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August 12, 2007 

Afghan, Pakistan talks end with terror pledge
by Sardar Ahmad
KABUL (AFP) - Afghanistan and Pakistan pledged to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries in their respective tribal regions and fight the opium trade financing Islamic militants.

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, addressing 700 tribal delegates at the end of a landmark "peace jirga" aimed at defeating the common threat of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, called for an urgent "rescue" from Muslim extremism.

A statement at the close of the four-day tribal council also agreed to push for reconciliation with the "opposition" -- a reference to Taliban who agree to accept the rule of law.

Participants pledged they would "not allow sanctuaries/training centres for terrorists in their respective countries," according to the declaration text.

They acknowledged the "nexus between narcotics and terrorism" and called upon the two governments to wage an "all-out war against this menace."

They agreed to establish a council, comprising 25 delegates from each country, to promote reconciliation with the "opposition" and cooperation between the neighbours.

Musharraf said both Afghanistan and Pakistan had to get away from what he called the backwardness and violence of Islamic extremism.

"These forces are disrupting peace and harmony, impeding our progress and development," he said. "We must rescue our societies from this danger and work together until we defeat the forces of extremism and terrorism."

The Pakistani president conceded that there was support from Pakistani tribal areas for the insurgency in Afghanistan, extremism and "Talibanisation" -- the spread of the Taliban's strictly Islamist doctrine.

Pakistan understood it had a "solemn responsibility" to fight against such influences, he said.

Musharraf's presence and speech lent weight to the conference, after he reversed an earlier decision to withdraw from the jirga.

However, tribal leaders from lawless Waziristan on the Pakistan side of the border boycotted the meeting on the grounds that it did not include the Taliban.

Musharraf had been expected to open the talks on Thursday with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, but pulled out at the last minute citing security concerns.

He had reconsidered only after phone calls from US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Karzai, with whom he has bickered over efforts to defeat a resurgence of the Taliban movement backed by Al-Qaeda.

The jirga brought together about 700 tribal leaders, parliamentarians, clerics and other influential figures from both sides of the border to debate ways to root out extremists.

Analysts have said the four days of talks may not immediately do much to stem the growing Islamist violence and the meeting is likely to result in little more than pledges of "brotherliness."

But it could bode well for longer-term cooperation, they said.

Karzai said at a luncheon Saturday with Pakistani officials that the jirga would cement relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a news report said.

"Assembling leaders and public opinion makers from both the countries to discuss and share their views on core issues is a good omen for peace and harmony in the region," a Pakistan news agency quoted him saying.

Relations between Karzai and Musharraf have in particular been strained over the resurgence of the Taliban, which was driven from government by a US-led coalition in 2001 after having been helped to power by Pakistan in 1996.

In Islamabad, foreign ministry spokeswoman Tasnim Aslam told AFP: "Pakistan is very hopeful that this jirga will contribute to establishing peace in these areas."
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Musharraf, Karzai meet ahead of anti-terror talks
KABUL (AFP) - Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf met his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai in Kabul Sunday before both leaders were due to close a four-day tribal assembly on the growing Taliban and Al-Qaeda threat.

Musharraf travelled to the presidential palace immediately after flying into Kabul for a one-day visit, the Afghan president's office said.

The leaders were due later to address the "peace jirga" in the west of the city, where tribal leaders were working on a "joint strategy" to root out extremists, a jirga spokesman said earlier Sunday.

The jirga, the first of its kind, has brought together about 700 tribal leaders and clerics from the volatile border as well as parliamentarians to debate ways to root out extremists.

They began deliberations on Thursday with the notable absence of Musharraf, who pulled out at the last-minute citing security concerns.

But the Pakistani president reversed his decision after phone calls from US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Karzai,

Delegates to the assembly had earlier split into committees focused on topics such as the reasons for terrorism, the fight against drugs -- said to finance militants -- and good neighbourliness, spokesman Asif Nang said.

The results of these findings were to go towards the formation of the strategy, expected to be announced Sunday before Musharraf and Karzai were to formally close the meeting, he said.

Recommendations are likely to include the establishment of a joint commission to analyse factors fuelling terrorism and another on fighting the drugs trade and organised crime, Afghan media reported Sunday.

Analysts have said the strategy may not immediately do much to stem the growing Islamist violence and the meeting is likely to result in little more than pledges of "brotherliness."

But it could bode well for longer-term cooperation, they said.

Two of Pakistan's seven tribal areas refused to send delegates, citing the lack of Taliban representation and saying there could be no solution without the hardline Islamist group.

Karzai said at a luncheon Saturday with Pakistani officials that the jirga would cement relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a news report said.

"Assembling leaders and public opinion makers from both the countries to discuss and share their views on core issues is a good omen for peace and harmony in the region," a Pakistan news agency quoted him saying.

In Islamabad, foreign ministry spokeswoman Tasnim Aslam told AFP: "Pakistan is very hopeful that this jirga will contribute to establishing peace in these areas."

"We believe that stability and peace in Afghanistan is of vital importance to Pakistan."

The neighbours have long been bickering over the violence, each accusing the other of not doing enough against Islamist leaders and sanctuaries.

Relations between Karzai and Musharraf have in particular been strained over the resurgence of the Taliban, which was driven from government by a US-led coalition in 2001 after having been helped to power by Pakistan in 1996.
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Musharraf decries rise of militancy
By RAHIM FAIEZ, Associated Press Writer
KABUL, Afghanistan - Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf told more than 600 Afghan and Pakistani tribal leaders Sunday that the two countries have been mired in the rise of militancy, extremism and radicalism while the rest of the world races forward with economic development.

Musharraf said the world is "forging ahead" while Pakistan and Afghanistan are confronted with a "particularly dark form" of terrorism he said is fostered by foreign influences.

He said the Talibanization of the countries' border regions has prevented Afghanistan and Pakistan from benefiting from globalization.

