall Street Journal By ANN MARLOWE JUNE 2, 2010
Gen. Stanley McChrystal has embraced Hamid Karzai as part of the Obama administration's startling about-face on the Afghan president. Until recently, the Obama team seemed to understand that Mr. Karzai was "not an adequate strategic partner," in the well-chosen words of our ambassador (and former general) Karl Eikenberry. Mr. Karzai's refusal to name cabinet ministers in the wake of the August 2009 election (as required by the constitution) so angered his own parliament that for several days last month they refused to conduct any business, instead sitting silent in protest.
Mr. Karzai and the American commander are both following what Col. Gian Gentile, head of military history at West Point, has called "a strategy of tactics"—by which he means ground-level measures pursued on an ad hoc basis without an overall objective.
Mr. Karzai has no vision of his country's future. But he's adept at playing off all the actors, including the U.S., against each other in the hope he will be the only one left standing. His strange lack of urgency about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, according to Abdullah Abdullah, the leader of the Afghan democratic opposition, stems from his underlying belief that the U.S. decision to gradually withdraw next summer is a bluff. Many Afghans think the U.S. is there for ulterior motives (Afghanistan's small oil and gas reserves, coal, taking Afghan farmland) and will stay forever.
Gen. McChrystal of course wants the best for his country and for Afghanistan. But he has a constituency in the military to serve as well. To avoid being tagged as a "knuckledragger" (the military's term for an unreconstructed commander who "doesn't get it" about counterinsurgency), he constantly states that we're fighting a "war of perceptions" and that winning over the Afghan population is the key to victory. His tactics are those enshrined in his boss Gen. David Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
The manual, which draws upon French counterinsurgency theorist David Galula and other military thinkers of the 1950s and '60s, urges stationing troops in small outposts close to the people, using the military to do armed social work, and measuring success in perceptions. The idea is that if you execute process correctly at the local level, you create spots of security that eventually grow to cover the disputed area. The population refuses to help the insurgents and allies itself with the government.
The press has bought Gen. McChrystal's line that now, finally, the American military will follow best-practice counterinsurgency and that now, finally, we will see good results.
I've seen our military do what the Field Manual says is right over the course of six embeds from the summer of 2007 onward, long before Gen. McChrystal took command on June 15, 2009. I've seen successes at the local and even provincial level—but nothing that has lasted even a year. In nearly every province and district of Regional Command East and Regional Command South, the security situation is either the same as it was in 2007 or significantly worse. The reason is that counterinsurgency is a set of tactics, not a strategy. It tells you how to persuade the population to embrace a good government, but it can't make a government acceptable to the people.
Anywhere counterinsurgency has worked there has been a good government in place. The Karzai government has become more egregiously corrupt and incompetent in the last three or four years. Fraud in the Aug. 20, 2009, election soured large segments of the population on the government and even the democratic process. Cynicism has replaced hope among young people, and conspiracy theories about American motives have gained ground.
Now Mr. Karzai and American leaders are pushing negotiations with the Taliban, a terrible idea for many reasons, practical and moral. It's part of the same confusion of process with vision that we're seeing from American leaders. Mr. Karzai and the Taliban aren't the only alternatives in Afghanistan. We have stupidly refused to show the Afghans that we take good governance seriously. Talking about the "war of perceptions" is not enough. We need a political strategy before we, and the Afghan people, lose.
Ms. Marlowe, a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute, recently completed her sixth embed with American troops in Afghanistan. Her monograph on David Galula will be published by the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College this summer.
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Proselytizing charges “need fair investigation
KABUL, 2 June 2010 (IRIN) - Two international NGOs facing accusations of religious proselytizing in Afghanistan have rejected the charges and an umbrella body has demanded a fair and impartial inquiry into the case.
The government has ordered Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and Church World Service (CWS) to temporarily suspend their activities until the case is investigated.
“We demand a fair and impartial investigation to illuminate these allegations,” Laurent Sailard, director of ACBAR, a consortium of more than 100 NGOs, including NCA and CWS, told IRIN.
He said the allegations were false and baseless.
"We have never and will never engage in any religious proselytism. Such activities are contrary to our mandate as a humanitarian organization, and we fully respect the religion of the communities we serve," Maurice Bloem, deputy director of CWS, said in a statement posted on its website.
The NCA has also denied the accusation, saying it worked to alleviate humanitarian hardship.
