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Afghan Taliban chiefs arrested in Pakistani sweeps
By Deb Riechmann And Munir Amhad, Associated Press Writers
KABUL – Pakistani authorities, aided by U.S. intelligence, have apprehended more Afghan Taliban chiefs following the capture of the movement's No. 2 figure — arrests that together represent the biggest blow to the insurgents since the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.
Presto! C.I.A. and I.S.I. Pull Taliban Rabbit From A Hat
By Arthur Kent, Skyreporter.com
February 16, 2010 -- As if by magic, but more by way of wily stagecraft, U.S. and Pakistani intelligence officials have “arrested” one of the Afghan Taliban’s top military commanders, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.
Mystery Of Taliban Military Leader's Capture Deepens
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty By Abubakar Siddique February 17, 2010
The capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's top military leader and second-most-influential leader within its ranks, has been confirmed. But the circumstances and reasons behind his detention are anything but clear.
Who in the Taliban Will Replace Baradar?
Newsweek By Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai 02/17/2010
Why was Taliban big-shot Baradar arrested this week, and who will replace him?
The Afghan Taliban's worst fears came true Monday, when word leaked that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the top-ranking deputy of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, had been arrested in Pakistan's populous port city of Karachi in a joint U.S.-Pakistani
Holbrooke in Pakistan after Taliban arrests
By Robert Birsel – Thu Feb 18, 8:18 am ET
ISLAMABAD (Reuters) – The White House's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan held talks with government leaders in Islamabad on Thursday, days after the capture of the Afghan Taliban's No.2 in Pakistan.
Afghanistan Wants Custody of Captured Taliban Leader
February 18, 2010 VOA News
Afghan intelligence officials are requesting that a recently captured top Taliban commander be turned over to Afghan authorities.
Empty Skies Over Afghanistan
New York Times By LARA M. DADKHAH Op-Ed Contributor February 18, 2010
Washington - THE Taliban have found a way to beat American airpower. And they have managed this remarkable feat with American help.
Taliban resistance slows coalition forces in Marja, Afghanistan
The Washington Post By Rajiv Chandrasekaran Washington Post Foreign Service Thursday, February 18, 2010
MARJA, AFGHANISTAN - Lt. Col. Cal Worth, who commands one of two Marine battalions leading the offensive against Taliban fighters here, set off at 7 a.m. Wednesday for the return journey to his battalion headquarters from a combat outpost less than four miles away.
In Marjah, Afghanistan, allied offensive going well so far
But in many ways, the harder part is still ahead. In the 'clear-hold-build' counterinsurgency strategy under Obama and his top military commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the 'hold' phase - sustaining security - is much more difficult.
By Gordon Lubold Staff writer The Christian Science Monitor - Feb 18 12:08 PM
Washington - The US and Afghan operations in southern Afghanistan are turning a corner, marking “the end of the beginning,” but it’s far too soon to declare victory there, according to the top commander of the region.
Iraq lessons can guide Afghan surge
FT.com - Afghanistan By John Nagl and Mitchell Reiss February 17 2010
As US forces fight to clear Taliban militia from the town of Marjah in Afghanistan s Helmand province, commanders need to look again at what we learnt in Iraq. A key cause of success in that country came when Sunni tribes flipped and decided to fight against hardcore
Taliban commander killed in N Afghanistan
KABUL, Feb. 18 (Xinhua) -- Afghan troops, during operation against Taliban militants in northern Kunduz province, eliminated their commander and detained three militants, a local newspaper reported Thursday.
Troops discover weapon cache in Taliban hotbed in Afghanistan
KABUL, Feb. 18 (Xinhua) -- The NATO-led forces discovered a huge weapon cache in Taliban's hotbed Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, a press release of the alliance said Thursday.
Pakistan's romance with Taliban far from over
Deutsche Presse-Agentur 02/17/2010
Islamabad - The capture of Taliban's second-in-command Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar represents a rising level of cooperation between Pakistani and US intelligence agencies, but it remains far from clear if Pakistan's 15-year Taliban romance is over.
Taliban ammunition 'running low'
February 18, 2010 BBC News
Taliban militants battling coalition troops in Marjah, Afghanistan, are running out of ammunition, Nato officials say.
U.N. envoy: Reconciliatory efforts needed in Afghanistan
CNN International By Tom Evans, CNN February 18, 2010
The Taliban should halt attacks on schools and clinics to demonstrate support for the reconciliation effort in Afghanistan, the United Nations' top envoy in Kabul said Wednesday.
U.N. Rejects Militarization of Afghan Aid
The New York Times By Rod Noedland 02/17/2010
KABUL - Senior United Nations officials in Afghanistan on Wednesday criticized NATO forces for what one referred to as the militarization of humanitarian aid, and said United Nations agencies would not participate in the military s reconstruction strategy in Marja as part of its current offensive there.
8 Afghan policemen go missing in central province
KABUL, Feb. 18 (Xinhua) -- Eight Afghan policemen have gone missing since Wednesday in Afghanistan's central Wardak province, spokesman for provincial administration Shahidullah Shahid said Thursday.
Army uses Python against Taliban roadside bombs in Afghanistan for the first time
The Army has used a new weapon against Taliban roadside bombs in Afghanistan for the first time, the Ministry of Defence said.
Telegraph.co.uk 17 Feb 2010
Royal Engineers fired the Python rocket-powered mine clearance system to blow up improvised explosive devices (IEDs) lined along a route in Helmand Province as part of the ongoing Operation Moshtarak.
Where patients fear to tread
KABUL, 18 February 2010 (IRIN) - The only functioning health post in conflict-affected Marjah in Helmand Province, southern Afghanistan, is not being used because people fear they could get caught in crossfire if they try and get there, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Tajikstan Reinforces Riverbanks To Prevent Loss Of Land To Afghanistan
February 18, 2010 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
KULOB, Tajikistan -- Officials in Tajikistan's southern Khatlon Province say they will plant apricot orchards on territory recently returned to Tajikistan by Afghanistan, RFE/RL's Tajik Service reports.
Afghanistan's top cops finish Canadian-sponsored leadership course
The Canadian Press February 17, 2010
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - They are the best and brightest of Afghanistan's boys in blue, and now they have the papers to prove it.
Afghan man claims he was AFP informant
The Age ADAM GARTRELL February 18, 2010 AAP
An Afghan man accused of people smuggling in Indonesia says he is innocent and claims Australian police pushed for his arrest only after he stopped feeding them intelligence.
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Afghan Taliban chiefs arrested in Pakistani sweeps
By Deb Riechmann And Munir Amhad, Associated Press Writers
KABUL – Pakistani authorities, aided by U.S. intelligence, have apprehended more Afghan Taliban chiefs following the capture of the movement's No. 2 figure — arrests that together represent the biggest blow to the insurgents since the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.
The arrests of more than a dozen Taliban leaders, including known associates of Osama bin Laden, came as militants fought to keep a grip on their southern stronghold of Marjah. Hundreds of militants were holding out against a six-day-old assault by 15,000 U.S., NATO and Afghan troops.
Nine Taliban militants linked to al-Qaida were nabbed in three raids late Wednesday and early Thursday near the port city of Karachi, Pakistani intelligence officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity because they weren't supposed to release the information.
Two Taliban shadow governors also were apprehended in separate raids, Afghan and Pakistani officials said without giving specifics.
The arrests follow the capture in Karachi of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, second only to the Taliban's one-eyed leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar. The White House and the Pakistani army have confirmed Baradar's arrest but have released few details, including when and how he was apprehended.
Pakistani intelligence officials said Baradar was traveling by car on the outskirts of Karachi when agents intercepted his vehicle, arresting him along with three bodyguards. One intelligence official said Baradar has provided "useful" information that led to the arrests of other militants.
They said communications intercepted by U.S. authorities played a key role in tracking and arresting the suspects, who were in Karachi buying timers and other bomb-making equipment. They were taken to Islamabad for questioning.
Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said the U.S. was pleased with the recent arrests. He declined to say whether they were the result of better intelligence or an increased willingness by Pakistan to go after suspected militants.
"What I will say to you, yet again, is that we are enormously heartened by the fact that the Pakistani government and their military intelligence services increasingly recognize the threat within their midst and are doing something about it," Morrell said.
Some of those apprehended included key figures in the Afghan insurgency, while others are members of militant groups that operate just across the border in Pakistan.
Among those arrested were Ameer Muawiya, a bin Laden associate who was in charge of foreign al-Qaida militants in Pakistan's border areas, and Akhunzada Popalzai, also known as Mohammad Younis, a one-time Taliban shadow governor in Zabul province and former police chief in Kabul, according to Mullah Mamamood, a tribal leader in Ghazni province.
Others captured in Karachi included Hamza, a former Afghan army commander in Helmand province during Taliban rule, and Abu Riyad al Zarqawi, a liaison with Chechen and Tajik militants in Pakistan's border area, Pakistani officials said.
Taliban shadow governors — Mullah Abdul Salam of Kunduz province and Mullah Mohammad in Baghlan province — were arrested separately in Pakistan about 10 to 12 days ago, according to the Kunduz governor, Mohammad Omar.
The two shadow governors were instrumental in expanding Taliban influence in the north, raising fears the insurgency was spreading beyond its base in the south. Salam was arrested in the Pakistani city of Faisalabad. One of the officials said Salam's arrest was the result of information gleaned from Mullah Baradar.
"He was Mullah Omar's key person in the north," said Omar, the Kunduz governor. "He was a tyrant. He was a cruel person. He strongly rejected the peace process."