"Along with Afghanistan, Pakistan has also witnessed the rise of militancy and violence attacking our society," Musharraf said. "We cannot remain mired in the past."

Musharraf, who spoke both in his native Urdu and in English, was speaking at the closing session of a four-day U.S.-backed cross-border jirga, or tribal council, aimed at finding ways to stem Afghanistan's rising bloodshed.

Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai walked into the tent hosting the jirga to an extended standing ovation. The Pakistani president pulled out of speaking at the opening session because of domestic issues, instead sending Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz.

At the opening session on Thursday, Karzai spoke passionately of the daily suffering the Afghan people endure as the Taliban attack the government, schools, foreign troops and innocent villagers.

He lamented in particular the kidnapping of 23 South Koreans, including 16 women, saying such actions tarnish Afghanistan's image. Twenty-one of the hostages are still alive; two males have been killed.

"It doesn't matter if they kidnap thousands of men, they abducted women!" he said. Referring to other attacks, he said: "They behead women in the name of the Taliban and Muslims in this country. In Helmand, one woman was nailed to a tree. In Zhari, they cut a woman in half. The same thing is happening in provinces near the Pakistan border."

The idea for the jirga was hatched almost a year ago during a White House meeting between President Bush, Musharraf and Karzai.

At the jirga's opening session, Pakistani Prime Minster Shaukat Aziz said that although militants receive support from the Pakistan side of the border, in part because of its porous nature, Afghanistan can't blame Pakistan for Taliban violence.

The Taliban, ousted by U.S.-led forces in late 2001, have stepped up attacks in the past two years. The violence has killed thousands, raising fears for Afghanistan's fledgling democracy.

U.S. and Afghan officials say Taliban militants enjoy a safe haven in Pakistani border regions, particularly Waziristan, where Washington also fears al-Qaida is regrouping. Pakistan says it has some 90,000 troops battling militants in the region, and that it is not a terrorist haven.
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Taliban says not releasing South Korean hostages: report
Sun Aug 12, 1:15 AM ET
SEOUL (AFP) - Afghanistan's Taliban has decided not to free any of 21 South Korean hostages despite earlier saying two women could go, the Korea's Yonhap news agency reported Sunday citing an insurgents' spokesman.

Yonhap quoted Taliban spokesman Yousuf Ahmadi as saying: "Our leaders have changed their minds and decided not to free two female hostages."

South Korean officials refused to confirm the report.

After face-to-face talks between the Taliban and a South Korean delegation, Ahmadi told AFP late Saturday that the two women, who are reported to be ill, were being released unconditionally as a "gesture of goodwill."

The Taliban abducted 23 Christian aid workers in volatile southern Ghazni province on July 19. Two male hostages have been shot dead, and the insurgents have threatened to kill the rest unless captured militants are released from jail in exchange for their lives.

But Kabul, backed by Washington, has refused to accept that demand, fearing it would only encourage more kidnappings.

The government in Seoul, meanwhile, says it is powerless to bring about a prisoner release.
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Fresh hopes for SKorean hostage release
by Mohammad Yaqob Sun Aug 12, 7:21 AM ET
GHAZNI, Afghanistan (AFP) - Two of the South Korean aid workers held hostage in Afghanistan were to be released within hours, a Taliban commander said Sunday, as new talks began over the three-week crisis.

Commander Abdullah Jal said the two women were still in the hands of the militants, but would be released Sunday as a goodwill gesture from the Islamist hardliners.

"God willing, they will be freed this afternoon as a gesture of good intention from the Taliban leading council," said Jal, the commander for the Ghazni region where 23 South Koreans were abducted July 19.

Two of the hostages have since been murdered by the Taliban, which has threatened to kill the remaining 21 unless the Afghan government meets their demands to release a similar number of key Taliban prisoners.

A Taliban delegation and a South Korean team meanwhile began a third day of talks at the offices of the Afghan Red Crescent Society in Ghazni, a small town about 140 kilometres (90 miles) south of Kabul.

"The third round of talks started between the Taliban and South Koreans," Ghazni province intelligence chief Mohammad Jaseem Khan told AFP.

The talks, which began on Friday, were being held behind closed doors. Journalist on Sunday were barred from even assembling outside the venue.

Intelligence agents had warned photographers against taking any pictures in the town, an AFP photographer said.

The talks coincided with fresh hopes that two of the 16 women in the hostage group would be free later in the day.

The Taliban first announced the release on Saturday but hours later the regular spokesman for the group, Yousuf Ahmadi, said the handover appeared to have been delayed by "transport difficulties."

Earlier Sunday, South Korea's Yonhap news agency quoted Ahmadi as saying, "Our leaders have changed their minds and suspended their earlier decision to free two female hostages."

Ahmadi however did not rule out the possibility of a release later. "The plan to release two female hostages first is still valid, but the timing has not been fixed yet," he said.

"There might be confusion and misunderstanding... I hope the situation will be resolved quickly."

South Korean officials refused to confirm the report, and Ahmadi could not be reached directly for comment.

Direct negotiations between the Taliban and a South Korean team are seen as one of the final options to save the group.

The Taliban repeated Saturday a demand for the release of jailed militants in exchange for the remaining hostages, a condition the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai has rejected, saying it could encourage kidnappings.

The hardliners are also involved in the separate abduction mid-July of two German engineers, one of whom has since been killed.

The Taliban has also demanded a prisoner swap for the surviving German, who is being held with four Afghans.

The Taliban were in government between 1996 and 2001, when they were driven out by a US-led coalition for sheltering Al-Qaeda -- blamed for the September 11 attacks in the United States.
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After Taliban news conference, Afghan government bans media from South Korea talks site
The Associated Press Sunday, August 12, 2007
KABUL, Afghanistan: Afghan officials banned journalists Sunday from shooting photos and video or conducting interviews near the site where talks on the fate of 21 South Korean hostages are being held — new restrictions a day after two Taliban leaders held a news conference there.