Under Afghanistan’s laws, religious proselytizing is forbidden and considered a serious crime.
Officials in the Ministry of Economy (MoE) said formal investigations into the case had begun but could not ensure the process would be fair.
“Everybody knows how our courts and judicial system work,” said Sediq Amarkhil, the MoE’s spokesman, adding that public perceptions had been distorted by widespread anti-NGO rhetoric.
Blame game
The controversy began after a private TV station, Noorin, showed video recordings of several Afghan men allegedly converting to Christianity.
“We have not accused the two NGOs but have aired a film for public awareness,” said Jawed Ibrahimi, an editor of the station, adding that the MoE had accused the NGOs apparently because of the word “church” in their names.
However, MoE officials said both CWS and NCA were accused by the TV presenters and there was no official bias to the NGOs’ names.
“We know this channel has its politics and has caused the controversy for political gain,” said Amarkhil.
ACBAR has also accused Noorin TV of spreading negative propaganda against NGOs and has filed an official complaint with the MoE.
However, Amarkhil said should investigations prove the NGOs are guilty, their operating licences will be revoked and their officials possibly punished according to Afghan law.
“We have also formed a commission, comprised of several ministries, to decide what should be done with the TV channel if investigations prove the NGOs are innocent,” he said.
About 1,547 NGOs, among them 302 international NGOs, are registered with the MoE, which cancelled the licences of 152 national and 20 foreign NGOs in May, saying they had not submitted six-monthly reports to the MoE for two years.
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Al Qaeda Again Forced to Fill Risky No. 3 Post
Wall Street Journal By SIOBHAN GORMAN JUNE 2, 2010
WASHINGTON - The strike that killed al Qaeda's operations chief last month deprives the group of a critical link to its affiliates as well as a crucial connection between its top leaders and foot soldiers.
But al Qaeda has become adept at filling this post, which by some counts has now had seven occupants since 2001.
"They seem to be able to replace people in this position with a fair degree of success," said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA official who ran the Obama administration's first review of Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. "They have a bench that's large enough so that when someone dies, they can put in a successor who can continue operational activity."
For example, he said, a 2006 foiled airliner plot in the U.K. was the product of three successive al Qaeda operational commanders.
The ability to replace key figures also points to the limitations of killing off top leaders with drone strikes, said Michael Scheuer, a former CIA official who launched the agency's unit dedicated to al Qaeda.
The post of operations chief for al Qaeda is one of the riskiest, terrorism specialists say, because it requires regular contact with a host of people from different organizations. Unlike al Qaeda's top two leaders—Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri—the third in command is a far-more-exposed battlefield role that is more easily spotted by U.S. intelligence.
"He was running the day-to-day operations of al Qaeda in Afghanistan," said Rita Katz, founder of the SITE Intelligence Group. "To that extent, he had to be reachable, which made his location more known."
A founding member of al Qaeda, Mr. Masri was particularly valued within the group for the connection he provided to its top leaders as well as with affiliated groups such as the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and the Haqqani Network.
Also known as Mustafa al-Yazid, Mr. Masri is believed to have provided critical links between the group's top leaders and those executing attacks in coordination with al Qaeda. Those include the December attack on a CIA base in Afghanistan, Najibullah Zazi's foiled New York subway-bombing plot and financing for Sept. 11 hijackers.
"It's not news to them that this is an incredibly vulnerable position," said Bruce Hoffman, a professor at Georgetown University who has written extensively on al Qaeda.
By Mr. Hoffman's count, the group has had seven people in the No. 3 post since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The first to be killed was al Qaeda military chief Mohammed Atef, who died in the U.S. offensive in November 2001.
The definition of al Qaeda's No. 3 is subject to interpretation, however. Not all have been of equal stature, and some terrorism specialists say al Qaeda has had multiple third-ranking leaders at the same time, much as U.S. agencies often have multiple undersecretaries.
U.S. officials and counterterrorism specialists say Mr. Masri's operational shoes will be difficult to fill because he was so well-connected.
Mr. Masri played a more direct role in the essential operations for al Qaeda's core organization than any of the senior lieutenants within al Qaeda, said Juan Zarate, who was White House counterterrorism chief in the Bush administration. "His loss is a gaping hole that al Qaeda will not be able to fill with any one person," he said.
