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August 14, 2007 

Iran president says no weapons for Taliban
by Waheedullah Massoud
KABUL (AFP) - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Tuesday rejected US and British claims that Iranian weapons are being supplied to Taliban insurgents fighting the Afghan government and international troops.

"I doubt seriously if there is any truth in it," Ahmadinejad said at a press conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul on his first visit to the country since taking office.

"With all our force, we support the political process in Afghanistan," he said.

Both British and US officials have charged that Iranian-made weapons were aiding the Taliban, the extremist militia which is waging a guerrilla war against the Kabul government as well as the multinational forces here.

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said in June there were so many weapons of Iranian origin coming into Afghanistan that it was hard to believe "it's taking place without the knowledge of the Iranian government."

The charges have been strongly denied by Tehran, which was a staunch opponent of the Taliban movement's 1996-2001 regime.

Karzai has also downplayed the claims, saying they have not been proven.

Afghanistan was close to Iran and also a friend and strategic partner of the United States, Karzai told reporters after meeting Ahmadinejad.

"If Afghanistan can bring them closer, that will be a great happiness for Afghanistan -- but it depends on both sides," Karzai said.

The United States led the invasion that drove the Taliban from power in late 2001 and is the biggest supplier of troops towards international efforts to defeat the Taliban insurgency.

The Iranian president insisted that his country, which shares a long border with Afghanistan, felt the "first impact" of any security troubles in Karzai's nation.

"For us, a secure and stable Afghanistan is the best," Ahmadinejad said.

Karzai raised eyebrows this month when he said on the eve of talks with President George W. Bush that Iran was "a helper and a solution" to problems in Afghanistan, pointing to cooperation in the fight against terrorism and drugs.

Bush responded days later saying he "would be very cautious about whether or not the Iranian influence there in Afghanistan is a positive force."

Ahmadinejad was later due to meet key opposition figure Younus Qanooni, speaker of the lower house of parliament, as well as some Iranian nationals before heading to Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.

His talks with Karzai were also likely to have focused on Tehran's expulsion of Afghans illegally residing in Iran.

Since April around 170,000 unregistered Afghans have been driven out, sparking considerable concern over Kabul's ability to cope with the influx.

An outcry in Afghanistan about the expulsions cost the refugees minister his job. Parliament, led by Qanooni, also voted for Foreign Minister Rangeen Dadfar Spanta to be sacked. The vote was overturned by the Supreme Court.

After their meeting, the two presidents signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation.

Officials from both sides signed four accords, including one on Iranian help towards capacity building in the Afghan government and in building a road in the west of the country.
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Tehran, Kabul sign six cooperation agreements
KABUL, Aug 14 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Afghanistan and Iran Tuesday signed six memorandums of understanding (MoUs) and agreements during President Mahmoud Ahmadinejads day-long maiden visit to Kabul.

One of the MoUs - envisaging all-round cooperation between the neighbours - was inked by Ahmadinejad and his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai and the rest by ministers from the two countries.

A second agreement, signed by visiting Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and Finance Minister Anwarul Haq Ahady, pertains to capacity building of Afghan institutions and officials.

Mottaki and Agriculture Minister Obaidullah Ramin inked a third accord, under which Iran will help Afghanistan in the veterinary sector.

Under a fourth MoU, inked between Mottaki and Public Health Minister Sohrab Ali Safari, Iran will build a 110-kilometre road linking Farah City with the Iranian border area of Mailak.

Similarly, Mottaki and Interior Minister Zarar Ahmad Muqbil put their signatures to an agreement that commits the neighbours to jointly fighting terrorist, drugs and organised crime.

Ministers for mines from both sides also sign a pact that provides for Iranian investment in Afghanistans mineral sector development.

Also on Tuesday, the Iranian embassy here said three projects completed by the Iranian government were inaugurated in Kabul. The $2.6 million schemes include a water exploration centre, a stomatalogy faculty and a conference hall at the Kabul Medical University.
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100 Iran-made bombs seized, claim Afghan officials
MAZAR-I-SHARIF, Aug 14 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Balkh intelligence officials have claimed seizing a hundred Iranian-made improvised explosive devices (IED) in the Hairatan border town on the eve of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejads maiden visit to Kabul.

An intelligence official, who did not want to be named, confided to Pajhwok Afghan News on Tuesday they recovered the bombs recently smuggled into the northern province for disruptive activities.

The YM-type landmines - manufactured in 1997 by the neighbouring country - were to be used for blowing up gas and oil installations in the region, claimed the intelligence official, who offered no concrete proof in support of his assertion.

Initial investigations indicated the explosive devices were smuggled into Afghanistan from Uzbekistan by loyalists of warlord Tahir Yoldashev, said the source, who alleged the dreaded militant leader was fighting alongside al-Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas.

Intelligence personnel are combing certain locations to track down the smugglers, according to the official, familiar with the seizure and the ongoing probe. He declined to give more details, arguing such information could hurt the manhunt and the investigation.

A senior official based in Hairatan, Qazi Najibullah, confirmed the sleuths recovered the bombs in his presence last evening. The official, who would not reveal more details for security reasons, added the explosives had been shifted to Mazar-i-Sharif.

Less than two weeks back, 16 Iranian-made landmines were found from a hideout in the mountainous district of Ghorian in the western Herat province that borders with Iran. On June 2, officials said five anti-tank mines - with all the Iranian hallmarks - were seized from a cave in the same district.

In mid-June, a top-ranking Bush administration official, in a departure from his previous stand, hinted the Iranian government was aware of large-scale weapons shipments to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he had seen a new intelligence analysis that broadly suggested 'a fairly substantial flow of illegal weapons' from Iran to Taliban. The arms were being shipped with the knowledge of the Iranian government, he presumed.

"Given the quantities that were seeing, it is difficult to believe that it's associated with smuggling or the drug business or that it's taking place without the knowledge of the Iranian government," remarked Gates.

But Afghan leader Hamid Karzai, who met the Iranian president in Kabul today, tends to dispel the impression that Iran is arming his foes or trying to create instability in his country. Earlier in the month, he disagreed on the issue with President Bush during media appearance at Camp David.
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Two freed Koreans to leave Afghanistan soon
KABUL (Reuters) - Two South Korean women freed by Taliban kidnappers are in a good condition and undergoing medical checks in Afghanistan on Tuesday before flying home "very soon," a Korean embassy spokesman said.

The pair were the first hostages to be released by Taliban kidnappers who seized 23 Korean church volunteers from a bus in Ghazni province on the main road south from the capital Kabul last month. The Taliban have killed two male hostages.

"They are in a good condition and they are staying in a safe place under our protection and are undergoing medical checks," the spokesman said. He said they would return to Korea "very soon, but still their flight schedule has not been fixed yet."

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun thanked officials who worked to secure the release. "I hope it is a good indication for the release of all the others," he told a cabinet meeting.

Taliban insurgents said they had freed the two women as they were seriously ill, but they were able to walk to a waiting Red Cross vehicle at their handover on Monday and both Korean and Afghan officials said they were relatively well.

The rebels said the release was also a gesture of goodwill, to encourage the Afghan government to free rebel prisoners in exchange for the remaining 19 captives, 16 of them women.

The Taliban have threatened to kill the remaining hostages if their demand is not met.

The Afghan government has refused to free Taliban prisoners, saying that would just encourage more kidnapping.

(Additional reporting by Jack Kim in Seoul)
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No new talks planned on Koreans
By AMIR SHAH, Associated Press Writer
GHAZNI, Afghanistan - Taliban leaders and South Korean officials negotiated by phone over the fate of 19 remaining hostages, but no new face-to-face talks had been planned, the International Committee of the Red Cross said Tuesday.

Two Korean women were released Monday in the first breakthrough in a drama that began more than three weeks ago when a busload of 23 South Korean church volunteers was seized. Two of the hostages, both men, were killed last month.

The handover came after two days of face-to-face talks between the Taliban and a South Korean delegation. Franz Rauchenstein, an official with the International Committee of the Red Cross said, officials were ready to host more talks at the office of the Afghan Red Crescent in Ghazni, but the two sides were talking by phone for now.

"We stand ready to play the role of neutral intermediary for the release of the next 19 hostages and we are urging the two parties to make it a short process in the interest of the hostages," he said.

The South Korean Embassy said the two women were transferred taken from the U.S. base at Ghazni to a safe place in "our care," and that they were in good condition and awaiting a flight home "very soon."

"They got medical checks, and nothing serious happened," said an embassy official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of embassy policy.

It was likely that the women were flown to the U.S. base at Bagram, where the South Korean military runs a hospital.

The official said South Korean delegates in Ghazni were "still maintaining negotiation channels" with the Taliban leaders but declined to give further details.

A Taliban spokesman said they released the women as a show of goodwill because negotiations were going well. Qari Yousef Ahmadi also reiterated the militants' demand that Taliban prisoners be released in exchange for the remaining 19 hostages.