Marajudin Pathan, the governor of Ghazni province where the hostages were kidnapped on July 19, said the ban was put in place during the negotiations because the Taliban might exploit the media spotlight.

"It's because the Taliban will take advantage and show off, so we don't want to give them that chance," Pathan said. "This is a terrorist group."

In an extraordinary scene that hasn't happened in years in Afghanistan, print journalists and camera crew crowded around two top Taliban leaders who gave an impromptu news conference outside the Afghan Red Crescent office on Saturday.

Mullah Qari Bashir and Mullah Nasrullah traveled to the city of Ghazni after being given an assurance of safe passage by the Afghan government. On the second day of hostage talks, they told reporters they thought the negotiations were going well and that they expected that the hostages would be released soon.

Veteran reporters in Afghanistan said the Taliban leaders' news conference was the first since the fall of the hardline militants in late 2001.

Pathan said the media ban would be lifted as soon as the hostage talks are over — "maybe within the next two days." He said the ban applied only to the area around the Red Crescent office, where the talks are being held, though journalists reported that police and intelligence officials told them the ban applied to the entire province.

Mujeeb Khalwatgar, the director of the Afghanistan Press Club, said such a media ban goes against the country's constitution and a recently passed media law.

"When the government provides an opportunity for two sides to sit together for negotiations, nothing should be hidden from the people," he said. "The intelligence service has no right to prevent them from carrying out their work."

Khalwatgar said the government can prevent journalists from revealing information that would harm national security, but that wasn't the case with the hostage negotiations.

"Why didn't they just prevent the Taliban from talking to the media yesterday?" he asked.

Pathan said he was "100 percent for democratic order" but that "sometimes you have no choice."

He said the punishment for journalists breaking the order would be deportation from the province. Many journalists in Ghazni traveled to the region from Kabul to cover the hostage talks.

A journalist in Ghazni who asked not to be identified for his own safety said that an intelligence officer threatened reporters with arrest if they reported on the media ban.

A spokesman for Afghanistan's Interior Ministry said he was not aware of the ban and would look into it.

Twenty-three South Koreans from a church group who intended to work as aid workers were kidnapped in Ghazni on July 19. Two male hostages have already been shot dead. Talks between the Taliban leaders and South Korean officials began Saturday.
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29 dead in Afghanistan fighting
Sun Aug 12, 7:53 AM ET
KABUL (AFP) - A wave of Taliban attacks across Afghanistan killed 29 people, including four international soldiers and nearly two dozen militants, military officials said.

The violence came after a week of intense fighting as the Taliban's Al-Qaeda-backed insurgency, launched nearly six years ago, intensified into the summer.

Three soldiers with the US-led coalition and their Afghan interpreter were killed near the border with Pakistan when they were hit by a bomb during combat, the force said in a statement.

Taliban fighters were responsible for the attack in Nangarhar province, a spokesman told AFP by telephone, claiming the soldiers were US nationals.

The coalition withheld their nationalities but most of the international soldiers in eastern Afghanistan are from the US military.

Earlier, the British defence ministry announced that a British soldier was killed and five wounded after their patrol came under fire from Taliban insurgents in southern Afghanistan on Saturday.

The attack was in the volatile Sangin district of Helmand province, considered a hotbed of Islamic extremists and opium farmers said to help finance the insurgency.

Militants also ambushed an Afghan army patrol in Sangin overnight, the Afghan ministry of defence said. The attack sparked a fierce gun battle in which seven rebels were killed and seven wounded, it said.

Warplanes were called in to attack ground targets after rebels stormed an Afghan army post in southern Uruzgan province on Saturday.

"Four enemies were killed and their bodies are still at the battlefield," the statement said. Three Taliban fighters were killed in a separate clash in the same area, it said.

The ministry also reported two Afghan soldiers were killed in the previous 24 hours but gave no details.

Militants meanwhile tried to overrun a district police headquarters in Wardak province overnight, sparking five hours of fighting which left four of the attackers dead, police said.

In neighbouring Ghazni, where the Taliban are holding 21 South Korean hostages, Afghan and coalition troops clashed Saturday with insurgents, four of whom were killed, they said.

An international military operation drove the Taliban out of government in late 2001 when the hardliners did not hand over their Al-Qaeda allies in the weeks after the 9/11 attacks.

But the hardliners have been able to regroup in recent months and carry out daily attacks aimed at undermining the new administration.
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Three coalition soldiers, interpreter killed in Afghanistan
Sun Aug 12, 6:00 AM ET
KABUL (AFP) - Three soldiers with the US-led coalition fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and an interpreter were killed in a bomb blast in the east of the country Sunday, the force said.

Taliban militants claimed responsibility for the attack in the eastern province of Nangarhar.

The bomb blast came during combat in a district bordering Pakistan, a coalition statement said. Another soldier was wounded.

The force did not release the nationalities of the group, but an Afghan with the military said the interpreter was an Afghan. Most of the soldiers in the coalition are US nationals.

A Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahed, claimed a "big number of Americans" were killed. The rebel movement often exaggerates casualties.

"It was a roadside bomb followed by an attack," he said in a telephone call to an AFP journalist from an undisclosed location.

Earlier, the British Ministry of Defence announced that a British soldier was killed and five others wounded after their patrol came under fire from Taliban insurgents in southern Afghanistan on Saturday.

The latest deaths bring the number of international troops killed in Afghanistan this year to 134, according to an AFP count.

Most died in action as the Taliban's Al-Qaeda-backed insurgency has intensified. More than 190 were killed last year.

The British soldier killed on Saturday was with the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force that is working alongside the coalition and Afghan forces to end the unrest and bring the largely lawless country under government control.
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Musharraf asks Afghanistan to trust Pakistan
By ANI Sunday August 12, 03:31 PM
Kabul, Aug 12 (ANI): President Pervez Musharraf today said the bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan could not be successful without mutual trust, and Kabul should show faith in Islamabad.