Mr. Masri played a hands-on role in directing al Qaeda's operations, said one U.S. official. His role was largely the result of circumstance: al Qaeda's top two—Messrs. bin Laden and Zawahiri—keep their distance from the rank-and-file because of concerns over their personal safety.
The U.S. hasn't had a fix on Mr. bin Laden's whereabouts for nearly a decade, Mr. Riedel said. "We haven't had a serious report on bin Laden's location since December 2001," he said. "We don't even have bad reporting on bin Laden's location. We have no reporting on bin Laden's location."
The CIA's drone campaign, meanwhile, has "seriously diminished" al Qaeda's second tier. That meant Mr. Masri had to play a far greater operational role than previous No. 3s to keep the group running smoothly and carrying out operations, the official said.
Another U.S. official acknowledged that al Qaeda has been able to replace senior figures in the past. "But Sa'id's death deals a serious near-term blow to the group—and to its two top leaders," the official continued. "While they've been focusing a great deal on their own security, Sa'id—their main conduit to al Qaeda—has been running its day-to-day operations. Losing him has to be a severe setback."
It isn't clear who will be appointed to fill Mr. Masri's role, butTtwo prominent al Qaeda figures are seen as possible successors.
One is Abu Yahya al-Libi, a senior al Qaeda official who has been one of the most sought-after U.S. terrorist targets. Since his escape from the prison at Bagram Air Force base in 2005, Mr. Libi has been a rising star in al Qaeda and recently has provided theological direction for the group.
"That name's a possibility, but it's unclear at this point who al Qaeda might appoint to replace Sa'id," the U.S. official said.
Another possible candidateis Attiyah Abd Al-Rahman, also known by his pen name Louis Attiyah Allah, a prominent al Qaeda strategist and emissary. He has been with al Qaeda for many years and is well-known within the group, making him a strong candidate for a top role, Ms. Katz said.
Aware of Mr. Masri's outsized role, his successor may feel pressure to show he can take operational control of the group by mounting a major attack, Mr. Hoffman said. "This is a blow, but we shouldn't lower our guard," he said. —Matthew Rosenberg contributed to this article.
Write to Siobhan Gorman at siobhan.gorman@wsj.com
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Afghan president takes 'personal interest' in suspended NGOs
Tue Jun 1, 11:59 am ET
KABUL (AFP) – Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai is taking a personal interest in the case of two Western aid organisations at the centre of a controversy over Christian proselytising, his spokesman said Tuesday.
The Afghan government has suspended two Christian aid groups after a TV show reported they were proselytising, which is illegal in the devoutly Islamic country.
The organisations -- Norwegian Church Aid and Church World Service of the United States -- were being investigated after Noorin TV reported they had converted Afghan Muslims to Christianity, the economics ministry said.
Converting from Islam to another religion is punishable by death under Afghan law. The Afghan constitution is based on traditional sharia law, which strictly bans religious conversion.
"The president of Afghanistan personally is interested in following this issue himself," Waheed Omar told reporters.
"This has created an uproar and from the president's point of view this is a serious issue and needs investigation."
Karzai had summoned both his interior minister and the head of country's spy agency on the matter, and "strongly instructed them to take immediate and serious action to prevent this phenomenon," he said.
Kirkens Noedhjelp or Norwegian Church Aid, which has worked in Afghanistan since 1979, released a statement on Monday rejecting the accusations and saying it was working to improve the lives of some of the most vulnerable Afghans.
A spokesman for the economy ministry, which oversees the activities of non-government organisations in Afghanistan said the US organisation also denied the allegations.
There are more than 1,000 aid organisations operating in Afghanistan, mostly funded by Western countries, and some have been accused of preaching Christianity.
The little-known Afghan channel Noorin TV showed footage of men it said were reciting Christian prayers in Farsi and being baptised.
The television station said the men were Afghans who had converted to Christianity thanks to the proselytising efforts of the two groups.
In parliament, Abdul Sattar Khawasi, a deputy of the lower house, called for Muslim converts to Christianity to be executed.
"Those Afghans that appeared in this video film should be executed in public, the house should order the attorney general and the NDS (intelligence agency) to arrest these Afghans and execute them."
Qazi Nazir Ahmad, a lawmaker from the western province of Herat, said killing a converted Muslim was "not a crime".