Taliban spokesmen have denied the arrests, accusing NATO of spreading propaganda to undermine the morale of Taliban fighters holding out in Marjah against the biggest NATO military operation of the eight-year war.
Thousands of U.S., British and Afghan troops are besieging Taliban-controlled areas around the Helmand province town, linchpin of the militant's southern supply and drug-smuggling network.
Once Marjah is won, NATO is expected to shift to neighboring Kandahar province, the birthplace of the Taliban.
Squeezing the Taliban goes hand-in-hand with U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategy to convince the insurgents they can't win and offer militants a way to leave the Taliban. The Afghan government is finalizing a plan to coax low- and mid-level fighters to switch sides in exchange for economic incentives and to lure the Taliban's top echelon into reconciliation talks.
Baradar is considered a pragmatic Taliban leader, prompting some experts on the region to speculate that he was captured so he could liaise with the Taliban leadership. Asked about that theory, Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, told reporters this week in Kabul: "I've read the speculation, but I'm not going to join in it except to say that it seems pretty fanciful to me."
U.S. officials have complained for years that Pakistan was protecting key Taliban figures in an apparent bid to maintain influence in case the movement returned to power.
Shaun Gregory, a Pakistan expert at Britain's Bradford University, said he thought Pakistan likely cooperated in the sweep because of "some sort of promise or guarantee from the Americans that it will have a significant role as the reconciliation process goes forward."
___
Associated Press writers Ashraf Khan in Karachi, Amir Shah in Kabul, Sylvia Hui in London and Anne Flaherty in Washington contributed to this report.
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Presto! C.I.A. and I.S.I. Pull Taliban Rabbit From A Hat
By Arthur Kent, Skyreporter.com
February 16, 2010 -- As if by magic, but more by way of wily stagecraft, U.S. and Pakistani intelligence officials have “arrested” one of the Afghan Taliban’s top military commanders, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.
The spymasters’ dramatic account of a clandestine early morning raid to capture Baradar at a madrassa near Karachi, complete with breathless speculation that Baradar might lead stalwart Pakistani spy chiefs "to Mullah Omar himself”, is sharply at odds with evidence of the I.S.I.’s long-standing complicity with Afghanistan’s anti-Western opposition groups.
“Of course this is absurd,” says Abdullah Abdullah, who ran strongly as a candidate in last year’s Afghan presidential election.
Shortly after the New York Times published the C.I.A.’s claims about Baradar's arrest, Abdullah told Skyreporter: “At any time the I.S.I. could apprehend these Taliban leaders.
“When I was Foreign Minister (from 2002-2006) we would provide our Pakistani counterparts with the names of the Taliban leadership, and details of their activities. But the Pakistanis would joke that these were common names, and they needed even more specifics from us. Of course it was a deception.”
Abdullah’s statements are echoed by a highly-placed security source in Kabul, who requests that his identity not be revealed “because of concerns by my American friends.”
He tells Skyreporter: “Baradar is a military commander whose whereabouts have been well known by the Pakistanis. His operations would not have been possible without the help of the I.S.I.” (the Pakistan Army’s Interservices Intelligence branch).
As detailed previously here, sources within the Afghan government’s intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security, have confirmed that the I.S.I. sustains all the leading Afghan militant groups operating from Pakistan.
For example, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar resides in I.S.I. safehouses while in Peshawar and Rawalpindi. His party’s base near Peshawar operates “like a Pakistan Army reservation,” according to another Afghan police source.
Jalaluddin Haqqani, the ailing patriarch of the Afghan guerrilla faction that has fielded the greatest number of suicide bombers and gunmen, is regularly treated in Pakistan by physicians supplied by the I.S.I.
For its part, Mullah Omar's Baluchistan-based Taliban shura, of which Baradar is a prominent member, has never been the target of determined political pressure, much less military strikes, from either the Pakistan Army or U.S. forces based in neighboring Afghanistan.
Afghan army and security officials maintain that the Taliban are little more than a proxy force, a covert instrument that has enabled the Pakistan military establishment to project its power across Afghanistan since the early 1990’s.
As for the C.I.A.’s posturing, Abdullah says: “The agency had a great setback with the suicide attack on its base near Khost. They lost seven of their people. I think this is a face-saving gesture from Pakistan, one that relieves the pressure to take real action against the Haqqanis, Mullah Omar and the others.
“I don’t believe this is a breakthrough, but let’s see how it is used in the weeks to come. It is probably most important for the positioning of Pakistan and the United States in forcing some kind of compromise on the Afghan people.”
Another authoritative source, a seasoned former member of the Kabul government’s security apparatus, offers a harsher assessment.
“Baradar has lived openly for years in Quetta (capital of Baluchistan). This so-called arrest is about the I.S.I. protecting an asset, not shutting him down.
“But it’s the kind of story that will let the U.S. declare ‘mission accomplished’. They can blame the Afghans for the state of the war, and allow the Pakistanis to dictate a settlement that works mainly for Pakistan, and marginally for Washington.”
Amidst all of this, however, lurks an explosive subplot. Word has been spreading in Kabul for some months that a most unlikely government insider has maintained regular contact with Mullah Baradar.
His name?
Ahmad Wali Karzai, President Karzai’s younger brother, linked both to the heroin trade in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, and to the C.I.A., as one of the agency’s informants and facilitators.
Says Abdullah: “All of these intrigues, along with Pakistan’s growing influence through the Taliban, take us back to the dangerous situation that existed prior to the 9/11 attacks in 2001. That is why our international friends should not allow a secret peace deal with the Taliban.
“The Taliban and other opposition leaders have no respect for Mr. Karzai and his government. They see no need to compromise if they can win everything they wish with Pakistan’s help.”
Next on Skyreporter, the logical result of big power machinations in Afghanistan: not peace, but full scale civil war.
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Mystery Of Taliban Military Leader's Capture Deepens
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty By Abubakar Siddique February 17, 2010
The capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's top military leader and second-most-influential leader within its ranks, has been confirmed. But the circumstances and reasons behind his detention are anything but clear.
Senior Afghan officials tell RFE/RL that Baradar, whose recent capture in Karachi was reported on February 16, is a key piece of Kabul's efforts to reconcile with the Taliban and has been engaged in the process with Afghan President Hamid Karzai's administration for months.
From this, alternative theories have emerged: One is that his capture is all part of a plan that will pave the way for him to enter Kabul and become the key figure in reconciling with moderate elements of the insurgency he once organized.
The other -- and one that sharply contradicts initial assessments that Baradar's capture exhibited Pakistan's willingness to go after Taliban militants on its soil -- is that Pakistan caught wind of Baradar's role and swept in to forestall the process and detain him for questioning.
Journalist and regional expert Ahmed Rashid says that while on hajj last year in Saudi Arabia, Mullah Baradar met with Afghan and Saudi officials. Prior to this, Rashid claims, Baradar's representatives held negotiations with President Karzai's younger half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, in southern Afghanistan -- the area where the Taliban first emerged and that still provides a large number of its fighters and key leaders.
Rashid says diplomats and officials in Kabul speculate that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency "might have conducted this raid, because they have made it very clear to the Americans that any negotiations that are held between the Americans and the Taliban have to go through Pakistan."
Rashid says Baradar's capture has critical implications for Kabul's plans to reconcile with moderates among the Taliban's ranks. "There is concern in Kabul, and perhaps some quiet anger, about his arrest and not quite knowing what the Pakistanis are going to do with him," he says.
"I can hope that the Pakistanis are going to treat him not as a prisoner but as a guest, and that he can be free to travel freely and perhaps start some kind of negotiations, perhaps in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps in some other neutral place between the Taliban leadership and Afghan government and the Americans."
Questions Around Arrest
Abdul Salam Zaeef, a former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan who now lives in Kabul, has participated in the Karzai administration's effort to negotiate with the Taliban. He told RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan that Baradar's arrest will not augur well for the reconciliation effort.
And prior to today's confirmation by a Pakistani military official that Baradar was indeed in custody, Zaeef noted that the timing of the capture of the key Taliban figure after the movement's leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, was curious.
"People like him are very important as a key contact [with the Taliban]," Zaeef said. "And what has happened to him is equal to the disappearance of that key contact for [negotiations] with the Taliban. If this [the news about his arrest] is true, it means that somebody wants to prevent people from reaching out to the Taliban by removing their key contact."
A senior Afghan official with knowledge of Kabul's reconciliation plans, however, tells RFE/RL on condition of anonymity that Baradar's arrest was scripted. His detention, the official says, was intended to serve as a "face-saving" incident that would allow him to be brought to Kabul and turned into a central figure who could persuade a large part of the insurgency he once led into accepting reconciliation with the Afghan government.
Kabul has so far been eerily silent about the arrest, its only official reaction being that it was awaiting the official confirmation of his arrest from Islamabad.
That confirmation came today. In a statement to reporters, Major General Athar Abbas, the chief spokesman for Pakistan's military, said that Baradar's identity was established on the basis of ''detailed identification procedures." Abbas also said that Baradar was one of several people arrested, but that further details could not be made public out of security concerns.
Former Taliban envoy Zaeef, for his part, dismisses the idea that arresting Baradar -- or any Taliban figure for that matter -- and bringing him to Kabul could help attract the attention of a large number of the movement's field commanders and fighters. "Anybody who is brought to Kabul as a prisoner will have little impact, because nobody will listen to him and his efforts will not be considered positive and effective," he says.