"We couldn't be successful without mutual trust. Instead of levelling allegations Afghanistan should trust Pakistan," Musharraf said while addressing the closing session of Pak-Afghan Jirga here.

He reiterated that Pakistan would extend full support to the Afghan Government's efforts for peace in the country, adding that Islamabad and the people of Pakistan want peace and brotherhood with their Afghan brethren.

Musharraf said that Talibanisation is an ideology and we have to join ranks to work against it.

Pakistan is well aware of its responsibilities and taking steps against terrorists in the border areas, The News quoted Musharraf, as saying.

He said a strong and stable Afghanistan is in the best interest of Pakistan, adding, "We want peace and progress in the country."

Musharraf also expressed well wishes for success of Jirga for peace and stability in the region, and President Hamid Karzai and his government for hospitality and invitation to him for addressing the Jirga. (ANI)
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Militants decapitate Afghan "spies" in Pakistan
By Haji Mujtaba Sun Aug 12, 5:03 AM ET
MIRANSHAH, Pakistan (Reuters) - Suspected Islamist militants decapitated two Afghan men in a volatile Pakistani tribal region on suspicion of being spies for the United States, intelligence officials and residents said on Sunday.

The killings were the latest in surging violence around the North Waziristan region on the Afghan border after militants in July scrapped a 10-month old peace agreement with the government.

Residents found a body with a severed head, hands and legs dumped on a roadside on the outskirts of Miranshah, the region's main town, on Sunday morning.

A note found lying near the body asked people not to attend the funeral for the slain man identified as Habib-ur-Rehman.

"The note said that Rehman confessed to spying for the United States and he was being paid $200 for the job," an intelligence official in Miranshah told Reuters.

Residents found another decapitated body of an Afghan man in Datta Kheil village, around 40 km (25 miles) west of Miranshah, in similar circumstances.

In neighboring South Waziristan, the militants have demanded the release of 10 colleagues held by the authorities in exchange for 16 paramilitary soldiers abducted three days ago, security officials said.

The men went missing while returning to their base in Jandola, 50 km (31 miles) from Wana, the main town of South Waziristan. The area is a hotbed of support for the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Militants have killed a large number of government officials, Afghan nationals as well as tribal elders on suspicions of spying in Waziristan.

Militants carry out attacks in the restive region almost daily since they pulled out the peace pact signed in September.

Pakistan has been under mounting U.S. pressure to step up action against the militants in recent weeks.

On Saturday, Pakistani forces, backed by army helicopters, attacked a suspected militant hideout near Miranshah after a roadside bomb hit a military convoy, wounding one soldier.

Two people were killed and two were wounded in crossfire that followed the blast.
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Troops in Afghanistan 'heading for failure'
Jewel Topsfield, Canberra August 13, 2007 The Age
THE 1000 Australian troops risking their lives in Afghanistan will fail to make the country any more secure or reduce global terrorism, according to an eminent Australian defence expert.

In a withering assessment of the "well-meaning futility" of the Australian Defence Force's role in Afghanistan, Professor Hugh White says "little, if anything, will have been achieved" when our forces withdraw.

It comes as Foreign Minister Alexander Downer conceded the public's patience was "wearing pretty thin" on the war in Iraq and "you will get people electing governments that do just want to walk away from Iraq".

Prime Minister John Howard last week sent a letter to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki pressing for more progress in stabilising the country.

In a journal report to be published this week, Professor White asks why Australian lives were being risked, when there was no possible reason to believe the work of the reconstruction taskforce in the dangerous Oruzgan province in Afghanistan's south-east would make a difference.

"The role of our forces there is to defeat the Taliban by winning hearts and minds through civil engineering," says Professor White, head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University.

In the capital of Oruzgan, Tarin Kowt, the Australian reconstruction taskforce rewired and replumbed the hospital and renovated the high school.

"How exactly, is any of the work now being done in and around Tarin Kowt meant to defeat the Taliban, strengthen the Kabul Government or sway political, religious and social alignments in this part of Afghanistan?" Professor White writes in ANU Reporter.

"Are the people of Oruzgan … to be transformed by a replumbed hospital or a four-week course in carpentry delivered by an alien force of heavily armed infidels? … Sadly, the ADF's mission in Tarin Kowt will most probably fail."

Professor White said some people argued Australians were not there to help the Afghans, but to fight terrorism. "But if that is true, we are equally heading for failure because we are fighting in the wrong country — the epicentre of extremist terrorism today is in Pakistan."

He said although there had only been one Australian casualty in Afghanistan in 2003, the risks were clearly growing, with the Australian Government sending an extra 300 troops to protect the taskforce in May.

"Before we risk the lives of young Australians by sending them there to build roads and hospitals we need to ask whether this will make any real difference."

Mr Downer said the Prime Minister's letter to the Iraqi Prime Minister followed comments he had made when he visited the region last month and stressed more needed to be done to achieve reconciliation.

"I was urging Prime Minister Maliki to set up some kind of a high-profile reconciliation conference of the various factional leaders in Iraq … the process has taken a good deal longer than we had hoped," Mr Downer told the Sunday program.

But he said "you can't just walk out of Iraq" and the Howard Government was not threatening to withdraw troops.
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How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad
By DAVID ROHDE and DAVID E. SANGER The New York Times August 12, 2007
Two years after the Taliban fell to an American-led coalition, a group of NATO ambassadors landed in Kabul, Afghanistan, to survey what appeared to be a triumph — a fresh start for a country ripped apart by years of war with the Soviets and brutal repression by religious extremists.

With a senior American diplomat, R. Nicholas Burns, leading the way, they thundered around the country in Black Hawk helicopters, with little fear for their safety. They strolled quiet streets in Kandahar and sipped tea with tribal leaders. At a briefing from the United States Central Command, they were told that the Taliban were now a “spent force.”