In early 2003 a 41-year-old Afghan was granted asylum by Italy after facing a death sentence for converting to Christianity.
Abdul Rahman became an international cause celebre after he was charged with rejecting Islam and held in a high security prison outside Kabul.
A European diplomat told AFP that Noorin TV had broadcast controversial reports in the past and believed there was a "hidden political agenda at a time when stirring up anti-foreign sentiment is quite fashionable in Kabul".
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Iran rejects US accusation it is training, arming with Taliban
By Slobodan Lekic Canadian Press June 2, 2010
BRUSSELS — Iran dismissed on Wednesday accusations by the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan Gen. Stanley McChrystal that Tehran has helped train and arm Taliban insurgents.
"Those kinds of lies are designed to conceal the failures of the (NATO forces) in Afghanistan," Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said.
On Sunday, McChrystal told reporters in Kabul that Iran — Afghanistan's western neighbour — has generally assisted the Afghan government in fighting the insurgent group.
"There is, however, clear evidence of Iranian activity — in some cases providing weaponry and training to the Taliban — that is inappropriate," he said. McChrystal did not provide details on how many fighters allegedly were trained in Iran.
Speaking in Brussels, where he met with EU officials and European lawmakers, Mottaki said that "in Afghanistan, Iran has always been part of the solution," and that Tehran was co-operating with the government in Kabul to stabilize the war-torn nation.
But he lambasted "erroneous" U.S. policies, blaming them for the ongoing conflict.
"When they arrived in Afghanistan eight years ago, the Americans said they would bring stability, destroy the drug trade and eliminate extremists and terrorists."
Instead, the extremists are still there today, drugs production is at record levels, and instability has engulfed the entire country, he said.
"The result is that ... extremism and fundamentalism have spread throughout the region," Mottaki said.
Mottaki also played down the possibility that the U.N. Security Council will adopt a U.S.-backed resolution calling for further sanctions against Iran over its refusal to stop enriching uranium.
He said its chances of passage were "very, very small," and that Russia and other security council members were already working to modify it.
Mottaki praised a deal reached between Iran and Brazil and Turkey, providing for a fuel-swap intended to address concerns that Iran may be enriching uranium for nuclear weapons. U.S. officials have criticized the agreement, in part because it does not stop Iran from continuing to enrich uranium.
"There have always been two options on the table — the option based on co-operation, and the second based on confrontation," he said. "The American position is based on confrontation, while the deal (with Turkey and Brazil) is based on co-operation."
He said Iran intended to build up to 20 nuclear electrical power stations in the future, because they were 10 times cheaper to operate than fossil-burning plants.
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Afghan Police Earn Poor Grade for Mission in Marja
The New York Times - Technology By C. J. CHIVERS June 1, 2010
MARJA, Afghanistan - Three months after arriving in the most dangerous area of Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, a contingent of specialized Afghan police officers has logged a mediocre performance while being almost wholly dependent on American supervision and support, Westerners who work with the officers said.
The conduct of Marja’s interim police, from a unit American officials describe as the Interior Ministry’s most promising force, has been undercut by drug use, petty corruption and, at times, a lack of commitment in the face of the ordinary hardships and duties of uniformed life.
When the force first arrived in late winter, entire units refused to stand guard or clean their living areas, several Marines said, and in northern Marja, police shifts often still abandon checkpoints during the sweltering midday heat, disappearing for lunch breaks lasting hours. Some officers have deserted the force.
The police also seem unschooled in rules of engagement, which risks putting their behavior at cross-purposes with Western units trying to earn civilian support. Police officials themselves say they have inadequate equipment and face a complex, dangerous mission.
This early assessment, of a high-profile unit on a much publicized mission, underlined anew the difficulties in creating Afghan forces that can operate independently and be entrusted with the nation’s security — an essential step toward drawing down Western forces after nine years of war.
It also raises questions about any timetable for Afghan self-sufficiency. American officials and contractors say it will take much longer for the units to be nurtured to self-reliance and a higher level of skill. For now, the police in Marja perform limited duties. American units create the space in which they operate, and provide their logistical, medical and military support.
“They are not hopeless,” said Daniel M. Aguirre, a retired police officer from Amarillo, Tex., who works with the police. “But they are at the first or second rung on the ladder.”
Marja’s police officers, members of the Afghan National Civil Order Police, or Ancop, are from a cadre of roughly 5,000 officers who have been more thoroughly screened and trained than the rank-and-file in the 104,000-officer national police force.