Talk Of Taliban Divisions
Addressing the initial reaction that the Taliban commander's capture would provide a major blow to the movement ability to conduct military operations, former Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil is skeptical. He tells RFE/RL that while Baradar was indeed a key Taliban military commander, his capture wouldn't lead to a "dramatic" shift of balance on the battlefield because, "I don't think everything depended on him."
Muttawakil, who is also involved in facilitating behind-the-scene contacts with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia, also says that he does not believe Baradar was involved in negotiations through Riyadh, because as part of the Taliban leadership he would have to strictly follow consensus.
Muttawakil says that reports suggesting that Baradar had developed strong differences with Taliban leader Mullah Omar hold little water. Furthermore, he says the idea that Islamabad would capture Baradar to prevent him from negotiating with Kabul is not plausible, and notes that Islamabad recently indicated its willingness to help in negotiating with the Afghan Taliban. He contrasts "Islamabad's nice diplomatic overtures," with "speculation about his arrest that are negative and problematic."
"I have no doubt that there is unity among the Taliban leadership," Muttawakil adds. "And as far as I can speculate, this movement is not divided into factions."
But Afghan journalist Sami Yousafzai, who has followed the Taliban for years, tells RFE/RL that Baradar's arrest would at the least be a personal blow to Mullah Omar, because he has lost a key confidant whom he trusted since the emergence of the militant movement in southern Afghanistan in 1994. And in the past few years, Yousafzai notes, Baradar also became his sole contact with the Taliban commanders and the outside world.
Baradar 'Acceptable' Candidate?
Yousafzai says that Mullah Omar will find it difficult to appoint a replacement, but that Baradar's arrest will not have a grave impact on the Taliban's overall strength.
In the past, the movement has withstood the killing of key commanders Mullah Dadullah and Akhter Mohammad Osmani. Even the 2007 arrest of Mullah Obaidullah, the former Taliban defense minister and Baradar's predecessor, did little to dent the movement.
Yousafzai suggests that speculation about Baradar's contacts with President Karzai are based on the fact that both belong to the Popalzai tribe, a Pashtun lineage whose members populate southern Afghanistan. He says that based on his extensive research of the Taliban, Islamabad would have little interest in arresting Baradar because, unlike other Afghan Taliban commanders, he was unwilling to develop links with the Pakistani Taliban or Al-Qaeda, who are fighting an acrimonious war against Pakistan.
"If there are negotiations with the Taliban and, be that Mullah Baradar or another leader, he cannot move them forward on his own without engaging and keeping in the dark certain quarters in Pakistan who support the Taliban," Yousafzai says. "There is no doubt that he was an acceptable figure for Pakistani officials and certain other quarters."
Yousafzai too rejects the idea that Mullah Baradar negotiated directly with Karzai or his emissaries. He says that anything concerning the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan is seen in Kabul through the prism of conspiracy theory.
In the final assessment of the situation, only concrete results -- such as a breakthrough in reconciling with known Taliban figures that leads sizeable numbers of the movement's foot soldiers to side with Kabul, or on the flip side a stepped-up terror campaign -- will tell the true impact of Baradar's capture.
RFE/RL Radio Free Afghanistan correspondent Hameed Mohmand in Kabul contributed to this report
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Who in the Taliban Will Replace Baradar?
Newsweek By Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai 02/17/2010
Why was Taliban big-shot Baradar arrested this week, and who will replace him?
The Afghan Taliban's worst fears came true Monday, when word leaked that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the top-ranking deputy of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, had been arrested in Pakistan's populous port city of Karachi in a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation. Baradar's arrest not only deprives the Taliban of its top operational leader; it could also put in jeopardy Mullah Omar, the so-called Commander of the Faithful and the man who would lead the Taliban if its government were ever restored to power in Afghanistan. If Baradar divulges Mullah Omar's whereabouts under interrogation, he could possibly turn the tide of the nearly nine-year-long war. Most of all, though, the capture signals the Taliban's exposure in Pakistan. Commanders worry about their dependency on, and their vulnerability to, neighboring Pakistan and its military's spy agency, the Directorate General of Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI. Turns out they have cause for alarm.
It has been a complicated relationship. Since the collapse of Mullah Omar's government and the Taliban's flight into Pakistan in late 2001, Pakistan and the ISI, which had helped to bring the hardline Afghan Islamic movement to power in the mid-'90s, have largely given the insurgents a haven along the frontier. From these border strongholds, the Taliban's top leadership strategized, planned attacks, rested, recruited, and reorganized its forces--largely out of harm's way. But they never forgot about their reliance on Pakistan.
"We can fight forever against the U.S. and NATO, but we can't resist Pakistan," says a former Taliban minister who declines to be quoted by name on such a sensitive topic. "We Taliban are like sheep eating in lush grasslands--but who could be sold any time for slaughter by our owners." The ISI, with whom Baradar is said to have had cordial relations, seems to have sold him out under U.S. pressure. And it wasn't the first time: in early 2007, just as Vice President Dick Cheney was due to visit Islamabad, the ISI arrested Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, the insurgents' defense minister, in Quetta near the Afghan border. He was as powerful then as Baradar is today.
In interviews, though, Taliban sources wondered why Pakistan decided to move on Baradar now. The insurgent leadership has been hiding more or less in plain sight around the Pakistani cities of Quetta, Karachi, and Peshawar. The ISI likely knows the precise location of each Taliban leader, perhaps with the exception of Mullah Omar, and can pounce on them at any time. A least one key Taliban source speculates that, with Baradar's arrest, Pakistan wants to send a message to the Taliban. "They may be saying, 'You guys think you're strong, but you are still vulnerable and need to pay attention to us,' " says the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Taliban sources do not believe that Mullah Omar will publicly announce a replacement for Baradar any time soon. "Everyone will be waiting to see on whose head the falcon will sit," said one Taliban commander who spoke on condition that he not be named. In the meantime, though, Taliban sources say Baradar's right-hand man, Abdul Qayum Zakir, will probably take over Baradar's duties. Zakir is a tough, battle- and prison-hardened commander from Kandahar province, the insurgency's heartland. He is believed to be in his mid-30s, and was an early commander on the northern front. When the Taliban government collapsed under heavy U.S. bombing in late 2001, he was captured in Mazar-e Sharif by the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance and handed over to the Americans. He spent some six years in various secret U.S. lockups and at Guantánamo Bay before being turned over to the Afghan government custody sometime in 2006. He is believed to have been released in 2007 for reasons that are unknown. Once freed, he immediately rejoin
ed the Taliban.
Back with the insurgents, Zakir, a member of the small Alizai tribe, quickly rose to take charge of the key provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan. As part of Baradar's drive to make the movement more accountable and transparent, Zakir was charged in 2008 with heading a new body, called the Military Complaints Committee, that worked to evaluate the performances of commanders and to settle disputes among them over turf and finances. Last year Baradar elevated him to head the powerful Defense Committee, which oversees insurgent military actions throughout the country.
Taliban who know Zakir tell NEWSWEEK he has been learning quickly on the job how to be more nuanced, flexible, friendly, and less dictatorial in his relations with other commanders. But it will be tough to follow the footsteps of Baradar, whose avuncular personal touch helped defuse internal tribal disputes as he commanded the larger military program. Many steely Taliban commanders called Baradar "Big Father." He was seen as being less remote, more responsive, and more patient than his boss, Mullah Omar. Zakir, at least at first, is unlikely to command that much respect among both rank-and-file fighters and Taliban commanders.
Zakir will also have to take over Baradar's heavy 18-hour-a-day workload. Handpicked by Mullah Omar to guide the movement while he remained in hiding, Baradar was not only in day-to-day charge of the insurgency; he also presided over the ruling Quetta Shura, the top policymaking body. He hired and fired provincial shadow governors as well as militia commanders. He controlled the insurgency's hefty treasury, which is filled with the proceeds from kidnapping ransoms, tax receipts, protection rackets for the drug trade, and charitable donations from the Gulf nations. "He commands all military, religious, and financial power," says Mullah Shah Wali Akhund, a Taliban subcommander, who had met Baradar four times before his arrest.
Zakir also takes over command of a movement that may be stronger than ever (in terms of military and political capabilities) but is also being severely tested by the surge of U.S. troops who are wresting control from the Taliban of important sectors of the Helmand River Valley--former insurgent strongholds where fighters launched operations and profited from the vast fields of poppies. It will be hard for Zakir to preserve fighters' morale and to keep the movement intact; the United States is certainly hoping that Baradar's arrest will cause a crisis of confidence in the guerrillas' ranks, leading to defections of fighters and low-level commanders who may sense the tide is turning against them.
But as Taliban commanders point out to NEWSWEEK, Mullah Omar's movement has survived and even prospered after the losses of other top commanders. "Baradar is replaceable," Mullah Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, the former Taliban foreign minister, told NEWSWEEK last summer. "If Baradar is removed, that doesn't mean everything will collapse. Mullah Omar will find a new Baradar who quickly will stand up." Indeed, the Taliban even gathered momentum after the 2007 death of Mullah Dadullah Akhund, who was at the time the insurgency's most effective, ruthless, and feared commander. Nor did the insurgency seem to suffer in 2007 when the ISI arrested Defense Minister Obaidullah Akhund, who was then a coequal with Baradar. Admittedly, though, the Baradar of 2010 is a much bigger, more important fish.