“Some of us were saying, ‘Not so fast,’ ” Mr. Burns, now the under secretary of state for political affairs, recalled. “While not a strategic threat, a number of us assumed that the Taliban was too enmeshed in Afghan society to just disappear.”

But that skepticism had never taken hold in Washington. Since the 2001 war, American intelligence agencies had reported that the Taliban were so decimated they no longer posed a threat, according to two senior intelligence officials who reviewed the reports.

The American sense of victory had been so robust that the top C.I.A. specialists and elite Special Forces units who had helped liberate Afghanistan had long since moved on to the next war, in Iraq.

Those sweeping miscalculations were part of a pattern of assessments and decisions that helped send what many in the American military call “the good war” off course.

Like Osama bin Laden and his deputies, the Taliban had found refuge in Pakistan and regrouped as the American focus wavered. Taliban fighters seeped back over the border, driving up the suicide attacks and roadside bombings by as much as 25 percent this spring, and forcing NATO and American troops into battles to retake previously liberated villages in southern Afghanistan.

They have scored some successes recently, and since the 2001 invasion, there have been improvements in health care, education and the economy, as well as the quality of life in the cities. But Afghanistan’s embattled president, Hamid Karzai, said in Washington last week that security in his country had “definitely deteriorated.” One former national security official called that “a very diplomatic understatement.”

President Bush’s critics have long contended that the Iraq war has diminished America’s effort in Afghanistan, which the administration has denied, but an examination of how the policy unfolded within the administration reveals a deep divide over how to proceed in Afghanistan and a series of decisions that at times seemed to relegate it to an afterthought as Iraq unraveled.

Statements from the White House, including from the president, in support of Afghanistan were resolute, but behind them was a halting, sometimes reluctant commitment to solving Afghanistan’s myriad problems, according to dozens of interviews in the United States, at NATO headquarters in Brussels and in Kabul, the Afghan capital.

At critical moments in the fight for Afghanistan, the Bush administration diverted scarce intelligence and reconstruction resources to Iraq, including elite C.I.A. teams and Special Forces units involved in the search for terrorists. As sophisticated Predator spy planes rolled off assembly lines in the United States, they were shipped to Iraq, undercutting the search for Taliban and terrorist leaders, according to senior military and intelligence officials.

As defense secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld claimed credit for toppling the Taliban with light, fast forces. But in a move that foreshadowed America’s trouble in Iraq, he failed to anticipate the need for more forces after the old government was gone, and blocked an early proposal from Colin L. Powell, then the secretary of state, and Mr. Karzai, the administration’s handpicked president, for a large international force. As the situation deteriorated, Mr. Rumsfeld and other administration officials reversed course and cajoled European allies into sending troops.

When it came to reconstruction, big goals were announced, big projects identified. Yet in the year Mr. Bush promised a “Marshall Plan” for Afghanistan, the country received less assistance per capita than did postconflict Bosnia and Kosovo, or even desperately poor Haiti, according to a RAND Corporation study. Washington has spent an average of $3.4 billion a year reconstructing Afghanistan, less than half of what it has spent in Iraq, according to the Congressional Research Service.

The White House contends that the troop level in Afghanistan was increased when needed and that it now stands at 23,500. But a senior American commander said that even as the military force grew last year, he was surprised to discover that “I could count on the fingers of one or two hands the number of U.S. government agricultural experts” in Afghanistan, where 80 percent of the economy is agricultural. A $300 million project authorized by Congress for small businesses was never financed.

Underlying many of the decisions, officials say, was a misapprehension about what Americans would find on the ground in Afghanistan. “The perception was that Afghans hated foreigners and that the Iraqis would welcome us,” said James Dobbins, the administration’s former special envoy for Afghanistan. “The reverse turned out to be the case.”

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice defended the administration’s policy, saying, “I don’t buy the argument that Afghanistan was starved of resources.” Yet she said: “I don’t think the U.S. government had what it needed for reconstructing a country. We did it ad hoc in the Balkans, and then in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq.”

In interviews, three former American ambassadors to Afghanistan were more critical of Washington’s record.

“I said from the get-go that we didn’t have enough money and we didn’t have enough soldiers,” said Robert P. Finn, who was the ambassador in 2002 and 2003. “I’m saying the same thing six years later.”

Zalmay Khalilzad, who was the next ambassador and is now the American ambassador to the United Nations, said, “I do think that state-building and nation-building, we came to that reluctantly,” adding that “I think more could have been done earlier on these issues.”

And Ronald E. Neumann, who replaced Mr. Khalilzad in Kabul, said, “The idea that we could just hunt terrorists and we didn’t have to do nation-building, and we could just leave it alone, that was a large mistake.”

A Big Promise, Unfulfilled

After months of arguing unsuccessfully for a far larger effort in Afghanistan, Mr. Dobbins received an unexpected call in April 2002. Mr. Bush, he was told, was planning to proclaim America’s commitment to rebuild Afghanistan.

“I got a call from the White House speech writers saying they were writing a speech and did I see any reason not to cite the Marshall Plan,” Mr. Dobbins recalled, referring to the American rebuilding of postwar Europe. “I said, ‘No, I saw no objections’, so they put it in the speech.”

On April 17, Mr. Bush traveled to the Virginia Military Institute, where Gen. George C. Marshall trained a century ago. “Marshall knew that our military victory against enemies in World War II had to be followed by a moral victory that resulted in better lives for individual human beings,” Mr. Bush said, calling Marshall’s work “a beacon to light the path that we, too, must follow.”

Mr. Bush had belittled “nation building” while campaigning for president 18 months earlier. But aware that Afghans had felt abandoned before, including by his father’s administration after the Soviets left in 1989, he vowed to avoid the syndrome of “initial success, followed by long years of floundering and ultimate failure.

“We’re not going to repeat that mistake,” he said. “We’re tough, we’re determined, we’re relentless. We will stay until the mission is done.”