The cadre, billed as superior or even elite, was created after years of Western exasperation with the Afghan police. The Pentagon hoped to develop a core of better officers who could be assigned to high-priority duties.
Marines and American law enforcement contractors said the Civil Order Police had unquestionably performed better than the regular police units assigned several years ago to Marja, where residents rebelled against the former officers’ criminality as the region slipped from government control.
A large American offensive in February returned a government presence to the region, although fighting remains frequent. American officers said that against this background, the fact that the police established a place in Marja’s public fabric — operating posts and checkpoints near their bases — marked a degree of success.
“They have not been rejected by the people, which was a fear of mine as we started out,” said Col. Randall P. Newman, who commands Western ground forces here. “And we have gotten some effective work out of them. I think these two things speak positively.”
Unlike many police units, which have local duties, Civil Order Police battalions can be deployed anywhere in the nation. This gives the Interior Ministry the flexibility to mass police units where they are needed.
The units also have higher recruiting standards and more extensive entry-level instruction than regular Afghan police formations. To be accepted, applicants must be literate. After completing basic training, they attend an eight-week course.
In return, members of the units start their careers as sergeants, and are paid roughly $260 a month instead of the $165 paid to a new patrolman in a regular police unit. They typically also receive a $75 monthly bonus as hazardous-duty pay.
More than 300 of the unit’s sergeants were assigned here after the Marines fought their way in and brought the Afghan government behind them. American commanders hoped they would augment security and serve as ambassadors to a population suspicious of the government.
The experiment began poorly. “They had a negligent discharge within about 30 minutes of getting to us,” said Staff Sgt. Joseph E. Wright, whose platoon worked alongside a Civil Order Police unit. He was describing a police sergeant who accidentally fired his weapon.
Matters grew worse. “They refused to work at night, refused to send out patrols and refused to stand post more than three hours,” he said. “We tried to establish routines, but every routine failed every time.”
Friction between the Marines and the police built until the sides came to what the staff sergeant called a standoff, with a platoon of Marines at one end of an outpost facing a platoon of Afghan officers at the other, and Marine and police supervisors meeting in the center to negotiate.
One problem had to do with the habits and attitudes of a police clique, the Marines said. Many of these police sergeants were smoking hashish.
To clean up the unit, the Marines conducted urinalysis tests. Those who tested positive were reassigned. Once these sergeants were gone, the Marines said, and after Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, the American infantry unit in northern Marja, held training classes, the remaining sergeants performed better.
They still required intensive attention, the Marines said. Sometimes they set up unofficial checkpoints and shook down motorists, taking cash or cellphones. “And at official checkpoints they were charging people for head-of-the-line privileges,” another American who works beside the police said.
In interviews, Civil Order Police sergeants said that discipline problems were in the past, and that their unit worked well under the circumstances. They complained that they were underequipped and needed more ammunition.
“Right now we have three magazines each, and we need six,” said Sgt. Hamidullah, from Faryab Province. “We don’t have enough rounds.”
The police also said that establishing connections with residents had been difficult. Part of their problem, they said, was that many sergeants are Tajik, and do not speak Pashto, southern Afghanistan’s dominant language.
“Nobody can find a lot of information about the Taliban,” said Sgt. Akhmad Fahim from Mazar-i-Sharif.
Mr. Aguirre, the retired police officer, said it was too soon to say how the police forces in Marja might fare. He urged patience — a message that has become a common theme — and said more time and resources were needed to make final judgments.
“We’ve led them by the hand to this point, and they are right on the fence,” he said. “The potential is there. But it depends on us.”
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First hearing opens for Afghans detained by US
The Associated Press By HEIDI VOGT 01/06/2010
BAGRAM AIR FIELD, Afghanistan - Four Afghans accused in bombing attacks appeared Tuesday for a preliminary hearing — the start of a legal procedure which U.S. officials say will lead to the first trial of detainees held by American forces in Afghanistan.
The hearing, which took place before three Afghan judges in a small white-walled room, was described by U.S officials as a major step in a plan to hand over control of the long-secretive detention facility at Bagram Air Field to the Afghan government.
Since the war began in 2001, detainees held in Afghanistan have had no access to lawyers. The U.S. alone decided who could be released or held indefinitely as a continued threat through a series of internal reviews by a military commission.