In the end, it's unlikely that Pakistan wants to roll up the Taliban and deliver the entire leadership to the United States. Pakistan is still thought to see the Afghan Taliban as a potential ally in extending Pakistani influence across the border and in curbing India's economic ambitions in Afghanistan. It just may want them to know, in the meantime, who is in charge.
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Holbrooke in Pakistan after Taliban arrests
By Robert Birsel – Thu Feb 18, 8:18 am ET
ISLAMABAD (Reuters) – The White House's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan held talks with government leaders in Islamabad on Thursday, days after the capture of the Afghan Taliban's No.2 in Pakistan.
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was picked up in the southern city of Karachi this month in a raid by Pakistani and U.S. agents, the most senior Taliban commander ever arrested in Pakistan.
U.S. special representative Richard Holbrooke, on his second visit to Pakistan this year, met Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani for talks that included security issues, Gilani's office said.
The previous day in Kabul, Holbrooke called the arrest of Baradar "a significant development."
"We commend the Pakistanis for their role in this and it is part of a deepening cooperation between us," he said.
Holbrooke was due to meet other leaders and talk to reporters later in the day.
U.S. ally Pakistan is battling its indigenous Taliban militants but has taken little action against Afghan Taliban operating from its soil who are not fighting the Pakistani state.
The al Qaeda-backed Pakistani Taliban, who are loosely allied with the Afghan Taliban, have launched a wave of bomb attacks in Pakistan in retaliation for offensives on their strongholds.
On Thursday, at least 20 people, including the commander of a militant faction which is not part of Pakistan's main Taliban alliance, were killed in a blast in the Khyber region on the Afghan-Pakistan border.
Security officials said the blast appeared to be related to factional rivalry.
Later, a suspected U.S. drone aircraft fired two missiles into Pakistan's North Waziristan region on the border, killing three militants, Pakistani officials said.
The United States has stepped up its attacks on militants in Pakistan with drones, launching 15 this year compared with 51 last year and 32 in 2008, according to Reuters tallies.
AFGHAN OFFENSIVE
Baradar's capture came as U.S. forces spearhead one of NATO's biggest offensives against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
It also comes as momentum builds for talks with the Taliban to end a war Western force commanders say they can't win militarily.
Pakistan wants to play a leading role in any Afghan peace process and keep the influence of old rival India at bay.
The government has said little about the rare arrest of a top member of a Taliban leadership council the United States says has been operating in Pakistan for years.
The army confirmed the arrest in a terse statement on Wednesday but gave no details, citing security reasons.
Although denying any support for its old Afghan Taliban allies, Pakistan has long turned a blind eye to their members and support networks in the belief the Taliban represent the only leverage it has over Afghanistan.
Analysts said the Baradar's arrest should bolster Pakistan's position as it maneuvers to play a role in any Afghan peace process, but it probably did not signal a fundamental Pakistani policy shift.
"This could be a gesture to show the international community that Pakistan is capable of dealing with the Taliban. They'd like to take this opportunity to exert their position vis-a-vis Afghanistan and vis-a-vis India," said Khadim Hussain of the Aryana Institute think tank.
MORE ARRESTS
In another sign Pakistan might be doing that, an Afghan official said two Afghan Taliban provincial "shadow governors" had also been arrested in Pakistan this month.
Mullah Abdul Salam and Mullah Mir Mohammad, respectively the shadow governors of the northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan, happened in Pakistan's Baluchistan province, Mohammad Omar, the Afghan governor for Kunduz, told Reuters.
Pakistan's military spokesman said he had no information.
While the arrests would appear to signal a more cooperative Pakistan, they were unlikely to herald a big shift in policy.
"I don't see any major change in Pakistan's policy on links with the Taliban as yet because things are still very fluid," said Rahimullah Yusufzai, an expert on militancy.
In another indication of the pace of unfolding events, on Wednesday officials in Kabul and in the Maldives, the Indian Ocean state, said Taliban-allied representatives and members of Afghanistan's parliament held talks at a resort there in January.
Arsala Rahmani, a former Taliban official who is now a member of Afghanistan's parliament, was one of those who attended. He said mediators had told the militants' representatives they should present a united front and conduct talks in consultation with the government and not through other channels.
He did not elaborate but analysts say Kabul is suspicious of any Pakistani involvement. No date was set for another meeting.
(Additional reporting by Zeeshan Haider, Chris Allbritton and Sayed Salahuddin in KABUL; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan)
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Afghanistan Wants Custody of Captured Taliban Leader
February 18, 2010 VOA News
Afghan intelligence officials are requesting that a recently captured top Taliban commander be turned over to Afghan authorities.
A spokesman for Afghanistan's Intelligence Directorate told reporters Thursday that Pakistan or any other country holding Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar should hand him over to Afghanistan.
Pakistan and U.S. officials say the Afghan Taliban leader was arrested last week in a joint operation in the southern Pakistani city of Karachi.
Baradar, an Afghan national, holds the second most important position within the Taliban, after the group's founder, Mullah Muhammad Omar.
Officials describe him as the most important Taliban figure captured since the start of the war in Afghanistan in late 2001.
The White House hailed the capture as a "big success."
Officials say the joint operation to apprehend Baradar suggests a higher level of cooperation between the United States and Pakistan.
In the past, U.S. officials have accused Pakistan's intelligence agencies of maintaining ties with the Afghan Taliban leadership, and of being reluctant to pursue fugitives in Taliban sanctuaries inside Pakistan. Authorities in Islamabad have denied those claims.
U.S. President Barack Obama met with top U.S. officials in Washington Wednesday to discuss the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Mr. Obama's spokesman said he received briefings from U.S. ambassadors in both countries, as well as an update from General Stanley McChrystal about the anti-Taliban offensive in southern Helmand province.
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Empty Skies Over Afghanistan
New York Times By LARA M. DADKHAH Op-Ed Contributor February 18, 2010
Washington - THE Taliban have found a way to beat American airpower. And they have managed this remarkable feat with American help.
The consequences of this development are front and center in the current offensive in Marja, Afghanistan, where air support to American and Afghan forces has been all but grounded by concerns about civilian casualties.
American and NATO military leaders worried by Taliban propaganda claiming that air strikes have killed an inordinate number of civilians, and persuaded by hearts and minds enthusiasts that the key to winning the war is the Afghan population s goodwill have largely relinquished the strategic advantage of American air dominance. Last July, the commander of Western forces, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, issued a directive that air strikes (and long-range artillery fire) be authorized only under very limited and prescribed conditions.
So in a modern refashioning of the obvious that war is harmful to civilian populations the United States military has begun basing doctrine on the premise that dead civilians are harmful to the conduct of war. The trouble is, no past war has ever supplied compelling proof of that claim.
In Marja, American and Afghan troops have shown great skill in routing the Taliban occupiers. But news reports indicate that our troops under heavy attack have had to wait an hour or more for air support, so that insurgents could be positively identified. We didn t come to Marja to destroy it, or to hurt civilians, a Marine officer told reporters after waiting 90 minutes before the Cobra helicopters he had requested showed up with their Hellfire missiles. He s right that the goal is not to kill bystanders or destroy towns, but an overemphasis on civilian protection is now putting American troops on the defensive in what is intended to be a major offensive.
And Marja is not exceptional.
While the number of American forces in Afghanistan has more than doubled since 2008, to nearly 70,000 today, the critical air support they get has not kept pace. According to my analysis of data compiled by the United States military, close air support sorties, which in Afghanistan are almost always unplanned and in aid of troops on the ground who are under intense fire, increased by just 27 percent during that same period. (While I am employed by a defense consulting company, my research and opinions on air support are my own.)
Anecdotal evidence and simple logic dictate that there are two reasons for this relative decrease of air support: Troops in contact with the enemy are calling for air support less often than before the tactical directive was issued, and when they do call for air strikes their requests are more frequently being denied.
Pentagon data show that the percentage of sorties sent out that resulted in air strikes has also declined, albeit modestly, to 5.6 percent from 6 percent. According to the military s own air-power summaries, often when the planes or helicopters arrive, they simply perform shows of force, or drop flares rather than munitions. It is only a matter of time before the Taliban see flares and flyovers for what they are: empty threats.
One of the most egregious episodes of failed support occurred last September in Kunar Province, when a detachment of Marines and Afghan troops tried to search the village of Ganjgal for a weapons cache. When they were fired on by insurgents in the nearby hills, they radioed for artillery support, a request that was rejected on the ground that civilians might be injured. They then pleaded for helicopters, which didn t arrive for more than an hour after the shooting started.
We are pinned down, a Marine major explained to his Afghan counterpart as they waited helplessly. We are running low on ammo. We have no air. We ve lost today. In the end, four Marines, eight Afghan troops and an Afghan interpreter were dead, and 22 others wounded.
Some would argue that more combat troops will always mean more combat troop deaths. That holds true, however, only if you believe that our soldiers should fight fair. Logic dictates that no well-ordered army would give up its advantages and expect to win, and the United States military, which does not have the manpower in Afghanistan to fight the insurgents one-on-one, is no exception.
Perhaps the directive against civilian casualties could be justified if one could show that Afghan lives were truly being saved, but that s not the case. According to the latest report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the number of civilian deaths caused by Western and Afghan government forces decreased to 596 in 2009, from 828 the year before. But the overall number of civilian deaths in the country increased by 14 percent, to 2,412, and the number killed by Taliban troops and other insurgents rose by 41 percent. For Afghan civilians who are dying in greater numbers every year, the fact that fewer deaths are caused by pro-government forces is cold comfort.