Ghazni Gov. Marajudin Pathan, who in the past has suggested the hostage standoff could be solved with a ransom payment, ruled out a prisoner swap.

ICRC officials waited for the Koreans on a stretch of desert road 5 miles south of the city of Ghazni. When a dark gray Toyota Corolla stopped, two women got out of the back seat and began crying at the sight of the waiting Red Cross SUVs.

The South Korean Foreign Ministry identified the freed hostages as Kim Kyung-ja and Kim Ji-na. Previous media reports said they were 37 and 32 years old, respectively.

Meanwhile, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad made his first-ever visit to Afghanistan, calling Iran's eastern neighbor a "brotherly nation" whose stability is paramount for the region.

When asked if Iran is supplying weapons to the Taliban by a reporter from Voice of America, a U.S.-funded outlet, Ahmedinejad laughed and said the United States doesn't want Afghanistan and Iran to be friends.

"The same allegation are made in Iraq. They are saying that they discover some weapons," Ahmedinejad said at a news conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. "What is the reason why they are saying such things? Iran is a big country. I have serious doubts about this issue."

Ahmedinejad's trip comes a week after President Bush said during a news conference with Karzai last week in the United States that he thought Iran was playing a destabilizing role in Afghanistan, where the Taliban have stepped up attacks the last two years.

The U.S. military has charged that Iran is supplying weapons to Shiite militias in Iraq who are fighting against U.S. troops there.
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Associated Press writers Alisa Tang and Fisnik Abrashi in Kabul contributed to this report.
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11 killed in Afghanistan violence
Tue Aug 14, 6:12 AM ET
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan (AFP) - Six Afghan civilians were killed when a rocket-propelled grenade blew up their vehicle during a Taliban attack on a military convoy in southern Afghanistan, police said.

The men had been travelling in a minibus near a convoy bringing supplies to NATO-led troops that came under attack in the southern province of Kandahar on Monday, the provincial police commander said.

An Afghan guard with a US private security firm was also killed in the attack, Kandahar police chief Sayed Agha Saqeb told AFP.

Five vehicles, including three trucks, were destroyed, Saqeb said.

The attack was in the Zhari district, just west of Kandahar city, which sees regular clashes between Taliban-led insurgents and troops.

Kandahar is the birthplace of the radical Islamist movement that swept to power in 1996 and was removed in 2001 by a US-led coalition.

A separate clash between troops and insurgents on Monday in Ghazni province, further north, left four Taliban dead, provincial police chief Alishah Ahamdzai said. Another was arrested.

Ghazni has been in the headlines since the July 19 kidnapping of 23 South Korean aid workers. Two of the hostages were freed Monday. Two others were shot dead by the Taliban last month.

The Taliban wants the release from jail of some of their fighters in exchange for the hostages but the government has rejected the demand.

The Taliban's Al-Qaeda-backed insurgency has intensified this year, despite the efforts of nearly 50,000 international troops working with the Afghan security forces to end the rebellion.
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Senate chairman tenders resignation to Karzai
KABUL, Aug 14 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Senate Chairman Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, citing his preoccupations with a reconciliation campaign, has tendered his resignation to President Hamid Karzai, an official said on Tuesday.

Meshrano Jirga (Upper House of Parliament) Secretary Aminuddin Muzaffari told Pajhwok Afghan News most senators voiced aversion to the resignation of Mujaddedi - known for his anti-Pakistan diatribe.

The secretary quoted the Senate chairman as saying in the resignation letter that he was unable to continue with his job owing to pressing engagements as head of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) - tasked with wooing opponents of the government.

Additionally, Muzaffari pointed out, the elderly politician had complained of incompliance with his advice by government officials - something that hurt his reputation. The official would not explain whether or not the president had accepted his resignation.

Meanwhile, a female senator confirmed that Mujaddedi had put in his papers but most members were opposed to the move. Requesting not to be named, the parliamentarian said the legislators wanted the former president to continue in his office.

Under Mujaddedis leadership, the NRC has been able to convince around 4,000 Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) adherents into renouncing violence and supporting the government led by President Hamid Karzai.

The Senate chairman, it will be pertinent to recall, had also threatened to stand down last year when Attorney-General Abdul Jabar Sabit accused Herat Mayor Muhammad Rafiq Mujaddedi of corruption and other illegal practices.

However, Mujaddedi did not make good on his threat prompted by the corruption charges against his clansman. It remains to be seen whether the NRC chairman will stick to his decision this time around.
Reported by Najib Khilwatgar
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Police have Afghanistan's most dangerous job - for $70 a month
Jason Motlagh, San Francisco Chronicle Foreign Service Tuesday, August 14, 2007
Kabul, Afghanistan -- Ahmed Haidari has spent nearly three years inside the blast walls of the Kabul police academy, learning to become an officer along with 1,000 other trainees. But when he graduates later this month, he will assume the most dangerous job in Afghanistan.

After losing hundreds of fighters in direct confrontations with NATO forces last summer, the Taliban have increasingly turned to suicide and hit-and-run tactics that target underpaid, ill-equipped police who are dying at a record pace. According to the Interior Ministry, more than 400 police have been killed since late March.

Just last month, the Taliban claimed responsibility for killing 35 people and injuring scores more outside Kabul police headquarters. It was the second such attack in as many days, and most of the victims were trainees.

"These days, (the Taliban) are killing police, not Army soldiers so much," said Haidari 23, as a group of trainees nodded in agreement. "We are still ready."

In some provincial districts with more than 100,000 people, there are just 25 to 30 police stretched thin, battling insurgents and lending a hand in drug eradication, all of which makes them easy targets, Afghan officials say.

"In remote areas of the country, the only force that you can find that is active there, that is working there, is the police of Afghanistan," said Interior Ministry spokesman Zemarai Bashary.

The upgraded Afghan National Army typically remains inside barracks until there is an attack, Bashary explained.

Analysts say the Taliban sent a two-fold message by attacking the Kabul police headquarters: no amount of international support can ensure security; and those who cooperate with the government are targets.

"Strategically, it makes sense to attack Afghan security forces where morally it gives people a complex about whether it is worth joining," said Hekmat Karzai, head of Kabul's Center for Conflict and Peace Studies.

Some attacks have even killed a handful of relatives of police officials, including a family of five in Ghazni province. Police often find it difficult to defend themselves when targeted for assassination. While insurgents strike with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, police are limited to used AK-47 assault rifles and other dated weaponry.

A joint report by the U.S. Defense and State departments estimated it would cost $600 million a year for years to come to bring the police force up to par, provided such funding is not siphoned off by corruption.

Even though police officers earn only $70 a month, some have not been paid in more than a year because of graft, according to the nonprofit International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think tank. As a result, some police extort money from opium poppy farmers who have produced another record harvest this year, and destroy crops of those who don't pay them bribes.

Last year, a U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime and World Bank report accused the interior ministry - the ministry in charge of security and anti-drug campaign - of playing an increasing role in organizing protection for criminal markets.

To be sure, efforts are under way to create a more honest police force. The European Union is taking over police training duties from Germany and has sent advisers to restive provinces where they are expected to work with local governments to attract and train new men and women. The plan is to add 20,000 more police to the current level of about 62,000 officers over the next couple of years, spokesman Bashary said.

The Afghan government is also putting together a 5,000-man reserve force based in central provinces to provide "quick-response support wherever police are attacked," he said. "They will go in and pound the enemy, and then withdraw."

And still another program aims to hire 11,200 auxiliary officers to supplement forces in high risk security areas, notably the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand where the Taliban has its strongest presence. Some critics say the 10-day crash training course for these officers will undermine the overall strength and integrity of the national police, increasing the likelihood of graft and infiltration by insurgents. Some U.S. trainers have said that 1 in 10 new Afghan recruits have links to the Taliban.

"While it has been emphasized that the (auxiliary police) would be recruited individually, many fear the result will be the regularization of militias," according to a report by the International Crisis Group.

Just days before his long-awaited graduation, Haidari worries more about being placed under the command of a corrupt officer than the resurgent Taliban.

"My friends who have been sent to the provinces say their officers have told them to steal from the people and take money from criminals," he said. "I'm scared of getting a police commander who works with the Taliban."
This article appeared on page A - 13 of the San Francisco Chronicle
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Afghanistan-Iran: Afghan deportees complain of lack of aid
HERAT, 14 August 2007 (IRIN) - Two months after their forced deportation from Iran, Afghan citizen Mohammad Alim and his six-member family still have an unsettled life in Herat Province, western Afghanistan.

They live in a tent in Jami camp, about 5km northwest of Herat city, where his wife Amina, and sister Parween, spend many hours trying to give his three children aged 5-10 an education, as they do not go to school.