The speech, which received faint notice in the United States, fueled expectations in Afghanistan and bolstered Mr. Karzai’s stature before an Afghan grand council meeting in June 2002 at which Mr. Karzai was formally chosen to lead the government.

Yet privately, some senior officials, including Mr. Rumsfeld, were concerned that Afghanistan was a morass where the United States could achieve little, according to administration officials involved in the debate.

Within hours of the president’s speech, Mr. Rumsfeld announced his own approach at a Pentagon news conference.

“The last thing you’re going to hear from this podium is someone thinking they know how Afghanistan ought to organize itself,” he said. “They’re going to have to figure it out. They’re going to have to grab ahold of that thing and do something. And we’re there to help.”

But the help was slow in coming. Despite Mr. Bush’s promise in Virginia, in the months that followed his April speech, no detailed reconstruction plan emerged from the administration. Some senior administration officials lay the blame on the National Security Council, which is charged with making sure the president’s foreign policy is carried out.

The stagnation reflected tension within the administration over how large a role the United States should play in stabilizing a country after toppling its government, former officials say.

After the fall of the Taliban in December 2001, Mr. Powell and Ms. Rice, then the national security adviser, argued in confidential sessions that if the United States now lost Afghanistan, America’s image would be damaged, officials said. In a February 2002 meeting in the White House Situation Room, Mr. Powell proposed that American troops join the small international peacekeeping force patrolling Kabul and help Mr. Karzai extend his influence beyond the capital.

Mr. Powell said in an interview that his model was the 1989 invasion of Panama, where American troops spread out across the country after ousting the Noriega government. “The strategy has to be to take charge of the whole country by military force, police or other means,” he said.

Richard N. Haass, a former director of policy planning at the State Department, said informal talks with European officials had led him to believe that a force of 20,000 to 40,000 peacekeepers could be recruited, half from Europe, half from the United States.

But Mr. Rumsfeld contended that European countries were unwilling to contribute more troops, said Douglas J. Feith, then the Pentagon’s under secretary for policy. He said Mr. Rumsfeld felt that sending American troops would reduce pressure on Europeans to contribute, and could provoke Afghans’ historic resistance to invaders and divert American forces from hunting terrorists. Mr. Rumsfeld declined to comment.

Some officials said they also feared confusion if European forces viewed the task as peacekeeping while the American military saw its job as fighting terrorists. Ms. Rice, despite having argued for fully backing the new Karzai government, took a middle position, leaving the issue unresolved. “I felt that we needed more forces, but there was a real problem, which you continue to see to this day, with the dual role,” she said.

Ultimately, Mr. Powell’s proposal died. “The president, the vice president, the secretary of defense, the national security staff, all of them were skeptical of an ambitious project in Afghanistan,” Mr. Haass said. “I didn’t see support.”

Mr. Dobbins, the former special envoy, said Mr. Powell “seemed resigned.”

“I said this wasn’t going to be fully satisfactory,” he recalled. “And he said, ‘Well, it’s the best we could do.’ ”

In the end, the United States deployed 8,000 troops to Afghanistan in 2002, with orders to hunt Taliban and Qaeda members, and not to engage in peacekeeping or reconstruction. The 4,000-member international peacekeeping force did not venture beyond Kabul.

As an alternative, officials hatched a loosely organized plan for Afghans to secure the country themselves. The United States would train a 70,000-member army. Japan would disarm some 100,000 militia fighters. Britain would mount an antinarcotics program. Italy would carry out changes in the judiciary. And Germany would train a 62,000-member police force.

But that meant no one was in overall command, officials now say. Many holes emerged in the American effort.

There were so few State Department or Pentagon civil affairs officials that 13 teams of C.I.A. operatives, whose main job was to hunt terrorists and the Taliban, were asked to stay in remote corners of Afghanistan to coordinate political efforts, said John E. McLaughlin, who was deputy director and then acting director of the agency. “It took us quite awhile to get them regrouped in the southeast for counterterrorism,” he said of the C.I.A. teams.

Sixteen months after the president’s 2002 speech, the United States Agency for International Development, the government’s main foreign development arm, had seven full-time staffers and 35 full-time contract staff members in Afghanistan, most of them Afghans, according to a government audit. Sixty-one agency positions were vacant.

“It was state-building on the cheap, it was a duct tape approach,” recalled Said T. Jawad, Mr. Karzai’s chief of staff at the time and Afghanistan’s current ambassador to Washington. “It was fixing things that were broken, not a strategic approach.”

A Shift of Resources to Iraq

In October 2002, Robert Grenier, a former director of the C.I.A.’s counterintelligence center, visited the new Kuwait City headquarters of Lt. Gen David McKiernan, who was already planning the Iraq invasion. Meeting in a sheet metal warehouse, Mr. Grenier asked General McKiernan what his intelligence needs would be in Iraq. The answer was simple. “They wanted as much as they could get,” Mr. Grenier said.

Throughout late 2002 and early 2003, Mr. Grenier said in an interview, “the best experienced, most qualified people who we had been using in Afghanistan shifted over to Iraq,” including the agency’s most skilled counterterrorism specialists and Middle East and paramilitary operatives.

That reduced the United States’ influence over powerful Afghan warlords who were refusing to turn over to the central government tens of millions of dollars they had collected as customs payments at border crossings.

While the C.I.A. replaced officers shifted to Iraq, Mr. Grenier said, it did so with younger agents, who lacked the knowledge and influence of the veterans. “I think we could have done a lot more on the Afghan side if we had more experienced folks,” he said.

A former senior official of the Pentagon’s Central Command, which was running both wars, said that as the Iraq planning sped up, the military’s covert Special Mission Units, like Delta Force and Navy Seals Team Six, shifted to Iraq from Afghanistan.

So did aerial surveillance “platforms” like the Predator, a remotely piloted spy plane armed with Hellfire missiles that had been effective at identifying targets in the mountains of Afghanistan. Predators were not shifted directly from Afghanistan to Iraq, according to the former official, but as new Predators were produced, they went to Iraq.