There is also little to indicate that the hearts and minds campaign has resulted in the population s cooperation, especially in the all-important area of human intelligence. Afghans can be expected to cooperate with American forces only if they feel safe to do so when we take permanent control of an area. Obviously, this involves defeating the enemy. With NATO intelligence services recently noting that the Taliban still have a shadow government in 33 of Afghanistan s 34 provinces, it s hard to say we re close to accomplishing that feat. Just last month, the Taliban set off a series of bombs in the heart of Kabul; the insurgents, it appears, no longer need to winter in Pakistan.
Of course, all this is not to say that the Untied States and NATO should be oblivious to civilian deaths, or wage total war in Afghanistan. Clearly, however, the pendulum has swung too far in favor of avoiding the death of innocents at all cost. General McChrystal s directive was well intentioned, but the lofty ideal at its heart is a lie, and an immoral one at that, because it pretends that war can be fair or humane.
Wars are always ugly, and always monstrous, and best avoided. Once begun, however, the goal of even a long war should be victory in as short a time as possible, using every advantage you have.
Lara M. Dadkhah is an intelligence analyst.
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Taliban resistance slows coalition forces in Marja, Afghanistan
The Washington Post By Rajiv Chandrasekaran Washington Post Foreign Service Thursday, February 18, 2010
MARJA, AFGHANISTAN - Lt. Col. Cal Worth, who commands one of two Marine battalions leading the offensive against Taliban fighters here, set off at 7 a.m. Wednesday for the return journey to his battalion headquarters from a combat outpost less than four miles away.
In a place where homemade bombs are buried under seemingly every road, this trip was supposed to be safe and easy: A team of Marine engineers and explosives-disposal experts had swept the route 48 hours earlier, unearthing and blowing up seven mines. But Worth's convoy had traveled less than a mile before the engineers discovered a mine on the rutted road. They would later find three more, all planted in the same intersection as the seven mines they found Monday.
Worth's Sisyphean challenge of moving about in Marja suggests that Taliban bombmakers, and those who bury the devices in the dirt roads here, have not been cowed by the presence of the Marines and a large contingent of Afghan soldiers. Nor have scores of other insurgent fighters, who kept up a steady pace of attacks on coalition forces Wednesday, firing assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades at coalition bases and patrols.
Although U.S. and Afghan forces have made steady inroads here since beginning the largest joint military operation of the war four days ago, they control only a few modest patches of this farming community, principally around the two biggest bazaar areas. Much of Marja has not yet been patrolled by troops on the ground, and video images from surveillance drones have shown Taliban fighters operating with impunity in those places.
U.S. and NATO commanders were not certain whether the insurgents who have lorded over Marja for the past three years would stay and fight, or flee to parts of Afghanistan with fewer international security forces. It appears clear, however, that many Taliban members here have opted to stay -- at least for now.
That may mean many more weeks of arduous house-to-house clearing operations for Marines and Afghan forces in this 155-square-mile area, making this a far more complex and dangerous mission than initially envisaged, and possibly delaying some efforts to deliver government services and reconstruction projects to the 80,000 people who live here.
"It's early days yet," said British Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, the top allied commander in southern Afghanistan. "You're dealing with a large area, with a lot of people in it. It's going to take a while to clear it."
Even if insurgents are not fleeing, they are also not winning any of their fights with the Marines. Dozens of militants -- there is no authoritative count -- have been killed since the operation began. One Marine has died.
Senior U.S. military officials have been encouraged by the relatively low level of coalition casualties -- more Marines have been evacuated for hypothermia and knee or ankle strains than for gun and bomb wounds -- and by the fact that combat engineers have discovered dozens of roadside bombs that could have struck tactical vehicles.
The low level of injuries is due, in large part, to the Marines' deliberate approach in moving about the area. Instead of driving all over, hunting down insurgents, they have been traveling in cautious convoys that are preceded by sophisticated mine-sweeping gear.
Marine commanders remain optimistic that their initial efforts at establishing bubbles of security around key commercial areas will have a catalyzing effect on the population and will result in residents pointing out Taliban fighters, bomb locations and arms caches.
Thus far, however, most residents seem to be opting for a wait-and-see approach. Most roads used by the Marines have been devoid of people, save for a few curious gawkers. The bazaars are similarly abandoned, some so hastily that merchants left their onions and potatoes sitting atop wooden carts.
When Worth departed from his Bravo Company's base next to the Koru Chreh bazaar at 7 a.m., he figured he was giving himself more than enough time to make it back to headquarters by 10 a.m. for what was to be the first meeting of shopkeepers and community leaders. Next up on his schedule, at noon, was a visit from Carter, the top Marine commander in Afghanistan and the governor of Helmand province.
By 9:30, his convoy had ground to a halt when the engineers found the first bomb at a narrow intersection. At 10:30, while munching pretzels in his armored truck, he received a radio message: The meeting of shopkeepers "was a no-show. Nobody came."
When Carter and the dignitaries arrived at his headquarters, Worth was still sitting on the road, waiting for the ordnance-disposal experts to defuse the fourth bomb of the day. Turret gunners spotted several men milling about in the bushes, and Worth feared an ambush. To make matters worse, one of the convoy trucks accidentally drove halfway into a canal, further exposing the forces.
The group finally got moving, but by then a group of Afghan soldiers had already raised their red, green and black flag in the bazaar for the dignitaries. The governor and the visiting generals walked around the rubble of the market -- large parts of which were destroyed by a U.S. Special Forces airstrike in spring 2009 -- and hailed the progress of the current mission.
"I have full confidence that Marja district will be very peaceful, and it will be one of the best-developed districts in Afghanistan," said Gulab Mangal, the Helmand governor.
When Carter was asked how long it would take to pacify Marja, he said: "You can't put a time on it. You just have to take it slowly but surely, and the people will be won around in due course."
Worth missed all of it. He arrived 30 minutes after they departed -- and 7 1/2 hours after he set off.
After the dignitaries left, the Afghan soldiers who raised the large, shiny tricolor pulled it down and replaced it with a smaller, faded one.
"It's still dangerous in this area," one soldier said. The Taliban "might burn it."
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In Marjah, Afghanistan, allied offensive going well so far
But in many ways, the harder part is still ahead. In the 'clear-hold-build' counterinsurgency strategy under Obama and his top military commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the 'hold' phase - sustaining security - is much more difficult.
By Gordon Lubold Staff writer The Christian Science Monitor - Feb 18 12:08 PM
Washington - The US and Afghan operations in southern Afghanistan are turning a corner, marking “the end of the beginning,” but it’s far too soon to declare victory there, according to the top commander of the region.
Now in its sixth day, the operation in central Helmand province, billed as the largest against the Taliban since 2001, and the first test of President Obama’s new strategy, is going smoothly. But it will take another month before all areas around Marjah and another area, Nad-e-Ali, are secure and another three months before coalition forces can be sure that the Afghan population actually feels safe.
“I guess looking downstream in three months time or thereabouts, we should have a pretty fair idea of whether we’ve been successful,” said Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, the British commander of what is known as Regional Command South, in a video teleconference with reporters at the Pentagon. “But I would be very cautious about triumphalism just yet.”
Next step will be Kandahar province
Only when US and Afghan officials believe they have completed the mission in central Helmand can they take the next step in the new strategy, mounting another major operation in nearby Kandahar province.
American officials have been publicizing this offensive, known as Operation Moshtarak, a Dari word for together, for weeks in hopes of scaring off an enemy before the fighting began. And in many ways, the operation differs in size, scope and method from others: including some 4,000 US Marines and British forces and as many as 7,000 Afghan national security forces. Unlike some other operations over the years, it was given final blessing by Afghan President Hamid Karzai last Friday.
Military officials have estimated that there could be as many as 1,000 Taliban fighters in the region. But it remains unclear if that was an accurate number or if it is, how many fighters have already left the battlefield. That will take some time, a senior military official says.
Offensive focuses on civilian population
Normalcy must be restored for the local population, markets must open, and jobs must reappear. Until then, it’s hard to see how much of the enemy has been diminished under a strategy that focuses more on the civilian population than on killing combatants.
“You see the degradation, but you don’t see it immediately,” says the senior military official, who would speak only on background.
Military officials say the enemy’s attacks have been somewhat more complex than usual, reflecting enemy resolve not to cede ground in the verdant Helmand river valley where much of the country’s opium crop is grown.
The senior military official said coalition forces have encountered more than 50 roadside bombs and some co-called daisy chains, bombs linked to one another to create a series of explosions.
News reports suggest the Taliban may also be using more small arms fire against US, Afghan, and British forces. As the Taliban feels increasingly more pressure, it will be even less inclined to stand and fight coalition forces and will likely turn to more such “asymmetric” tactics, such as roadside and suicide bombs, Maj. Gen. Carter said.
But in many ways, the easy part is nearing an end and the harder slog is still ahead. In the “clear-hold-build” counterinsurgency strategy under Mr. Obama and his top military commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the “hold” phase – sustaining security – is much more difficult.
Major test for Obama's strategy
“The Marjah offensive will test the president’s new strategy and show whether a population-centered strategy can work,” said Tony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington, in a prepared analysis of the issue. “At the same time, this means that ‘winning’ involves far more than tactical victory, and that the aftermath of the fighting will be much more important than the immediate outcome of the battle.”
This hold phase will be enabled in part by Obama’s additional 30,000 troops. But the strategy will also lean heavily on the Afghan forces, who officials say are so far “performing well.”