"Except for a tent and some kitchen utensils we have not received any assistance," said Alim, 42, adding that his family had never before gone to bed hungry.

Living nearby is another destitute Afghan family. They cannot return to the south of Afghanistan owing to insecurity, lack of work and a variety of other problems.

"All our property and earnings have been left behind in Iran," said Abdul Gafoor, a member of one of the families. "Without shelter and other basic necessities it is very difficult to establish a new life here."

Since April, some 200,000 Afghans living in Iran illegally have been deported to their home country, according to the Afghan government.

"A lot of deported families are poor, unskilled and in a state of shock; their lives were changed within hours," said Fernando Arocena, country representative for the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

UN aid

In July the UN allocated US$5 million through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to ease the suffering of thousands of Afghan families deported from Iran.

The fund has enabled different UN agencies to come up with promises of food and non-food humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable deportees.

"It is a comprehensive response in which the WHO [World Health Organization] provides health assistance, WFP [World Food Programme] distributes food items, UNICEF [UN Children's Fund] helps children and the IOM contributes non-food items and transportation assistance," said Arocena.

The IOM country representative said deported families had received assistance based on their specific needs and that is was a comprehensive response.

Complaints

However, some deported families who live in transit camps in Herat and Nimruz provinces, bordering Iran, have complained about both the quality and quantity of humanitarian aid.

One angry deportee said: "In this hot weather they [aid agencies] have given us blankets instead of tents, food and drinking water."

Shojauddin Shoja, an adviser in Afghanistan's Ministry of Refugees and Returnees, also criticised aid agencies' humanitarian response.

"Unfortunately we were not consulted in determining what is urgently needed and in what quantities," Shoja told IRIN on 13 August.

The UN and the IOM say they are working closely with Afghan authorities and local NGOs to meet the humanitarian requirements of the most vulnerable deportees.

Diplomatic efforts

In April two Afghan cabinet ministers were sacked for failing to deal with an unexpected influx of tens of thousands of deportees.

Afghan officials have meanwhile stepped up diplomatic efforts to encourage Iran to slow down the deportation of Afghans living and working illegally there.

The issue will be on the agenda of talks between President Karzai and his Iranian counterpart Ahmadinejad, who was in Kabul on 14 August. "President Karzai will ask for a humane, gradual and dignified deportation of Afghans from Iran," Shoja added.

Over 900,000 Afghans are registered as refugees in Iran and are allowed to live and work there, according to the UN Refugee Agency. However, at the same time there are tens of thousands of Afghan nationals in Iran who are there illegally.
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Coalition helicopters make hard landing in east
KABUL, Aug 14 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Two Coalition helicopters made hard landing in eastern Afghanistan, a statement from the Coalition's Bagram base said on Monday.

Although being investigated by the Coalition troops, the statement said "there is no indication of enemy involvement in the incidents".

A search and rescue operation was launched immediately to secure the sites, recover the crew and transport injured personnel to the Coalition's medical facilities for treatment. The crewmembers suffered minor injuries.

The specific location and details of the incident would not be released until the completion of recovery operations, said the statement.

A separate statement said the "hard landing" was caused by bad weather. The helicopters involved were AH-64 Apache. All personnel on-board were American, it added.

"These downed aircraft are not the result of enemy contact," spokesperson for the Coalition forces Vanessa R. Bowmansaid. "The investigation will gather the facts surrounding this incident," said the spokesperson, who advised civilians to stay away from the location.
Javid Hamim/Mueed Hashmi
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Afghanistan: UN wants more protection for civilians
New York, 14 August (AKI) - The United Nations is demanding greater protection for civilians in Afghanistan as conflict and insecurity affect thousands of people across the country.

The UN said the number of those killed in the country had doubled from 2005 to 2006 and resurgent fighting in the south had driven 80,000 others from their homes during the same period.

“The safety of the Afghan people must be our first priority,” Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s special representative Tom Koenigs told a three-day workshop in the Afghan capital Kabul.

“It is civilians who continue to bear the brunt of insecurity and conflict in Afghanistan. We all have a responsibility to redouble our efforts to ensure the safety and welfare of Afghanistan’s people,” he said.

The UN said poor security had made much of the southern region inaccessible for humanitarian assistance and prohibited the investigation of deaths and injuries of those caught up in the conflict.

The workshop gathered over 80 representatives from the government, the Afghan armed forces and police, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and UN agencies, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Academic institutions and Afghan civil society, including community and religious leaders, were also taking part.

“We want the recommendations emerging from this workshop to lay the foundation for developing a strong and effective protection framework for civilians across Afghanistan,” Koenigs said.

“We want to maintain the momentum of this workshop, and gear ourselves to adapt in the best possible way to ensure conflict prevention and the safety of people.”

The workshop was taking place as two of the South Korean hostages held by the Taliban were released in Ghazni province.

Ban Ki-moon welcomed the release of the two hostages who were among the 23 abducted by the Taliban on the main road between Kandahar and Kabul on July 19. Two of the hostages have been killed by the Taliban.

He said among the detained there were many young women "who came to help the people of Afghanistan and they should not be made part of the conflict in that country".
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UNHCR’s shelter assistance and repatriation update
KABUL, August 13 (UNHCR) As part of its shelter programme, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) provides some 10,000 returnee families with shelter assistance this year to help them build their homes. As in previous years, returning families from Pakistan, Iran and displaced families will be eligible to benefit.

UNHCR has already signed agreements with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to help construct some 10,000 housing units for the vulnerable returnees, of which about 70 per cent across the country are now either under construction or have already been completed. UNHCR concentrates on providing rural housing, so that returning Afghans to rural areas can stay in their home villages and won’t be compelled to move to urban cities.

The project includes 2,850 shelter units in Central Region (Ghazni, Kabul and Parwan), 2,200 in Northern (Baghlan, Kunduz and Takhar), 1,900 in Eastern ( Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar), 900 in Southeast ( Paktya), 800 in West ( Badghis, Farah and Hirat), 700 in South ( Kandahar and Zabul) and 200 in Central Highland (Bamyan and DayKundi).

Of the nearly 10,000 shelter unites planned for this year, some 1,200 are allocated for the families who have recently received plots of land from the government of Afghanistan, including in Barikab and Beniworsik land allocation sites.

UNHCR’s shelter programme is designed to help the most vulnerable returned refugees and internally displaced persons countrywide. Though not all returnees are considered eligible for shelter assistance, selected families will receive timber for the roof and frames for the windows as well as doors and shelter tool kit to build their houses with.

Since 2002 when UNHCR first launched its shelter programme, over 160,000 families (more than 1 million returnees) have benefited. By the end of this year, UNHCR will have provided more than 170,000 vulnerable families with shelter assistance.

Over 300,000 Afghan Refugees Returned

The number of Afghan refugees repatriating from Pakistan and Iran since March 2007 has reached more than 300,000. Most of these refugees have returned from Pakistan to the eastern provinces of Afghanistan while nearly 5,000 have returned from Iran.

The overall figure includes over 200,000 unregistered Afghans who returned during a six week grace period between March and mid April this year announced by the government of Pakistan.

The total number of assisted returns since the operation began in March 2002 stands at over 4 million while at least another 1 million returned spontaneously. End.
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Pak-Afghan Jirga to soon initiate dialogue with Taliban, says Sherpao
Tuesday August 14, 2007 (1332 PST) PakTribune.com, Pakistan
ISLAMABAD: Federal Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Sherpao on Monday said that in view of establishing peace in South Asia, a 50-member Pak-Afghan Jirga will soon initiate a dialogue with Taliban and other concerned officials.

While talking to host of Journalists after inaugurating a Highway 7th Avenue under the aegis of CDA in Islamabad on Monday, Sherpao said that Kabul Jirga would promote peace in region and would end hostilities between the two countries.

He said that Pakistan and Afghanistan have come closer due to the efforts of incumbent Government.

He said that Jirga played an important role in view to adopt a joint strategy and escalating peace efforts in this regard.

He said that Pak-Afghan Jirga would be remembered for a very long time, as it is for the first time in the history that people of both countries sat together and discussed measures and steps to promote peace.

Earlier, while addressing the simple but dignified ceremony, Sherpao said that with the construction of 7th Avenue, traffic flow will be reduced to quite an extent and masses will take a sigh of relief as last few months have been quite hectic for them due to travelling on alternative routes.

On the occasion were present, Secretary Interior Syed Kamal Shah, CDA officials Moinuddin, Sabtain Kazmi, Chief Commissioner Islamabad Khalid Pervaiz, IG Islamabad Police Chaudhry Iftiqhar and DIG Islamabad Nadeem Baloch and others

He said that till the end of 2007, people will notice a big and revolutionary change in the Capital.

He congratulated CDA officials for working day and night to make the project a successful one in this regard.

Replying to a question, Interior Minister said that Government is taking apt measures for the elimination of terrorism from the country.