Tuesday's hearing also comes just a few weeks after a federal appeals court ruled that detainees held in Afghanistan cannot file suit for their release in U.S. courts — a right enjoyed by detainees in Guantanamo Bay — because Afghanistan is a war zone in the nearly nine-year fight against Taliban insurgents.
But the chaotic nature of the first court session also showed that the transition toward an Afghan role will likely be slow and messy.
The defendants, a 60-year-old farmer and his three adult sons, were ushered into an elevated booth in a corner of the courtroom. All four prisoners wore dark gray-blue tunics. The father — whose long gray beard was tinted orange from traditional henna dye — wore a brown shawl around his shoulders. Two of the sons had bloodshot eyes.
They stood as prosecutor Ghawarl, who uses only one name, read out the charges and evidence against them.
He said some of the men's fingerprints matched those on bombs found in their native Khost province, in eastern Afghanistan. A search of their house turned up a stash of Kalashnikov rifles and pistols, he added.
But the defendants spoke only a smattering of Dari, the Afghan language used in the hearing. There was no translation into their native language — Pashto — which is spoken by most of the about 830 prisoners held at the prison. There were simultaneous translations but into English for Western soldiers and journalists in the courtroom.
The four government-appointed Afghan defense lawyers objected to the lack of Pashto translation and complained they had only had a few days to review the cases.
They also argued that it is common for men in the remote mountains of eastern Afghanistan to keep a stash of weapons to protect their families and not necessarily to fight for the insurgents.
The chief judge agreed to adjourn to give the defense lawyers more time to talk to their clients and review their cases, and to enlist a Pashto translator. No new hearing date was set.
According to the indictment, 24-year-old Misri Gul was captured first in Khost in October 2009. His brother Ghazni was detained when he went to visit Misri at the detention facility in March. Then last month, U.S. forces raided their family house and arrested a third brother, 22-year-old Rahmi, and their father Bismullah.
U.S. officials have not promised a trial for every detainee. Some of those held are will likely be too high of a security threat or too valuable as intelligence assets to relinquish to the Afghan system. It is unclear how many will be granted trials.
"We're in this world between two systems," said Brig. Gen. Mark Martins, the deputy commander for U.S. detention operations.
He said the problems in that first hearing should be taken in context: this is the first session and there are kinks that will have to be worked out. He said he did not have details on whether there was classified intelligence that would have to be held back from the trial.
The hearing took place in a new prison complex on the edge of Bagram, Afghanistan's main U.S. base. The prison — called the Parwan Detention Facility — opened in December and can hold up to 1,300 inmates. It replaced a smaller and more notorious prison that was inside the Bagram base.
The deaths of two Afghans at the older prison in 2002 led to prisoner abuse charges against several U.S. service members. Allegations of mistreatment have dogged the detention facility since, even after reforms improved conditions.
Still under construction are a full courthouse, lodging for court officials and an Afghan army barracks. The Americans expect to start handing over portions of the complex to the Afghans in January and continue piecemeal over about a year.
The new complex and the possibility of trials are to phase out a procedure that has damaged the reputation of U.S. forces in Afghanistan — the indefinite imprisonment of Afghans suspected of insurgent ties.
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Khalili says Kuchis need to get off land in Wardak
Pajhwok By Abdul Qadir Siddique 01/06/2010
KABUL - Mohammad Karim Khalili, Afghanistan's second vice president, on Monday declared all decrees granting land to nomadic Kuchis in central Maidan Wardak province to be null and void.
Khalili, who has just returned from a week in the province to end deadly clashes between Kuchi and Hazara communities over grazing land, said the only valid decree was the one issued by President Hamid Karzai.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, rulers and kings of Afghanistan granted Kuchis land in Wardak and other parts of the country.
But Khalili said these were no longer applicable. According to the president's decree, all Kuchis should leave grazing lands in exchange for land in other parts of the country.
Repatriation of displaced people, the exchange of dead bodies and compensation for damage on both sides was also part of the decree.
According to Ministry of Interior, eight people were killed and several others injured on both sides during two weeks of fighting which also resulted in the destruction of several Hazara houses.
"President Karzai's decree voided all previous decrees toward Kuchis," Khalili told reporters in the capital, Kabul. However, he said those who have legal deeds to their properties would not be deprived of their right of possession.