Indeed, US officials say where this operation differs from others is that they will have the Afghan and coalition forces to conduct the second holding phase – meaning to secure an area and then sustain that security. Carter said about 1,000 more police officers are being trained and will be sent into Helmand in coming weeks.
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Iraq lessons can guide Afghan surge
FT.com - Afghanistan By John Nagl and Mitchell Reiss February 17 2010
As US forces fight to clear Taliban militia from the town of Marjah in Afghanistan s Helmand province, commanders need to look again at what we learnt in Iraq. A key cause of success in that country came when Sunni tribes flipped and decided to fight against hardcore al-Qaeda militants. Afghanistan is not Iraq, but the US and its allies would be foolish to ignore the lessons of the Sunni Awakening that took place in Iraq s al-Anbar province in 2006 and 2007. Properly applied, these lessons could help us use the increased military resources of the Afghan surge to accelerate a political victory in Afghanistan.
First, the US must fight the insurgency from the bottom up. Well into 2006, US efforts to engage tribal factions in Iraq were primarily top-down: military commanders and diplomats tried to negotiate grand bargains with high-profile (but not always influential) sheikhs to get their tribes to stop fighting as insurgents. Unfortunately, this strategy did not work. Al-Qaeda attacked these tribes with impunity, deterring others from rising up and seeking US assistance.
In Afghanistan, local commanders and civilians are working with low-level Afghan tribal leaders to flip the Taliban, but their efforts are being hampered by the requirement that all tribal engagement be cleared with the Karzai government. Given the disenchantment of most Pashtun tribes with Kabul, these preconditions are killing fledgling successes before they can gather momentum.
We need a unified policy that encourages local commanders to engage the tribes in their respective areas and to take advantage of fleeting opportunities to separate them from the insurgents. Flipping Afghan tribes will begin with a series of localised arrangements supported by the centre, not a centralised solution executed at the periphery.
Second, US forces must be better strategic communicators. Until 2007, the US sent mixed messages to the Iraqi tribes about its willingness to engage. American forces worked with the tribes before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom and created an expectation of co-operation in the future governance of the country. The Coalition Provisional Authority established in May 2003 abruptly reversed course, thereby cementing tribal opposition to the American presence.
Later, mixed messages were sent as US diplomats and military officers selectively reached out to certain tribal leaders while insisting that negotiations could not take place with those who had American blood on their hands. At the same time, tactical-level military units were constantly devising their own approaches to engaging tribes and local power-brokers, with no co-ordination from higher command. Only in 2007 did the coalition adopt a clear, consistent position that it was willing to support any tribes and factions that rejected al-Qaeda in Iraq, a stance that helped the Anbar Awakening spread and turn the tide.
The coalition has repeated this mistake in Afghanistan, sending mixed signals about their willingness to engage with the tribes. We must be willing to engage with any and all tribes that reject militant extremists. Additional details, such as how tribal militias should eventually be linked to the Afghan interior ministry, can be dealt with after the fighting is over.
Finally, it is essential that US and allied forces be keenly sensitive to the human terrain watching for any opening to integrate the tribes into the political process and giving local commanders the initiative to exploit these opportunities. The US initially failed to comprehend the human terrain in al-Anbar as it struggled with an insurgency it was ill-prepared to fight. It could not distinguish between the irreconcilable bad guys and those who might be persuaded to join our side. Until US forces acquired better local knowledge, efforts to stabilise the province were doomed to fail.
History does not repeat itself, but it often rhymes. By paying attention to some of the lessons of Iraq engaging tribes at the local level and providing a consistent message based on a real understanding of the human terrain we may defeat the Taliban insurgency with more words and fewer bullets.
John Nagl is president of the Center for a New American Security and a retired Army officer who helped write the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Mitchell Reiss is diplomat-in-residence at the College of William & Mary and author of the forthcoming Negotiating with Evil
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Taliban commander killed in N Afghanistan
KABUL, Feb. 18 (Xinhua) -- Afghan troops, during operation against Taliban militants in northern Kunduz province, eliminated their commander and detained three militants, a local newspaper reported Thursday.
"A Taliban commander called Mullah Zabihullah was killed and three of his armed were arrested," Daily Afghanistan reported.
Quoting the provincial governor Mohammad Omar, the newspaper added that security forces raided Taliban hideout in Chardara district Wednesday night as a result Mullah Zabihullah was killed and three of his men were caught.
The governor, according to newspaper, also said that major cleanup operation would be launched against Taliban militants in Kunduz province.
Taliban militants have yet to make comment.
Kunduz, which used to be a relatively peaceful province until early last year, has been the scene of increasing militancy over the past several months.
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Troops discover weapon cache in Taliban hotbed in Afghanistan
KABUL, Feb. 18 (Xinhua) -- The NATO-led forces discovered a huge weapon cache in Taliban's hotbed Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, a press release of the alliance said Thursday.
"An Afghan-international security patrol found a large weapons cache in the Now Zad district of Helmand last night," the press release said.
The cache, according to the press release, contained variety of arms and ammuniton, including three anti-aircraft weapons, 15 rocket-propelled grenades, 34 mortar rounds and hundreds of artillery shells.
It added that the cache was destroyed by an explosive ordnance disposal team.
The discovery of weapon cache took place when a massive operation against Taliban militants has been going on in the neighboring Marja district since early Saturday.
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Pakistan's romance with Taliban far from over
Deutsche Presse-Agentur 02/17/2010
Islamabad - The capture of Taliban's second-in-command Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar represents a rising level of cooperation between Pakistani and US intelligence agencies, but it remains far from clear if Pakistan's 15-year Taliban romance is over.
Afghan Taliban can hardly survive without hiding places inside Pakistan, and the country has yet to find an alternative for the militia that has served as its proxy in Afghanistan since 1994 when the Taliban movement was founded.
This marriage of convenience might linger on, at least for now.
'Mullah Baradar's arrest may be a significant development but it does not show that Pakistan has taken a U-turn on its policy towards Taliban,' said Saleem Safi, an analyst covering the conflict on Pakistan-Afghan border for the last two decades.
'His arrest fits a pattern of Pakistan surrendering one or two Taliban leaders to its Western allies whenever pressure mounts on it to do more in the fight against terrorism, and at the same its overall relations with Taliban remain good,' Safi added.
He cited the examples of the capture of former Afghan ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salam Zaeef in early 2002 and militant commanders Mansur Dadullah and Ustad Yasir recently.
Baradar, the operational head of Afghan Taliban who was one of its four founders in 1994, seems to be the latest victim of Pakistan's game of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.
As a symbolic gain, his arrest is set to please the US government at a time when its chances of a real success in Afghanistan remain scanty despite a recent troop surge, and the success of its latest assault in the south-eastern province of Helmand is in doubt.
The White House welcomed the increased cooperation with Pakistan against the 'extremists' after the joint raid by the intelligence agents of both countries in the southern port city of Karachi.
'We've seen an increase in Pakistani push-back on extremists in their own country,' US presidential spokesman Robert Gibbs said Tuesday.
'The Pakistanis realized that extremist threats within (their) own borders were threats to their own country.'
Gibbs may be only partly correct. Pakistan has acted mainly against groups of local Taliban that have challenged its own writ and targeted government officials and civilians.
Among them were the followers of hard-headed cleric Maulana Fazlullah in Malakand region, and fighters associated with the Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan in South Waziristan. Both groups have been disrupted, if not completely defeated.
At the same time, local Taliban like Mullah Nazir in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in the North Waziristan, who mainly focus on cross-border attacks on international forces in Afghanistan, remain unscathed.
And the Haqqani network led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, described by US officials as the 'most lethal group,' still operates from North Waziristan.
The Hizb-e-Islami organisation of veteran jihadi leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is believed to have its offices in and around Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.
Most of all, one-eyed Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Muhammad Omar is alleged to be hiding in Pakistan, with the support of the Inter Services Intelligence agency, although Islamabad denies that.
The US might have genuine reason to rejoice over Pakistan's increasing cooperation, and netting a big fish like Baradar is the sort of action against the Taliban which suits Islamabad and Washington equally.
A senior Pakistani diplomat told German Press Agency dpa earlier this month that the US had given Islamabad a lead role in arranging peace talks between Taliban and the government in Kabul, on the condition that Mullah Omar and his most senior lieutenants be excluded from the process.
'We have been asked to concentrate on second-tier leadership and peel away a huge chunk of them, leaving the top guys vulnerable,' said the diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Seducing the young Taliban commanders away from the experienced and charismatic Mullah Omar, and his cunning deputies like Baradar, is no easy job even for the ISI that created and nurtured the movement over the years.
But losing an opportunity to revive its fading influence in Kabul - where its arch-rival India has made inroads - could be a fatal mistake, especially when the US is not ready to accept less than a respectable withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Pakistan might have gone other way round, trying to gradually round up notorious senior Taliban leaders and replace them with militants over which it has more control, and whom would be acceptable for the US as negotiation partners.
'Whatever the reasons for Mullah Baradar's arrest, Pakistan and Taliban will continue to work together even if there is a trust deficit on the part of Taliban towards Pakistan,' Safi said.
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Taliban ammunition 'running low'
February 18, 2010 BBC News
Taliban militants battling coalition troops in Marjah, Afghanistan, are running out of ammunition, Nato officials say.
A BBC correspondent in Kandahar says that from eavesdropping on Taliban communications, Nato understands militants have called for support.
On Wednesday, an Afghan general said Taliban fighters were increasingly using civilians as "human shields".