He said that Pakistan would not allow any country to use its soil for terrorism adding that we hope that Pak-Afghan Jirga will bear fruit soon.

Responding to another question, Sherpao said that Independence Day has utmost historic importance and will be celebrated in a befitting manner in the country to highlight the achievements and gigantic efforts of Founder of Pakistan Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

He further added that stringent security measures will be taken in all the four provinces on the Historic Day falling on August 14 (today) while Security has been kept on a High Alert to avoid any untoward incident.CJP to lay foundation of SC extension today

ISLAMABAD: Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry will lay the foundation stone of the Supreme Court Building's Phase-II on Pakistan Independence today (Tuesday).

The project will add four new blocks to the building for chambers of judges, offices of law officers and Supreme Court Bar Association, a basement for enlargement of the existing judges, library for judges and a human right cell.

The Capital Development Authority (CDA) has awarded the contact to Construction Company. The Project would bear cost of Rs. 267 million and would be completed in one and half year.

The present building of SC was inaugurated in 1993.
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Jirga sidesteps Pashtun radicalization
By Haroun Mir Asia Times Online
KABUL - After months of negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a joint jirga (council) finally took place in Kabul. But the four-day gathering, which ended this weekend, was more like a peace conference than a traditional jirga, where belligerent parties should have faced one another and accepted the outcome of the meeting.

Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf and President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan made eloquent speeches in support of peace and a policy of friendship between the two Muslim nations. But they failed to highlight the main threat to the stability of the countries - the intensive radicalization of Pashtun tribes at the hands of al-Qaeda.

On Sunday, the 700-strong jirga approved a joint declaration to form a mini-jirga for dialogue with groups of militants, including the Taliban. The declaration also said that the sides would avoid hostile statements against each other and that they would exchange anti-terrorism intelligence.

The declaration recognized terrorism as a common threat, emphasized the need for a "war on terror", and pledged: "The government and people of Afghanistan and Pakistan will not allow sanctuaries/training centers for terrorists in their respective countries."

But the assembly was picked by the Afghan and Pakistani governments and lacked representatives from the Pashtuns who fight Afghan and coalition forces, and support the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

The jirga was to have taken place in the Afghan city of Jalalabad last December as a Pashtun inter-tribal meeting to discuss the trans-border incursion of insurgents from Pakistan into Afghanistan and the presence of al-Qaeda and foreign fighters in the Pashtun tribal territories.

But it changed to become a conference between official delegations of the two countries. The Pakistani delegation was mainly composed of Pashtuns, with no major national figures from Punjab or Sindh among them. The majority of the speakers from both sides defended the official position of their respective governments in the ongoing blame game between the countries.

In any case, a traditional jirga is not the right mechanism to overcome historic rivalries between Pakistan and Afghanistan. For the majority of Pakistanis, such as Punjabis and Sindhis, the jirga has no historic or legal significance.

The absence of major Punjabis, the dominant ethnic group, proves that Pakistan tried to limit it to a traditional council among Pashtun tribes.

The large number of the participants, and ambiguity about specific goals, lowered expectations for the jirga. A few speakers from both sides mentioned the main issues, such as widespread radicalization of Pashtun youth and the lack of economic development in the tribal zones.

But the majority of participants limited their speeches to emotional mutual praise, such as the great sacrifice the Afghan people made during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, in the global fight against communism or the assistance that the Pakistani people have provided Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In fact, this jirga should have focused on specific issues rather than on broad and general discussions.

There is a difference in perception between Afghanistan and Pakistan in terms of resolving issues between the countries. While Afghanistan looks at them in a more traditional and tribal way, such as the jirga, the majority of Pakistanis don't live under such a tribal structure.

In addition, Pakistan's military and civilian leadership does not want to leave its national strategic interests in the hands of a traditional assembly. It considers the jirga as simply a matter of inter-Pashtun dialogue.

The Afghan authorities should have focused mainly on finding solutions to the Pashtun problem in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, because Pashtuns remain the main supporters and backers of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Historically, Afghanistan is much better positioned to interfere in Pashtun tribal affairs than Pakistan, because in the past 200 years the majority of its rulers have been Pashtuns who have also claimed authority over the Pashtun tribes in Pakistan.

Afghanistan and Pakistan face a far greater dilemma than their historic territorial disputes. Because of almost three decades of intensive radicalization of Pashtuns in Pakistani madrassas (seminaries), they are losing their tradition tribal structures. Traditional leaders have been replaced by the likes of Mullah Omar and Mullah Dadullah; the latter hardline commander was killed in fighting in Afghanistan this year. Many traditional Pashtun leaders in Afghanistan were killed during the war against the Soviets or were assassinated by the communist regime in the early 1990s. A few left for the West.

Pakistani authorities, in their struggle against India, have over the years promoted extremist Islamic movements in the tribal zones to the detriment of traditional Pashtun parties. Indeed, most traditional Pashtun leaders have been sidelined by religious leaders. For instance, despite an agreement for all traditional Pashtun leaders from the tribal zones to take part in the jirga, just the boycott by one of Pakistan's major religious leaders - Maulana Fazlur Rahman - was enough to discourage a number of leaders from participating.

The weakening of Pashtun tribal structures has had a long-term impact on both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In a traditional jirga, any decision made by the chieftains, elders and spiritual leaders is binding on all tribe members, which is not the case anymore, as the leaders have lost their authority to religious leaders.

Second, issues in the context of the confrontation between the West and Islamic extremism bypass Pashtuns' tribal interests. Pashtun youth, such as Taliban fighters, consider themselves part of a global Islamic movement that does not limit itself to any territorial boundary or tribal code of conduct.

Afghanistan faces two distinct problems with its neighbor Pakistan. One is territorial issues, and the other is the radicalization of Pashtun tribes both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. In both cases, Afghan authorities should reach a comprehensive solution with Pakistan for it to regain control of its Pashtun territories.

The cessation of hostilities over disputed territories between Afghanistan and Pakistan requires strong and brave leadership in both countries, rather than endless bilateral peace conferences. Historically, bold political decisions between rival nations have been made by strong charismatic leaders and not by assemblies of people. For instance, rapprochement between Germany and France after World War II was only possible with leaders such as General Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer.

Afghanistan and Pakistan should first work to regain control of their Pashtun territories from the Taliban and al-Qaeda before engaging in deep negotiations over disputed borders.

Both countries have a huge stake in the future of the Pashtun tribes. Hundreds of thousands of indoctrinated young Taliban fighters in the hands of al-Qaeda are a threat to the stability of the region. They are a tough and formidable force to be used in a guerrilla war against any country in the region.

The Taliban are like a war machine. In the event of internal conflict in Pakistan, religious parties could use them to fight against secular parties. The only guardian of Pakistan's stability is its powerful military. In the event of internal unrest and the military splits along ethnic lines or ideology, the Taliban would become the only dominant force in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda could conceivably create its own kingdom in Pakistan, as it did in Afghanistan from 1995-2001.

Recent events in Pakistan should convince its military leadership that the threat to the existence of the country does not come from India or Afghanistan, but from extremist religious parties and al-Qaeda inside Pakistan.

The focus of North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led troops to fight international terrorism as well as financial resources that are dedicated in this war are unique opportunities for Afghanistan and Pakistan to overcome the threat of Islamic extremism, starting by taking back the control of Pashtun territories from al-Qaeda. In Afghanistan, without the presence of foreign forces, it would be just a matter of days before the Taliban and al-Qaeda took control of the whole country.

The United States, as a major ally of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, should force the two countries to adopt a common long-term strategy against al-Qaeda and Taliban ideology. The peace jirga is a good initiative to start dialogue and build confidence between the two nations, but it is not the right mechanism to make crucial political decisions to prevent the creation of a "Talibanistan".
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Japan's opposition flexes its muscles
By Richard Tanter Asia Times Online, Hong Kong
The defeat of the ruling Liberal Democratic party-led coalition by the Democratic Party of Japan in the House of Councilors election on July 29 has already sent shockwaves to people concerned about the US-Japan security alliance. Surprising many who saw only his bullying style and right wing policies, opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa moved quickly to set the Democrats on a course deeply antagonistic to US hopes for Japan as a global military partner.

The opposition used its new parliamentary dominance immediately after securing the election victory in four telling ways. First the Democrats and their coalition partners appointed long-standing liberal social democrat Eda Satsuki as president of the upper house - the first non-LDP president in half a century - giving the DPJ the power to control proceedings in the chamber for the first time. [1]

The second move was to notify the LDP that it would require prior Parliamentary approval of all overseas deployments, rather than the present comfortable requirement of confirmation after the fact. [2] The third was to give notice that the Democrats were opposed to any extension of the Air Self Defense Force deployment in Kuwait, and was considering introducing a bill to end the deployment. [3]

The fourth was to give notice to both the LDP and the United States that the party was opposed to any extension of the long-running Maritime Self Defense Force deployment in the Indian Ocean beyond the expiry of the current legislative authority on November 1st under the 2001 Special Antiterrorism Measures Law. [4]

It says a great deal about the deep penetration of the Japan-US alliance structure into Japanese domestic politics that Ozawa's most salient and vociferous public critic was not the prime minister but the US ambassador in Tokyo, Thomas Schieffer. Ozawa and Schieffer share a reputation for blunt hectoring styles of intimidation. Following reports that the DJP was considering opposing a fourth extension of the Indian Ocean deployment, Schieffer stridently and publicly demanded DPJ support.