“We were economizing in Afghanistan,” said the former official, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to comment publicly. “The marginal return for one more platform in Afghanistan is so much greater than for one more in Iraq.”

The shift in priorities became apparent to Dov Zakheim, the Pentagon’s former comptroller, as planning for the Iraq war was in high gear in the fall of 2002. Mr. Rumsfeld asked him to serve as the Pentagon’s reconstruction coordinator in Afghanistan. It was an odd role for the comptroller, whose primary task is managing the Pentagon’s $400 billion a year budget.

“The fact that they went to the comptroller to do something like that was in part a function of their growing preoccupation with Iraq,” said Mr. Zakheim, who left the administration in 2004. “They needed somebody, given that the top tier was covering Iraq.”

In an interview, President Bush’s national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, insisted that there was no diversion of resources from Afghanistan, and he cited recently declassified statistics to show that troop levels in Afghanistan rose at crucial moments — like the 2004 Afghan election — even after the Iraq war began.

But the former Central Command official said: “If we were not in Iraq, we would have double or triple the number of Predators across Afghanistan, looking for Taliban and peering into the tribal areas. We’d have the ‘black’ Special Forces you most need to conduct precision operations. We’d have more C.I.A.”

“We’re simply in a world of limited resources, and those resources are in Iraq,” the former official added. “Anyone who tells you differently is blowing smoke.”

A Piecemeal Operation

As White House officials put together plans in the spring of 2003 for President Bush to land on the deck of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and declare the end of major combat operations in Iraq, the Pentagon decided to make a similar, if less dramatic, announcement for Afghanistan.

On May 1, hours before Mr. Bush stood beneath a “Mission Accomplished” banner, Mr. Rumsfeld appeared at a news conference with Mr. Karzai in Kabul’s threadbare 19th-century presidential palace. “We clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction activities,” he said. “The bulk of the country today is permissive, it’s secure.”

The Afghanistan announcement was largely lost in the spectacle of Mr. Bush’s speech. But the predictions of stability proved no less detached from events on the ground.

Three weeks later, Afghan government workers who had not been paid for months held street demonstrations in Kabul. An exasperated Mr. Karzai publicly threatened to resign and announced that his government had run out of money because warlords were hoarding the customs revenues. “There is no money in the government treasury,” Mr. Karzai said.

At the same time, the American-led training of a new Afghan Army was proving far more difficult than officials in Washington had expected. The new force, plagued by high desertion rates, had only 2,000 soldiers. The Germans’ effort to train police officers was off to an even slower start, and the British-led counternarcotics effort was dwarfed by an explosion in the poppy crop. Already, small groups of Taliban fighters had slipped back over the border from Pakistan and killed aid workers, stalling reconstruction in the south.

A senior White House official said in a recent interview that in retrospect, putting different countries in charge of different operations was a mistake. “We piecemealed it,” he said. “One of the problems is when everybody has a piece, everybody’s piece is made third and fourth priority. Nobody’s piece is first priority. Stuff didn’t get done.”

A month after his announcement in Kabul, Mr. Rumsfeld’s aides presented a strategy to the White House aimed at weakening warlords and engaging in state-building in Afghanistan. In some ways, it was the approach Mr. Rumsfeld had rejected right after the invasion.

Pentagon officials said that Mr. Rumsfeld’s views began to shift after a December 2002 briefing by Marin Strmecki, an Afghanistan expert at the Smith Richardson Foundation, who argued that Afghanistan was not ungovernable and that it could be turned into a moderate, Muslim force in the region.

Mr. Strmecki said that the United States needed to help Afghans create credible national institutions and that Pashtuns, Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group and historically the Taliban’s base of support, needed a more prominent role in the government. Mr. Rumsfeld, according to aides, was impressed by Mr. Strmecki’s emphasis on training Afghans to run their own government and hired him.

Then another personnel change helped alter Afghanistan policy. Mr. Khalilzad, an Afghan-American who was a senior National Security Council official and a special envoy to Iraq exiles, was appointed ambassador to Afghanistan.

Mr. Khalilzad said he accepted the job after Mr. Bush promised to greatly expand resources in Afghanistan. “We had gotten the president to a significant increase,” Mr. Khalilzad recalled.

A leading neo-conservative, Mr. Khalilzad could get Ms. Rice or — if need be — Mr. Bush on the phone. He had been a counselor to Mr. Rumsfeld and had worked for Dick Cheney when Mr. Cheney was the first President Bush’s defense secretary. “Zal could get things done,” said Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, a former American military commander in Afghanistan.

When Mr. Khalilzad arrived in Kabul on Thanksgiving 2003, he brought nearly $2 billion — twice the amount of the previous year — as well as a new military strategy and private experts to intensifying rebuilding.

They started a reconstruction plan dubbed “accelerating success” that involved the kind of nation-building once dismissed by the administration. General Barno expanded “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” to build schools, roads and wells and to win the “hearts and minds” of Afghans. The teams amounted to a much smaller version of the force that Mr. Powell had proposed 18 months earlier.

By January 2004, Afghanistan had reached a compromise on a new Afghan Constitution. With American backing, Mr. Karzai weakened several warlords. In October 2004, Mr. Karzai, who had been appointed president, was elected. At the same time, NATO countries steadily sent more troops to Afghanistan, and soon Mr. Rumsfeld, needing for troops for Iraq, proposed that NATO take over security for all of Afghanistan.

By spring 2005, Afghanistan seemed to be moving toward the success Mr. Bush had promised. But then, fearing that Iraq was spinning out of control, the White House asked Mr. Khalilzad to become ambassador to Baghdad.

A Lingering Threat

Before departing Afghanistan, Mr. Khalilzad fought a final battle within the administration. It revealed divisions within the American government over Pakistan’s role in aiding the Taliban, a delicate subject as the administration tried to coax Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, to cooperate.