Gul Rahman Qazi, a professor of law at Kabul University, said it was unclear if Afghan law allowed a presidential decree to undo the decrees of previous presidents or kings.
A Kuchi MP, Haji Alam Gul, said Khalili did not have authority to declare a decree void. He said that a week ago, he had asked the government to find a legal solution to the problem.
Waheed Omar, the presidential spokesman, said Khalili had not presented his report to the president and that Afghan government would officially announce its stance about annulling previous decrees once it received the report.
"This is a legal issue; I can't say anything for now."
Khalili also said the government should provide land for Kuchis in over the next three months and that he hoped the issue would be resolved permanently this year.
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Australian Military Chief Says Steady Progress Made in Afghanistan
Voice of America Phil Mercer 01 June 2010
Sydney - Australian defense officials say more amored vehicles will soon be deployed to Afghanistan.
After two days of parliamentary testimony Tuesday, Defense Minister John Faulkner said that the government will spend $255 million on new armored vehicles to protect troops fighting a resurgent Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
Faulkner also said indicated his government will not send more troops to country, despite recent success against Taliban insurgents and signs that life is improving for Afghans.
Australian troops have been part of the multi-national force Afghanistan since late 2001. About 1,500 soldiers are there now to help in the fight militants, train local forces and assist civilian reconstruction efforts.
The country's top military officer, Air Chief Marshar Angus Houston, said during the hearing that Australian Special Forces have killed insurgents responsible for planting roadside bombs, which have inflicted terrible losses on coalition troops and civilians. Houston added that while Afghanistan remains an extremely dangerous country, positive steps have been made, including vital military successes and in important social areas.
"Australian Special Forces and their partners, the provincial police reserve, have been active in targeting Taliban insurgent networks. Across Uruzgan in the last three years the number of schools has more than doubled. There are approximately 43,000 children registered in school, including 4,100 girls," said Houston.
Australia's military leaders think that better facilities, such as schools and electricity, might make Afghans less likely to side with the Taliban, which governed the country before the U.S.-led invasion nine years ago.
Houston cited a recent opinion poll he said suggests that more than half of the Afghan population thinks their battered nation is heading in the right direction.
However, he and Faulkner said that Australia will not send more troops to replace the Dutch force that will leave Uruzgan province in August and return to the Netherlands. To do so, they said, would undermine security at home, and the country's ability to respond to natural disasters and other problems in the Pacific. Instead, Canberra says NATO must assume extra responsibilities when the Dutch depart.
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Number of drug addicts on the rise in Kabul
Pajhwok By Niamatullah Zafarzoi 01/06/2010
KABUL - Close to the presidential palace in Afghanistans capital, Kabul, 22-year-old Dawood Jan sits staring listlessly into space.
He is one of a growing number of drug addicts that have made this area, in the Muradkhani locality, their home.
With his pale face and frail body, Jan, from Laghman province, seems to be no longer interested in life. The young man said he started using drugs while in Iran, where he was living with an addict.
Jan said his family had arranged his engagement and he had returned to Afghanistan a year earlier, but that he had continued to use drugs. He said youth should not get involved with others who take drugs.
Agha Muhammad, 23, sat apart from the rest of the addicts. The Logar resident blamed his association with other drug users for his own addiction. He said he spent 50 afghanis a day on drugs and that without them he was in constant, severe pain.
Drugs convert the youth into useless members of society, said Ahmad Zia, a graduate of Kabul University.
He said smoking, snuff and associating with bad company led youngsters towards drugs like heroin and opium.
Zalmay Afzali, a spokesman for the Counter-Narcotics Ministry, said the number of drug addicts had increased in the country following the return of refugees from Iran and Pakistan. He said an estimated 1.5 million people were using drugs across the country.
He said the 43 rehabilitation centres were not enough to treat all the drug addicts in the country, He said he hoped more centres would be set up in the near future to address the problem.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes has established some rehabilitation centres where 30 to 40 drug addicts are being treated under the supervision of experts.
Ahmad Shah Sharifi, a teacher at the Kabul University, said he believed that the youth were frustrated by the lack of jobs, which was what drove them to drug use. He said the only way out was to provide employment to youth in the country.
However, Dr. Tariq Suleman, head of the Nijaat Centre, a drug rehabilitation centre set up in 2002, said addiction was a social problem.
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