Schieffer came to Japan following a controversial posting as representative of the George W Bush administration in Australia, where he had gained a reputation for highly visible overbearing interventions in Australian political life. After Ozawa's announcement that the DPJ was considering opposing another extension of the Indian Ocean mission, Schieffer met with Ozawa, proclaiming the question of Afghanistan an issue which "should be above partisan politics".

Schieffer then insisted that Ozawa was wrong to maintain that Afghanistan was an American war without UN sanction, in particular arguing that the operation is covered by UN Security Council Resolution 1746 passed on 23 March this year. [5]

The apparent effect of Schieffer's public attack on the Japanese opposition leader was not only to strengthen Ozawa's resolve on the Indian Ocean deployment, but to broaden the argument to the point of a rejection of participation in US coalition global operations.

"Our interpretation of the constitution is that the right to self-defense is made only when Japan is attacked," Ozawa said in the open-door meeting with Schieffer in Tokyo. "If I am in the position of decision-making, unfortunately I don't think we'll be able to participate in the operations led by the United States." [6]

The Nikkei news service noted that "the ambassador, appearing slightly agitated by Ozawa's remarks that US President George W Bush launched the "American war" on Afghanistan without waiting for international consensus, reminded the opposition leader that '90% of the oil Japan uses comes through this area and that Japanese nationals also died in the September 11, 2001, attacks'."

Two days later in a meeting with Foreign Minister Taro Aso, Schieffer's assessment of the consequences of Ozawa's supposed irresponsibility had expanded, since he now considered the maintenance of the Indian Ocean coalition "so important to the security of not only the United States and Japan but to the whole world". [7]

In the meeting with Schieffer, held with the press present, the pugnacious and generally somewhat nationalist Ozawa expressed views shared by many of the now marginalized conservative doves in the LDP he once directed. Ozawa reiterated his view that the war in Afghanistan was a war in America's interests started by the United States without United Nations authorization. Japan, argued Ozawa, should participate in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping, but should not cooperate in what he presented as an American war.

It is yet to be seen whether or not Ozawa will maintain this position in the face of American pressure and internal party disagreement. It may be that this stance is only a negotiating tool to batter the flailing Abe administration, on the one hand, and push the United States toward taking Japan less for granted on the other. Post-war parliamentary oppositions in Japan have usually folded when push comes to shove, and Ozawa has important pro-American critics in his party, such as his predecessor Seiji Maehara.

But Ozawa has placed the question of the real role of the Indian Ocean deployment on the public agenda in a way it has not been in the past six years. Whatever his ultimate goal may be Ozawa has raised the strong possibility that by not renewing authority for the small ASDF deployment in the Gulf, Japan will join the increasingly long list of former US coalition partners in Iraq.

Reflecting the deep psychological structure of alliance dependence characteristic of American allies such as Japan and Australia, one media criticism of Ozawa's move was that by not immediately acceding to US demands, Japan would run the risk of "isolating itself". [8] A Nikkei editorial feared that "such a development could also harm Japan's alliance with the US". [9]

The risk of "isolation" is to be overcome by over-performance of "global responsibilities", a senior naval officer told the Yomiuri newspaper: "I believe that our mission is a passport into the international community in its continuing fight against terrorism." [10]

Most importantly, the LDP's election defeat and Ozawa's high profile attack on the Indian Ocean deployment have delivered a fatal blow to the US campaign to push the government to deploy air and ground troops to Afghanistan. For at least the past year, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)have been calling for an increased Japanese military commitment to Afghanistan.

The US and the NATO hardline members on Afghanistan have called with increasing asperity on other NATO countries for more troops on the ground in the losing fight in Afghanistan, with fewer restrictions on their use in combat. Japan, like Australia, is regarded by NATO and the US as a key "non-NATO partner country" [11], and Prime Minister Abe indicated that closer cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan was one of his goals. [12] At the same time as the Afghan Vice President visited Tokyo in June, and called for further Japanese assistance including an increased Self Defense Force role, a senior US defense official was pressing the LDP to commit ground forces to Afghanistan. [13]

The Japanese security establishment, the US ambassador and the mainstream media all assailed Ozawa's move as a threat to coalition solidarity over Afghanistan as part of the "war on terror". An unnamed senior defense ministry official told the Yomiuri: "Afghanistan is a hub for international terrorist groups. If efforts to rebuild the country fail, all the world will continue to be scared by threats of terrorism." [14]

The Nikkei scolded the DJP: "the Diet's refusal to extend this legislation would call into question Japan's commitment to the international fight against terrorism."[15] At the same time as the possibility of a US invasion of Waziristan was being debated, Thomas Schieffer lectured Ozawa at their meeting that taking the Maritime Self Defense Force out of its Indian Ocean role, at a time when Pakistan's navy has taken its turn in command of the coalition operation, would weaken Pakistan's commitment to the coalition cause.

"It is very important to keep Pakistan, the only Muslim country in this coalition because that sends a strong message to everyone in the Middle East that the war on terror is not a war on Muslims." [16]

The United States clearly sees Ozawa's shift as a serious threat to its capacity to maintain a coherent coalition presence in Afghanistan. The Japanese presence is important politically rather than militarily. In March, 2007, the supply ship Hamana set off for its Indian ocean station for the sixth time escorted by the newly commissioned destroyer Suzunami. [17]

While these deployments over the past six years have been useful to the MSDF in its quest for coalition experience in distant ocean operations, actual demands on the refueling operation have diminished in recent years. [18] The Japanese material contribution could easily be replaced.

For the United States, the loss of a possible recruit to the ground war in Afghanistan is more threatening. The Iraq War has been effectively written off, but the demands of the equally serious but less questioned war in Afghanistan are escalating. When US deputy undersecretary of defense for Asia and Pacific security affairs James Shinn pressed former LDP vice president Taku Tamasaki over further SDF deployments in the Afghanistan theater, Tamasaki warned him: "It's very difficult. It will take a great deal just to have the special antiterrorism measures law extended at the extraordinary Diet session to be held this fall." [19] Clearly, Tamasaki was right in his reading of the Japanese political landscape, and equally clearly the US was not prepared to take "no" for an answer.

That it should be Ozawa Ichiro who led the most important challenge to US presumption to direct Japanese security policy may surprise many. But perhaps this was due to a misunderstanding of the full ramifications of Ozawa's well-known championing of the rightwing nationalist agenda slogan of Japan becoming "a normal country".

The process of remilitarization is the best-known consequence of the success story of that agenda: the effective abandonment of half a century of "defensive defense" and its replacement with a policy of military preparedness commensurate to perceived threat, the normalization of overseas deployment of the SDF, and the move toward "great power realism" and closer integration into US global military planning. [20]

The nationalist agenda always had the restoration of full Japanese sovereignty as one of its goals: hence it is hardly surprising that Ozawa should be so sharp about US unilateralism and its presumption that Japan will automatically follow the US. Ozawa did not dismiss the possibility of collaboration with the US against terrorism, but only from a position of "a bond of equals" [21] - not a term that could ever have been applied to the Ampo alliance relationship at any time in its half century history.

But perhaps most importantly in the long run for both Japanese democracy and for the possibility of Japan taking its place in global politics "as a normal country" without further militarization, either within the alliance or beyond it, is Ozawa's other longstanding demand for Japan: that Japanese elected representatives, both as legislators and ministers, take full and proper responsibility for their decisions.

For too long, Ozawa has argued, Japanese politicians have been prepared to allow unelected senior officials to wield power over policy while elected politicians simply looked on, providing electoral legitimacy but not taking responsibility. [22] Foreign policy and security policy are prime examples, and Ozawa's use of the DJP's new Upper House power is a case of practicing exactly what he has preached.

The results are already visible. Ozawa's attack on Middle East policy in terms of "alliance business as usual" undoubtedly has many motives and may well not be sustained. But for the first time he has positioned the parliamentary opposition to hold the government to account, and forced the US to move from behind the scenes pressure to direct public intervention, and put paid to any US hopes of a Japanese military contribution to the war in Afghanistan.