The Afghan-Nato offensive in Helmand province is now in its sixth day.
Operation Moshtarak, meaning "together" in the Dari language, is the biggest coalition offensive since the Taliban fell in 2001.
Nato officers told BBC security correspondent Frank Gardner in Kandahar that the resistance they were currently encountering was coming from small, disjointed but determined groups of fighters.
Protecting Marjah
In the next few days, US Marines and Afghan government troops are due to push into south-west Marjah, which is believed to be an insurgent stronghold.
But the head of the council for tribal elders in Helmand told BBC Pashto that the long-term security of the area depended on locals being involved in policing.
"As long as you don't get local people involved in the security, you will not be able to protect this area," Haji Abdurahman Sabir said.
"If police were from local people I am sure Marjah would have fallen within two days," he said.
He added that the people of Helmand felt isolated from Afghanistan's central government.
During fighting on Wednesday, US Marines had to call in air support as they came under heavy fire from fighters hiding in bunkers and in buildings including homes and mosques.
Afghan commander Gen Mohiudin Ghori said his soldiers had seen Taliban fighters placing women and children on the roofs of buildings and firing from behind them.
He told the AP news agency: "Especially in the south of Marjah, the enemy is fighting from compounds where soldiers can very clearly see women or children on the roof or in a second-floor or third-floor window."
Nato has stressed the safety of civilians in the areas targeted during Operation Moshtarak is its highest priority.
One villager who had fled to Helmand's provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, told BBC Pashto that relatives could not leave Marjah because the area was heavily mined.
"They say they can't get out of their home. If anyone takes a look outside they are fired upon by the Nato troops - they have no food left and can't go out to shop.
"The Taliban left some places but are now resisting very strongly."
On Wednesday, Helmand's governor, Gulab Mangal, visited Marjah and later travelled to Camp Bastion to visit injured civilians from the area.
Nato reports that he held a shura - a council meeting - with local tribal elders and officials to discuss security in Nad Ali.
British and Afghan troops are reported to be advancing more swiftly in the nearby district of Nad Ali than are their US and Afghan counterparts in Marjah.
Afghan officials say that more than 1,200 families have been displaced and evacuated from Marjah and all are receiving aid in Lashkar Gah.
Meanwhile, it has been confirmed that three days of previously undisclosed talks took place last month between Afghan parliamentarians and Taliban representatives.
The Afghan and Maldives governments said the meeting took place in the Maldives but were not brokered by local officials or any other third party.
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U.N. envoy: Reconciliatory efforts needed in Afghanistan
CNN International By Tom Evans, CNN February 18, 2010
The Taliban should halt attacks on schools and clinics to demonstrate support for the reconciliation effort in Afghanistan, the United Nations' top envoy in Kabul said Wednesday.
"I believe that the reconciliation process, a peace process, is important, and there is a need to talk," Kai Eide, the U.N. special representative to Afghanistan, said. "The best way of doing it is, as we have seen in so many other conflicts, by starting step-by-step with some confidence-building measures."
Eide, who is about to retire as the U.N.'s envoy in Kabul after a two-year tenure, told CNN's Christiane Amanpour in an exclusive interview to air Thursday that he does not believe the conflict will ultimately be solved by military means alone. "There has to be a political process," he said.
The U.N. envoy pointed out that the Afghan government and its international allies have already implemented some confidence-building measures of their own in an effort to win the trust of the Taliban.
"One of them is, for instance, the start of the de-listing of (Taliban) people from the sanctions list. That has already happened. Five people were de-listed," he said, referring to an international list of names of people allegedly with close links to al Qaeda.
Eide suggested it might be worth de-listing more Taliban members as well, so they can travel freely and have access to their assets without fear of any international sanctions.
He also raised the possibility of freeing some detainees from the Bagram detention center in Afghanistan, which holds 645 suspected terrorists. "I think this should be reviewed to see if anybody could be brought out of detention," Edie said.
Edie declined to comment on whether or not he has had any contact himself with the Taliban, and he said it's too early to assess the impact of the arrest of the insurgency's top military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Karachi, in a joint Pakistani and U.S. operation.
Eide's remarks come as U.S., British, and Afghan forces continue a major offensive in and around the Taliban stronghold of Marjah in southern Helmand Province. It's NATO's largest assault since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
"I think it is important, with all the troops that are now coming in, to try to push back the insurgency in those areas where we've seen a stronghold," Eide said. "Now comes the next phase, which is to establish the institutions that are required and also to start thinking of the economic development of those areas."
Afghans are better prepared for this "second phase" than at any other time during the war, he said. "They are bringing in people who can start running the institutions, the judiciary, and so on... and then to also start economic development."
The Afghan National Army is making significant progress in taking the lead in security operations in Afghanistan, but added it needs the support of thousands more NATO trainers, Eide said.
"What we need to do now in order to reach the goal that we set for October 2011, which is 172,000 (Afghan) troops, is to intensify the training activities from our side," he said. "I believe that the troop contributing countries should look at the composition of their forces and devote more of them to training and mentoring of the Afghan forces."
NATO needs a big number of training teams and perhaps as many as 1,000 international personnel in institutions in Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan as part of the surge of more than 30,000 U.S. and NATO troops that is now underway, Eide said.
"I think the Afghan president and the Afghan government want to be enabled to play the lead role, both on the military side and on the civilian side," he added.
The U.N. envoy said he believes the reconciliation effort has not yet reached a point where a real peace process is underway.
He said it's important for President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan to form a national consensus when he holds a peace jirga, or conference, this spring and to make sure that all of Afghan civil society unites behind reconciliation.
"We need to improve the institutions of this country and to bring the people closer to the government," Eide noted. "We need a nationwide plan, which we do not have so far."
Asked what he was most proud of during his U.N. tenure in Afghanistan, Eide stated first that he believes that he and the U.N. played a decisive role in putting concerns about civilian casualties at the top of the agenda.
"We've seen how the current commander, Gen. (Stanley) McChrystal has moved very, very vigorously on this and reduced the number of civilian casualties and house searches dramatically."
Eide also said Afghanistan's international partners are more united than ever on key political issues, and brushed aside criticism from his former deputy, American Peter Galbraith, about the management of last August's presidential election amid charges of fraud by Karzai's supporters.
Eide will be replaced by a veteran Swedish diplomat, Staffan de Mistura, at the beginning of next month.
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U.N. Rejects Militarization of Afghan Aid
The New York Times By Rod Noedland 02/17/2010
KABUL - Senior United Nations officials in Afghanistan on Wednesday criticized NATO forces for what one referred to as the militarization of humanitarian aid, and said United Nations agencies would not participate in the military s reconstruction strategy in Marja as part of its current offensive there.
We are not part of that process, we do not want to be part of it, said Robert Watkins, the deputy special representative of the secretary general, at a news conference attended by other officials to announce the United Nations Humanitarian Action Plan for 2010. We will not be part of that military strategy.
The American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, has made the rapid delivery of governmental services, including education, health care and job programs, a central part of his strategy in Marja, referring to plans to rapidly deploy what he has referred to as a government in a box once Marja is pacified.
Mr. Watkins did not specifically criticize the Marja offensive, saying, It is not the military that will be delivering the services, they will be clearing the area so the government can deliver those services.
However, the United Nations would not be participating, he said.
Wael Haj-Ibrahim, head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs here, said the military should not be involved in providing health care or schools.
If that aid is being delivered as part of a military strategy, the counterstrategy is to destroy that aid, Mr. Haj-Ibrahim said. Allowing the military to do it is not the best use of resources. Instead, he said, the military should confine itself to clearing an area of security threats and providing security for humanitarian organizations to deliver services.
The distribution of aid by the military gives a very difficult impression to the communities and puts the lives of humanitarian workers at risk, Mr. Watkins said.
Last month, eight leading humanitarian organizations working in Afghanistan, including Oxfam and ActionAid, issued a joint report that was highly critical of the International Security Assistance Force, as the American-led NATO force is known, because of the international militaries use of aid as a nonlethal weapon of war.
They maintained that this violated an agreement between international forces and the United Nations that the military s primary role should be to provide security and, only when there is no other alternative, to provide limited developmental and humanitarian assistance. The agencies maintain they are able to work in conflict areas of Afghanistan when local residents see them as independent and not connected with the military, and this approach puts that at risk.
Military-led humanitarian and development activities are driven by donors political interests and short-term security objectives and are often ineffective, wasteful and potentially harmful to Afghans, a statement by Oxfam said.
The United Nations officials expressed the same concern, though more diplomatically, and one official, who did not want to be quoted by name because of the political sensitivity of the issue, said the United Nations had repeatedly raised those concerns with the international forces without success.
The American military refers to its strategy, first enunciated in Iraq in 2006, as clear, hold and build. Previously there were insufficient foreign and Afghan troops in Afghanistan to pursue that strategy systematically because they were unable to hold large areas for long periods of time. The offensive in Marja is intended as a showcase where the strategy can work, and the coalition says it has adequate forces now to do that.
Clear, hold and build, it s short-sighted for two reasons, the United Nations official said. Territory changes hands in a conflict, and if the services are associated with a particular group, it will be destroyed. That has happened often with projects like schools and clinics around the country.
The officials were particularly critical of NATO s planned civilian surge, bringing in more government-financed aid workers involved in projects like the country s provincial reconstruction teams, which are located in each province and designed to provide fast-track development and aid services in their areas.
These reconstruction teams are NATO groups run by various allied countries, including Canada in Kandahar, and Britain in Lashkar Gah, and they primarily disburse development and aid money locally in each province.