Notes
1. "With new Upper House majority, Ozawa steps up attacks on govt," NikkeiNet, August 8, 2007.
2. "Ruling parties to accept DPJ's demand on troop deployment," NikkeiNet, August 7, 2007.
3. "Ozawa to mull submitting bill to cancel SDF dispatch to Iraq," NikkeiNet, August 7, 2007.
4. Ibed. 5. UN Security Council Resolution 1746 (2007).
6. "DPJ rejects Schieffer's request to extend antiterrorism operations," NikkeiNet, August 8, 2007.
7. "Japan, US conclude pact on protecting shared military info," NikkeiNet, August 10, 2007.
8. For example, Hidemichi Katsumata, "MSDF mission key for Japan, reinvigorated opposition shouldn't hinder antiterror law extension," Daily Yomiuri Online, August 7, 2007.
9. "Newly powerful DPJ must avoid partisan gamesmanship," NikkeiNet, August 8, 2007.
10. Hidemichi Katsumata, "MSDF mission key for Japan, reinvigorated opposition shouldn't hinder antiterror law extension," Daily Yomiuri Online, August 7, 2007.
11. Masako Ikegami, "NATO and Japan: Strengthening Asian stability," NATO Review, Summer 2007.
12. "Japan and NATO: Toward further collaboration," Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the North Atlantic Council, January 12, 2007.
13. "Incoming US official hopes Japan will dispatch SDF to Afghanistan," Afghanistan News Center, June 29, 2007 (Kyodo).
14. Hidemichi Katsumata, "MSDF mission key for Japan," Yomiuri, August 7, 2007.
15. "Newly powerful DPJ must avoid partisan gamesmanship," NikkeiNet, August 8, 2007.
16. "Japan's DPJ won't back extension of anti-terror law, Ozawa says," Keiichi Yamamura and Stuart Biggs, Bloomberg, August 8, 2007.
17. The best systematic coverage of the MSDF deployment chronology and composition is "Jieitai Indoyo haken (Dispatch of SDF to the Indian Ocean) at Wikipedia (Japanese).
18. Richard Tanter, "The MSDF Indian Ocean deployment - blue water militarization in a 'normal country'," Japan Focus, May 15, 2006.
19. "Incoming US official hopes Japan will dispatch SDF to Afghanistan," Afghanistan News Center, June 29, 2007 (Kyodo).
20. Richard Tanter, "With eyes wide shut: Japan, Heisei militarization and the Bush Doctrine," in Melvin Gurtov and Peter Van Ness (eds.), Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, (New York: Routledge, 2005) , and Richard Tanter, "About face: Japan's remilitarization," CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, Tokyo, November 2006.
21. "DPJ's Ozawa talks tough in meeting with US envoy Schieffer," NikkeiNet, August 9, 2007.
22. See for example Ozawa "Ichiro, Nihon kaizo keikaku" (Plan for Japan's reconstruction), (Tokyo: Kodansha,1993).

Richard Tanter is senior research associate at Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability and director of the Nautilus Institute at RMIT and a Japan Focus associate. He has written widely on Japanese security policy, including "With Eyes Wide Shut: Japan, Heisei Militarization and the Bush Doctrine" in Melvin Gurtov and Peter Van Ness (eds), Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, (New York: Routledge, 2005). His most recent book, co-edited with Gerry Van Klinken and Desmond Ball, is Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999.
(Republished with permission from Japan Focus)
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Afghan army awaiting new rifles from Canada
ALEX DOBROTA Globe and Mail, Canada - Aug 13, 2007
KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN -- Equipped with antiquated Soviet-era weaponry, the Afghan National Army is still waiting for a shipment of modern rifles promised by Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor, a high-ranking Afghan official said.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sherinshaw Kohbandi, the commander of Kandahar Province's 2nd Battalion, said Mr. O'Connor pledged to equip the ANA with the C-7 assault rifles used by Canadian soldiers.

"His recommendation was that within the next few months he'll supply us with brand new equipment from Canadian Forces," Lt.-Col. Kohbandi said on the weekend, adding he met the minister during one of his recent trips to Kandahar. "So I'm hoping and waiting for that day that will come for us."

A spokeswoman for Mr. O'Connor said Canada is looking at various ways to help the Afghan army, and delivering C-7s is an option.

 Lt.-Col. Kohbandi made his comments after a transition ceremony at Kandahar Base, where Lieutenant-Colonel Rob Walker handed over the command of the Canadian Battle Group in Afghanistan to Lieutenant-Colonel Alain Gauthier, of the Quebec-based Royal 22nd Regiment, known as the Vandoos.

The Vandoos are currently beginning a six-month rotation, replacing troops from the Royal Canadian Regiment and Princess Patricia's Light Infantry. Commanding officers with the Vandoos have repeatedly said their main focus will be training Afghan security forces to prepare them to face the Taliban on their own.

The Afghan National Army has fewer than 500 soldiers, about one battalion, ready for combat in Kandahar Province. The Canadians plan to train more than 1,000 Afghan soldiers over the next few months.

Besides their thin ranks, the Afghan army also lacks modern equipment. Its soldiers often drive into battle on board pickup trucks and wielding AK-47s, also known as Kalashnikovs.

The AKs fire a 7.62-mm round, which loses accuracy at long ranges. In comparison, the Canadian C-7 rifle, a variant of the U.S. M-16, fires the NATO-standard 5.56-mm round, which travels faster than a 7.62 mm bullet. The C-7 is also more accurate than the Kalashnikov.

Lt.-Col. Kohbandi said he hopes the shipment of C-7s will arrive within the next few months to allow his soldiers and officers to be trained on the new equipment before they join the Vandoos in combat operations.

"We'll be trained and educated for that for the next operations, so we're looking forward to that," he said through a translator.

Lt.-Col. Gauthier told reporters he expects the ANA to control the area in and around Kandahar City within the next six months. This should enable Canadian forces to devote more resources to outlying regions in Kandahar Province, he said.
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Let's go to Afghanistan
By Guardian Unlimited Travel / News 11:00am
Does the imminent publication of new guidebooks to Afghanistan and Algeria mean that these countries are now acceptable tourist destinations, asks Julian Borger

There will be a couple of new destinations on offer in the Lonely Planet library next month, with the publications of guides to Afghanistan and Algeria. In fact, these are the first ever Lonely Planet guides to either country, which is striking in that there is a war underway in one while the other has recently emerged as the base for the Mahgreb branch of al-Qaida.

So the question is: does the appearance of these books amount to an incitement to war tourism or an inducement to unwitting adventure tourists to expose themselves to real danger?

The case for these books says that people are going, and will continue to go, to these places anyway, and they will be a lot safer with the hard-headed tips and advice for which Lonely Planet is known. The publishers point out that in Afghanistan there is a community of foreign aid workers, contractors and soldiers on the ground already who will appreciate guidance on things to do and see when they are off-duty.

The case against is that the very existence of these books, with their covers displaying glossy pictures showing a happy Afghan burkha salesman and his son and the glowing dunes of the Algerian Sahara, constitutes a implicit seal of approval, suggesting both countries have passed a threshold of acceptability. They will catch the eye of up-for-it backpackers browsing the bookshelves for a new challenge.

Ben Anderson, the man behind the BBC's Holidays in the Axis of Evil who knows a thing or two about extreme travel, said: "Before I did this professionally I would have assumed that if there was a Lonely Planet guide it would mean it was possible to go there."

The two countries represent quite different situations. Algeria is officially at peace, and the guide is consequently far more gung-ho. It describes the country's "edgy cachet" and points out that, after decades off limits, it is an undiscovered gem "and the time to visit is now".

Tom Hall, Lonely Planet's travel editor said: "Algeria is coming in from the cold. There's a buzz about it. With the resurgence in interest in Morocco, there is a curiosity over a country that has been off the map for a while."

Early on in the guide, there is a boxed section pointing out areas that are off limits, and some advice on keeping updated on the security situation. But arguably, any would-be traveller should not have to wait until page 200 to find out that the particularly vicious local terrorist group, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) has rebranded itself as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and claimed responsibility for a suicide car-bomb attack in Algiers in April that killed 24 and wounded over 300.

The Afghanistan guide is naturally much more cautious. There is a whole chapter on safety, and risk assessments on each region at the start of the relevant chapter. The basic message about the south, for example, is don't go there, sensibly enough. On the other hand, the guide is relatively upbeat about travelling to Pakistan through Jalalabad and the Khyber Pass, which seems like a very risky trip.

Kabul itself is also becoming increasingly nerve-jangling with the Taliban's increasing use of suicide bombs aimed at the heart of the Karzai government.

In the end, it seems to me the issue is one of language. There are warnings sprinkled throughout these two books, but they involve many of the same phrases applied in other Lonely Planet guides to the dodgier districts of western capitals. The dangers in Afghanistan and Algeria are exponentially greater, but the words are the same.
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Report: EU's Afghan Training Efforts Falling Short
Deutsche Welle, Germany - Aug 12, 2007
According to a media report, the European Union's efforts to train Afghanistan police have met with little success. The report puts the blame on the Kabul government.

Efforts by the European Union to train Afghanistan's police are not going according to plan, the German news magazine Der Spiegel reported.

Although most members of a 160-strong police assistance mission have been in the country since June, they have very little to do, the magazine said in its online edition on Saturday.

The report blamed the inactivity on the Afghan government's failure to name participants for the planned training courses.

The EU agreed on the assistance mission in May, the first time the bloc assumed a collective role in aiding Afghanistan's law-enforcement sector. It is led by German Brigadier-General Friedrich Eichele.

Instead of providing training and advice to criminal investigators and drug enforcement officers, many members of the mission are acting as mentors to police officers trained in earlier programs, Der Spiegel said.

Turkey block
Bildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift:  An Afghan police officer, left, guards suspected Taliban men
The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is supposed to provide protection for the 20-nation contingent, which is scattered across Afghanistan.

But a dispute surrounding EU member Cyprus and European bloc aspirant and NATO member Turkey has led to Ankara blocking an agreement that regulates cooperation between the EU and the military alliance in Afghanistan, the report said.

Another problem is the reliability of the police recruits, the report added.

Once they are trained, many offer their services to the Taliban, local militia leaders or drug lords, who pay much better than the government in Kabul, the report said.
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US behind Afghan warlord's rise, fall
At Guantanamo, unruly chieftains join combatants
By Farah Stockman, The Boston Globe Staff  |  August 12, 2007
GARDEZ, Afghanistan -- When US special forces wanted to defeat the Taliban, they befriended Abdullah Mujahid, the police chief of this mountainous province. They visited his home with a gift of chocolates, and gave money and equipment to his fighters.

Mujahid met frequently with US troops, and even arrested and handed over a suspect the US military sent to the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

But as the threat of the Taliban receded, US forces sought to replace Mujahid -- an illiterate leader who had been accused of corruption -- with a professionally trained police chief. Soon, Mujahid was accused of being responsible for an attack on US forces. He was sent to Guantanamo Bay, where he languishes not far from the man he arrested.

The fall of Mujahid offers a rare glimpse into the trials of postwar Afghanistan, where US special forces struggled to rein in the warlords they once wooed.

But it also reveals the extent to which the military is using the Guantanamo Bay detention center for a starkly different purpose than the one outlined by President Bush: to keep the worst terrorism suspects behind bars.

A Globe investigation found that the military has used Guantanamo Bay not just for terrorists "picked up on the battlefield" -- as Bush has repeatedly asserted -- but also for uncooperative or unruly tribal chieftains, many of whom had been key supporters of the US-led invasion.

The use of Guantanamo Bay for purposes other than fighting international terrorism could have legal significance, because Bush has tried to justify creating a place where detainees can be held without normal legal protections on the grounds that the prisoners are enemy combatants who might launch a terrorist attack if they are released.

Despite Bush's assertions, at least 52 detainees who had been held at Guantanamo Bay were not accused of ties to the Taliban or Al Qaeda, according to publicly released military records detailing the accusations against nearly 500 prisoners. At least a dozen were once officials in the post-Taliban government, arrested in their homes or offices during a broader US campaign to rein in warlords.

Mujahid was one. The former head of the United Nations office in Gardez, Thomas Ruttig, said he urged the Afghan government to remove Mujahid from his post because he was seen as an uneducated, disruptive, and corrupt figure. But Ruttig said he expected Mujahid to be fired or tried for corruption in Afghanistan, not held indefinitely in Cuba without a trial.

"I never dreamed he would be sent to Guantanamo," Ruttig said in a recent interview in Kabul.

John Sifton, a Human Rights Watch researcher, helped write a 2003 report that accused Mujahid and his inner circle of allowing their fighters to set up illegal checkpoints to take money from truck drivers. But he, too, said Mujahid should not have been sent to Guantanamo Bay.

"Guantanamo is not even vaguely the appropriate place for him," he said, adding that the administration shouldn't use its power to hold accused terrorists at Guantanamo to solve political or criminal problems in Afghanistan.

The distinction between Guantanamo and a regular military or civilian prison is significant because Guantanamo detainees are stripped of most of their rights, and can be held on unspecified charges without being given a chance to mount a normal legal defense.

For a year after Mujahid's arrest in July 2003, the military refused to release any information about why he was arrested. But in 2004, after a Supreme Court ruling forced the government to reveal why people were being held, the military accused Mujahid of "being responsible for" an attack in which a US soldier was killed, though UN and Afghan officials say Mujahid was not in Gardez at the time.

Then, in 2005, the military accused him of being a senior leader of a militant group operating in India-held Kashmir. But Pakistani news accounts suggest that another man by the same name who died last fall was a senior leader of that group.

Now, even the military has stopped saying that Mujahid belongs in Guantanamo Bay. In February, Pentagon officials informed his lawyers that he was among a group of at least 12 detainees who had been cleared to return to Afghanistan, either for release or further detention.

Pentagon spokesman Jeffrey Gordon declined to discuss the accusations against Mujahid, but said the decision to clear him for transfer does not "change the fact that he still poses a threat to the United States."

"We take into account many factors in the decision to transfer a detainee," Gordon said. "Those factors include the risk the detainee would pose if released, the prospects of the detainee reintegrating into society, and the capacity of the receiving government to hold the detainee if they deem detention is necessary to mitigate the threat."

Gordon declined to comment on why Mujahid had not yet been sent back to Afghanistan, where his wife and three children await him. Gordon said only that the US and Afghan governments are working on a transfer agreement.

Recently, Mujahid was moved from a communal living arrangement to a solitary cell, with only limited contact with other inmates.

"No one has told us why," said his lawyer, Carolyn Welshhans, who has taken his case pro bono, even though she has only limited access to him.

A call for volunteers
Enlisting the help of strongmen like Mujahid was once a key to the US strategy in Afghanistan. When the Taliban were defeated, only a few hundred US soldiers were on the ground -- most of them special forces Green Berets working alongside the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, a coalition of warlords who sometimes clashed in turf battles with one another.

In Gardez, Mujahid and his childhood friend Ziauddin -- who, like many Afghans, uses only one name -- filled the vacuum left by the fleeing Taliban. As members of the tiny ethnic Tajik minority, they suddenly had powerful patrons in the Tajik-led Northern Alliance and the new Afghan government.

Mujahid became police chief and Ziauddin became the local army commander. The government of US-backed President Hamid Karzai was so new that it had not yet begun to pay salaries or send equipment. So Mujahid and Ziauddin used untrained volunteers to patrol with their personal weapons.

Complaints quickly arose. Citizens in Gardez accused them of letting their fighters rob drivers at checkpoints, according to interviews with UN, US, and Afghan officials and a Human Rights Watch report. The fact that they came from a minority tribe also sparked opposition.

But many in town backed the two men, who were embroiled in a tribal war against Pacha Khan Zadran, a warlord in the south. Throughout 2002, the US military described Mujahid and Ziauddin's forces as pro-government in media reports, and called Zadran a renegade.

In spring 2002, US fighters recruited Mujahid and Ziauddin, among others, to help in the fight against remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in a mountainous area known as Shaikot.

The key point of contact between local strongmen and US special forces was a sunburned man known only as "Commander Mike," according to current and former Afghan and UN officials. Special forces operate only under first names or aliases.

Commander Mike was known in the lawless mountainous provinces for brokering deals with local warlords, according to humanitarian workers and Afghan soldiers in the area at the time. They said he was known to use scare tactics before a negotiation, sometimes exploding harmless bombs in the air above the heads of Afghan commanders to get their cooperation.

Commander Mike gave Ziauddin money and a satellite telephone to fight in Shaikot, as well as shoes, uniforms, and camping gear for about 320 fighters, Ziauddin said in an interview.

Later, when Mujahid's father returned from a religious visit to Saudi Arabia, Commander Mike brought chocolates to the family home and was given perfume in return, according to Mujahid's brother.

A year later, in spring 2003, a second man also called Commander Mike appeared at the special forces base in Gardez. This man wore a beard and was a "real fighter," according to Faiz Zaland, an Afghan aide to the provincial governor at the time who also served as a translator for the US military there.

The new Commander Mike came at a time when the US military was trying to replace troublesome strongmen with educated, modern leaders. The US government was also trying to set up the first "Provincial Reconstruction Team" in Gardez to work with the Afghan government, hoping to win the confidence of citizens by kicking out corrupt leaders and turning Gardez into a model of good government, according to interviews with US officials who worked in Gardez.

The new Commander Mike kept up relations with Mujahid and Ziauddin for a time. In February 2003, Mujahid arrested a suspect he handed over to special forces. The suspect was later sent to Guantanamo Bay.

But at the same time, Commander Mike was quietly working to banish Mujahid and Ziauddin from Gardez, according to former and current Afghan and UN officials who met with him frequently in security coordination meetings.