Many of the reconstruction teams, the official said, see their role as providing services in exchange for intelligence-gathering and political activity directed against the insurgents. He declined to identify any that operate under that premise, although he added that not all did so.
In many parts of the country, only nongovernmental organizations are able to operate safely because of the security situation, and they fill the gap in governmental services.
Because the reconstruction teams are run by foreigners and are associated with their countries militaries, they need to go out with heavy security, and aid groups worry that locals begin to associate all aid workers with the military.
Oxfam said the military was going way beyond its remit in Afghanistan, citing an American Army counterinsurgency manual that defines humanitarian aid as a nonlethal weapon.
A statement issued Wednesday by the international forces emphasized the military s new, population-centered approach to fighting the insurgents. The conduct of Operation Moshtarak is visibly demonstrating that the force has changed the way it operates and that it is working with and for the people of Afghanistan, the statement said, referring to the Marja offensive. It also suggested the military phase of the operation could be protracted.
The insurgents are tactically adept, have resilience and are cunning, so continued tactical patience on the part of the combined force is important. Mining is significant in areas, and the combined force must be very deliberate in its movement in order to minimize local Afghan and combined force casualties.
The United Nations Humanitarian Action Plan has a proposed budget of $870.5 million, a substantial increase over previous years, because the increased level of NATO military activity has led to increased needs for services in many parts of the country, according the United Nations.
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8 Afghan policemen go missing in central province
KABUL, Feb. 18 (Xinhua) -- Eight Afghan policemen have gone missing since Wednesday in Afghanistan's central Wardak province, spokesman for provincial administration Shahidullah Shahid said Thursday.
"Eight policemen went missing since yesterday in Chak district, " Shahid told Xinhua.
He added that the case is under investigation.
Meantime, Zabihullah Mujahid, who claims to speak for Taliban outfit, in talks with media via telephone from unknown location said that 15 policemen along with their weapons joined Taliban in Wardak province Wednesday night.
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Army uses Python against Taliban roadside bombs in Afghanistan for the first time
The Army has used a new weapon against Taliban roadside bombs in Afghanistan for the first time, the Ministry of Defence said.
Telegraph.co.uk 17 Feb 2010
Royal Engineers fired the Python rocket-powered mine clearance system to blow up improvised explosive devices (IEDs) lined along a route in Helmand Province as part of the ongoing Operation Moshtarak.
The Python is mounted on a trailer pulled behind a Trojan armoured engineer tank. It is then propelled back like a catapult, shooting a snake of high explosives high into the air and on to a minefield, where it detonates.
The weapon was used to clear a dry river bed of IEDs north of Patrol Base Wahid in Nad-e-Ali district in Helmand yesterday, the MoD said.
Lieutenant Colonel Matt Bazeley, commanding officer of 28 Engineer Regiment, added: "We are clearing this belt of death so that civilians and their families can begin to live without fear of being blown to pieces by a cowardly and dishonourable enemy that is happy to kill indiscriminately."
A Trojan, which is fitted with a large plough on the front, was also used to clear a safe passage through a suspected IED field near Showal in Nad-e-Ali on Saturday.
This was the first time the plough had been used on an active operation in Afghanistan, the MoD said.
About 15,000 Nato and Afghan troops are involved in Operation Moshtarak, an offensive to drive the Taliban out of strongholds in Helmand.
UK forces are concentrating their efforts on the town of Nad-e-Ali, while US Marines are battling in nearby Marjah.
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Where patients fear to tread
KABUL, 18 February 2010 (IRIN) - The only functioning health post in conflict-affected Marjah in Helmand Province, southern Afghanistan, is not being used because people fear they could get caught in crossfire if they try and get there, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
A staffed and functioning ICRC health post was set up in the town before the 13 February NATO/Afghan government offensive, and both sides notified of its existence.
“We treat both sick and wounded civilians and fighters,” Bijan Frederic Farnoudi, ICRC’s communication officer in Kabul, told IRIN, referring to the organization’s role under international law.
ICRC said it is having problems communicating with its medical staff in Marjah and is concerned about their safety as fighting continues. A few ICRC health workers were visiting those in need of health care in, or near, their homes. “Our main concern is patients being able to either safely access them, or our own staff safely accessing patients in their homes,” said Farnoudi.
The ICRC has taken nine people to the provincial capital of Lashkargah for hospital treatment. Evacuating the wounded and sick from Marjah had been tricky: The main road to Lashkargah is inaccessible and taking alternative routes is risky as no one knows where a roadside bomb might be, it said.
Mobile health teams
Over 1,400 displaced families (more than 10,000 individuals) have been registered in Lashkargah; 110 families have sought refuge in Nawa District, and 300 families in the Kashrod District of Helmand’s neighbouring Nimruz Province, according to aid agencies.
“Because IDPs [internally displaced persons] do not live in a camp or one specific area, we have launched two mobile health teams to serve them in Lashkargah city,” Enayatullah Ghafari, provincial director of the health department, told IRIN.
He said 30 displaced patients, most of them children suffering from acute respiratory and diarrhoeal diseases, were treated by mobile health workers on 17 February. Some of the treated children were also “malnourished”, Ghafari said.
Prior to the military operation, the health department was delivering basic health services in Taliban-controlled Marjah through a community health centre and two sub-posts.
“We have no news of our staff and don’t know about the status of our health centres in Marjah,” Ghafari said.
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Tajikstan Reinforces Riverbanks To Prevent Loss Of Land To Afghanistan
February 18, 2010 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
KULOB, Tajikistan -- Officials in Tajikistan's southern Khatlon Province say they will plant apricot orchards on territory recently returned to Tajikistan by Afghanistan, RFE/RL's Tajik Service reports.
Heavy floods in 2005 caused the Panj River -- which marks the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan -- to leave about 1,500 hectares of Tajik territory on Afghanistan's side of the river.
Khujamurod Fazliddinov, the head of Khatlon's Hamadoni district, told RFE/RL the government invested 93 million somoni ($19.4 million) into fortifying the river banks and for planting apricot orchards on 475 hectares of the land that was returned to Tajikistan.
Officials hope the work will keep the Panj River from changing its course in the future.
Last year, Tajik border guards regained control of some 35,000 hectares of land in the Shurabad district bordering Afghanistan.
Tajik-Afghan border disputes recently gained importance after reports of Afghan poachers and drug smugglers illegally entering Tajikistan.
Some of the mountainous areas close to the Tajik-Afghan border in the Shurobod district still contain Soviet-era land mines.
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Afghanistan's top cops finish Canadian-sponsored leadership course
The Canadian Press February 17, 2010
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - They are the best and brightest of Afghanistan's boys in blue, and now they have the papers to prove it.
Twenty-three Afghan cops graduated from a special leadership course at a ceremony held today at the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar city. The six-week course was taught by Afghans following a Canadian-influenced syllabus.
The Canadian-sponsored course is the first of its kind for Afghanistan's fledgling police force.
The officers were taught everything from handling payroll to how to deal with the public.
The graduates will now return to their detachments to teach their new skills to their colleagues.
There are 48 civilian and 40 military Canadian police trainers in Afghanistan working with the national police force.
The Canadian government is spending $99 million over three years on the Afghan army and police.
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Afghan man claims he was AFP informant
The Age ADAM GARTRELL February 18, 2010 AAP
An Afghan man accused of people smuggling in Indonesia says he is innocent and claims Australian police pushed for his arrest only after he stopped feeding them intelligence.
Sajjad Hussain Noor, 26, was arrested in October last year and is now in a Jakarta jail awaiting extradition to Australia to face people smuggling charges.
Noor, an ethnic Hazara, says he tried to seek asylum in Australia in 2001 but the crowded boat he shared with 145 other Afghans broke down in Indonesian waters.
Without enough money to try again, he was forced to wait in Indonesia for the UNHCR to assess his refugee claim.
In the meantime, he approached the Australian embassy in Jakarta with information about the smuggler who arranged the failed journey, he says.
"He f***ed my life and I wanted to f*** him back," Noor told AAP in an exclusive interview inside the jail.
Noor wanted Australia to reward his co-operation by helping him with his case but embassy officials refused, he says. He subsequently decided not to help them.
But Noor says he approached them with new information in 2008.
He says he met with embassy officials, including at least one Australian Federal Police (AFP) officer, on several occasions.
"I said: 'This guy, this guy and this guy are doing this, this and this, and I know them, I can give you information, where they are and when they move'," he said.
But Noor said he eventually began to feel exploited because he was getting nothing in return.
"So I stopped," he said.
"They tried to reach me, they called me. 'Please come and meet us, we want to ask you more questions.'
"But from that time when I stopped meeting with them they turned against me."
The following year, Australia requested Indonesian police arrest him. Noor says he was shocked to learn he was wanted in Australia.
Despite having access to information about people smugglers, Noor says he never participated in the business himself.
"I never did anything criminal," he says.
"From 2001 to 2009, until I was arrested, I never made any problems."
The AFP declined to comment on Noor's claims.
"Matters related to persons detained in Indonesia are a matter for Indonesian authorities to comment on," an AFP spokesperson said.
Noor is likely to be in custody for at least a year while Indonesia processes Australia's extradition request.
If the extradition proceeds, Noor will leave behind an Indonesian wife and three young children. If he is convicted, he could face up to 20 years' prison.
Noor says the UNHCR rejected his refugee application last year but it has given him no explanation for the decision.
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