Zaland said Commander Mike was responsible for the arrests of Ziauddin, Mujahid, and Hafizullah Shabaz Khail, a district officer of neighboring Zurmat. Khail, who was also sent to Guantanamo Bay, met an American named Mike at the Spindak Hotel for several days of talks shortly before his arrest, according to military transcripts of Khail's testimony.

"Mike was the guy who followed all the cases," said Zaland, the former military translator, adding that the Americans had lost patience with their former allies. "During the Shaikot operation, Ziauddin and Mujahid helped the coalition forces a lot. But they were just negative-minded. They were illiterate, from the smallest tribe. They didn't have any background in the military or police."

The relationship sours

A key turning point came early in 2003, when General Dan K. McNeill -- now head of NATO's force in Afghanistan -- traveled to Gardez and met with Mujahid and Ziauddin to ask them to remove their fighters from two strategic hilltops that overlooked the town, according to Ziauddin and Zaland, the translator.

Ziauddin said he and Mujahid resisted and complained to their friends in the Afghan Ministry of Defense about the orders, saying that their enemies -- Pacha Khan Zadran and Al Qaeda -- would come in over the hills.

US forces eventually bombed Ziauddin's arms caches on the hills, but did not arrest him until many months later. Over time, US forces came to suspect Ziauddin and Mujahid of launching rockets at the new US Provincial Reconstruction Team base, according to interviews with US soldiers and Afghan officials who served in Gardez at the time.

Relations between Mujahid and the special forces deteriorated further in March 2003. US soldiers in Gardez had severely beaten a group of Afghan prisoners during an interrogation, and one of them had died, according to several former Afghan police and a report by the Afghan attorney general's office, which investigated the case.

The second Commander Mike ordered that the seven living prisoners be transferred to Mujahid's jail, according to the attorney general's report and Raz Mohammad Dalili, the Afghan governor at the time who helped make the arrangements for the transfers.

At a joint security meeting, Commander Mike threatened to kill Mujahid if he released the prisoners, according to the Crimes of War Project, a Washington human rights group that investigated the alleged abuse.

The Americans who dropped off the prisoners spoke briefly to Mujahid in his office behind a closed door and then drove away, said Mehboob Ahmad, Mujahid's personal driver.

Some of the prisoners were unconscious, and their bodies had turned black and blue, Ahmad said. Mujahid ordered that they be given medical treatment and mattresses, Ahmad said.

"Mujahid was upset. We all were," he said. "I think anyone who would have seen them in that condition would be upset."

Mujahid described the prisoners' injuries to Afghan military prosecutors, who later wrote a report recommending that the American soldiers be punished. In January of this year, two special forces soldiers received administrative punishments in connection with the prisoners' treatment. Major James Gregory, a spokesman, said at the time that the special forces command "takes all allegations of abuse seriously."

Weeks after the prisoners were dropped off at Mujahid's jail, the Afghan government decided to remove Mujahid from his post. Dalili, the governor, said in a recent interview in Kabul that the second Commander Mike helped persuade him -- and Afghanistan's central government -- to replace Mujahid with a professionally trained police chief.

Initially, Mujahid refused to allow the new chief into the town. But after negotiations -- and after Mujahid was offered a job as "highway commander" in Kabul -- he stepped down in an elaborate ceremony.

Around this time, Commander Mike called Mujahid to his office and advised him to leave Gardez, warning that he was at risk of being sent to Guantanamo Bay if he remained, said Ahmad, who drove Mujahid to that meeting.

Ruttig also recalled that Mujahid was told that he would be arrested if he stayed in Gardez.

Mujahid left Gardez for Kabul. He stayed a month, waiting for a letter of appointment for the new job, but it never came.

While he was away, US forces were ambushed near an abandoned police checkpoint near Gardez, killing one soldier and injuring two others.

Mujahid was held responsible for the attack because US forces believed that it had been carried out by one of his supporters as revenge for his removal from his post, Zaland said.

In July 2003, Mujahid returned to Gardez to attend a wedding. Days later, American forces arrived at his home and asked him to come to a meeting. He went willingly, but never returned. Months later, employees from the Red Cross in Kabul handed Mujahid's family a letter he had sent to them from Guantanamo Bay.

Mujahid's deputy at the police station, Fazel Ahmad Wasiq -- who today runs the US-assisted police training center in Gardez -- said it was a good thing for the town to get a new police chief. But he insists that Mujahid did not deserve to be sent to Guantanamo Bay.

After Mujahid's arrest, Wasiq said he visited Commander Mike and asked for an explanation.

"I said, 'You were so friendly with him. He was a good guy. Why did you arrest him?' " recalled Wasiq. The only explanation Mike gave, he said, was: " 'We were ordered to do it by higher-ups.' "

From chief to combatant
Six days after Mujahid's arrest, the Americans arrested Ahmad, his driver. Ahmad said they stripped him naked and at one point held him upside down for more than 10 hours during questioning. They asked him whether Mujahid had secretly hoarded weapons while he was police chief, he said.

"I replied that he has handed over all the weapons and kept not even a bullet," said Ahmad.

US soldiers also arrested Syed Nabi Siddiqui, a police colonel who had served under Mujahid and had stayed on to work with the new chief. Siddiqui said soldiers beat him, photographed him naked, and kept him in a cage while they questioned him.

"The American forces asked: 'Who is Mujahid? Is he a criminal? Did he kill somebody?' " Siddiqui said. "I replied that Mujahid is preventing the thieves from coming in the town."

Siddiqui said he also told them that -- decades ago -- Mujahid had been a member of Harakat-e-Mulavi, an Afghan group that fought the Russian invasion in the 1980s that is now believed to have ties to extremists. That allegation surfaced in Mujahid's file at Guantanamo Bay.

Both Ahmad and Siddiqui were released from US custody with a slip of paper that said they had been determined not to be a threat. They have both joined a lawsuit against former defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld protesting their treatment.

The Army's Criminal Investigation Command investigated their cases and found no evidence that they were abused, said Chris Grey, a spokesman.

For months, Ziauddin avoided arrest by staying in Kabul, where his allies gave him a job at the Ministry of Defense.

But he returned to Gardez in fall 2003, sparking swift complaints from Afghan officials who accused him of extortion and threats. Within days of his return, US forces arrested him and detained him at Bagram Air Force Base for about a year. He is currently unemployed, but free.

Four years after his arrest, Mujahid still sits in Guantanamo Bay. In 2004, he was told he could call witnesses from Afghanistan to try to prove that he is not an "enemy combatant." But officers later told him none of his witnesses could be found -- even Afghanistan's interior minister.

The accusations against Mujahid were not drawn up by the special forces soldiers who knew him in Gardez. The Pentagon hired emergency workers with two weeks' training to search through intelligence reports to create the files against the detainees, according to an affidavit by Rear Admiral James M. McGarrah, a top Pentagon official.

The first file, drawn up in 2004, accused Mujahid of membership in Harakat-e-Mulavi, the extremist group that fought the Russians. But a year later, all mention of Harakat disappeared, replaced by a new allegation: that he was a senior leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant group based in Lahore, Pakistan, that conducts terrorist operations in India-held Kashmir.

Mujahid was stunned.

"It seems you have confused me for someone else," he said in 2005, at the one review hearing before US military officers that he receives each year.

Mujahid's lawyers investigated the allegation. A Google search turned up a clue: A man named Abdullah Mujahid was indeed believed to be a senior leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba. But that man had been killed in November 2006.

Mujahid's lawyers planned to highlight the apparent mistake. But this past February, they received an e-mail from Pentagon officials, telling them Mujahid had been cleared to return to Afghanistan.

Yet, six months have gone by and he languishes in his solitary cell. Gordon, the Pentagon spokesman, said the US government is working closely with Afghan officials to transfer detainees such as Mujahid home. Five Afghan detainees were sent home last week, but Mujahid was not one of them.

His friends in Afghanistan, along with his lawyers and human rights workers, maintain that his presence at Guantanamo Bay is a misuse of the powers claimed by the president to hold terrorism suspects -- defined by Rumsfeld as "the worst of the worst."

"Here we have a man who, by many accounts, was helping the United States, and fought against the Taliban, and we have evidence to demonstrate that," said Welshhans, his lawyer.

To indefinitely imprison anyone without a trial, let alone someone like that, is unconscionable."

When -- or if -- Mujahid makes it home, he will find that much has changed.

His father has died. His children, ages 7, 6, and 5, have grown up without him.

The town has grown, too. Wasiq, his former deputy and friend, now runs a new police training facility. His successor -- the professionally trained police chief -- was fired after allegations of corruption. His sworn enemy, Pacha Khan Zadran, is now a member of Parliament.

But a few things have not changed, according to the people of Gardez: Americans who use only their first names still broker deals, make arrests, and detain people across the restive countrywide.

The insurgency they are fighting rages on.
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