In an interview on Afghan television, Mr. Khalilzad noted that Pakistani journalists had recently interviewed a senior Taliban commander in Pakistan. He questioned Pakistan’s claim that it did not know the whereabouts of senior Taliban commanders — a form of skepticism discouraged in Washington, where the administration’s line had always been that General Musharraf was doing everything he could.

“If a TV station can get in touch with them, how can the intelligence service of a country, which has nuclear bombs, and a lot of security and military forces, not find them?” Mr. Khalilzad asked.

Pakistani officials publicly denounced Mr. Khalilzad’s comments and denied that they were harboring Taliban leaders. But Mr. Khalilzad had also exposed the growing rift between American officials in Kabul and those in Islamabad.

Mr. Grenier said that when he was the C.I.A. station chief in Islamabad the issue of fugitive Taliban leaders was repeatedly raised with senior Pakistani intelligence officials in 2002. “The results were just not there,” he recalled. “And it was quite clear to me that it wasn’t just bad luck.”

Pakistani had backed the Taliban throughout the 1990s as a counterweight to an alliance of northern Afghan commanders backed by India, Pakistan’s bitter rival. Pakistani officials also distrusted Mr. Karzai.

Deciding that the Pakistanis would not act on the Taliban, Mr. Grenier said he had urged them to focus on arresting Qaeda members, who he said were far more of a threat to the United States.

“From our perspective at the time, the Taliban was a spent force,” he said, adding, “We were very much focused on Al Qaeda and didn’t want to distract the Pakistanis from that.”

But Mr. Khalilzad, American military officials and others in the administration argued that the Taliban were crossing from Pakistan into Afghanistan and killing American troops and aid workers. “Colleagues in Washington at various levels did not recognize that there was the problem of sanctuary and that this was important,” Mr. Khalilzad said.

But it was not until 2006, after ordering a study on Afghanistan’s future, that Mr. Bush strenuously pressed General Musharraf on the Taliban. Later, Mr. Bush told his aides he worried that “old school ties” between Pakistani intelligence and the Taliban endured, despite the general’s assurances. The Pakistanis, one senior American commander said, were “hedging their bets.”

“They’re not sure that we are staying,” he added. “And if we are gone, the Taliban is their next best option” to remain influential in Afghanistan.

As 2005 ended, the Taliban leaders remained in hiding in Pakistan, waiting for an opportunity to cross the border. Soon, they would find one.

To Afghans, a Fickle Effort

In September 2005, NATO defense ministers gathered in Berlin to complete plans for NATO troops to take over security in Afghanistan’s volatile south. It was the most ambitious “out of area” operations in NATO history, and across Europe, leaders worried about getting support from their countries. Then, American military officials dropped a bombshell.

The Pentagon, they said, was considering withdrawing up to 3,000 troops from Afghanistan, roughly 20 percent of total American forces.

NATO’s secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said he had protested to Mr. Rumsfeld that a partial American withdrawal would discourage others from sending troops.

In the end, the planned troop reduction was abandoned, but chiefly because the American ground commander at the time, Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, concluded that the Taliban were returning and that he needed to shift troops to the east to try to stop them. But the announcement had sent a signal of a wavering American commitment.

“The Afghan people still doubt our staying power,” General Eikenberry said. “They have seen the world walk away from them before.”

To sell their new missions at home, British, Dutch and Canadian officials portrayed deployments to Afghanistan as safe, and better than sending troops to Iraq. Germany and Italy prevented their forces from being sent on combat missions in volatile areas. Those regions were to be left to the Americans, Canadians, British and Dutch.

Three months after announcing the proposed troop withdrawal, the White House Office of Management and Budget cut aid to Afghanistan by a third.

Ms. Rice said that much of the money allocated to Afghanistan the previous year had not been spent. “There was an absorption problem,” she said.

Mr. Neumann, then the ambassador, said he had argued against the decision.

Even so, American assistance to Afghanistan dropped by 38 percent, from $4.3 billion in fiscal 2005 to $3.1 billion in fiscal 2006, according to a study by the Congressional Research Service.

By February 2006, Mr. Neumann had come to the conclusion that the Taliban were planning a spring offensive, and he sent a cable to his superiors.

“I had a feeling that the view was too rosy in Washington,” recalled Mr. Neumann, who retired from the State Department in June. “I was concerned.”

Mr. Neumann’s cable proved prophetic. In the spring of 2006, the Taliban carried out their largest offensive since 2001, attacking British, Canadian and Dutch troops in southern Afghanistan.

Hundreds of Taliban swarmed into the south, setting up checkpoints, assassinating officials and burning schools. Suicide bombings quintupled to 136. Roadside bombings doubled. All told, 191 American and NATO troops died in 2006, a 20 percent increase over the 2005 toll. For the first time, it became nearly as dangerous, statistically, to serve as an American in Afghanistan as in Iraq.

Mr. Neumann said that while suicide bombers came from Pakistan, most Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan were Afghans. Captured insurgents said they had taken up arms because a local governor favored a rival tribe, corrupt officials provided no services or their families needed money.

After cutting assistance in 2006, the United States plans to provide $9 billion in aid to Afghanistan in 2007, twice the amount of any year since 2001.

Despite warnings about the Taliban’s resurgence from Mr. Neumann, Mr. Khalilzad and military officials, Ms. Rice said, “there was no doubt that people were surprised that the Taliban was able to regroup and come back in a large, well-organized force.”

Divisions Over Strategy

In July 2006, NATO formally took responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan. To Americans and Europeans, NATO is the vaunted alliance that won the cold war. To Afghans it is little more than a strange, new acronym. And NATO and the Americans are divided over strategy.

The disagreement is evident on the wall of the office of Gen. Dan K. McNeill, the commander of the 35,000 NATO forces in Afghanistan, where he keeps a chart that is a sea of yellow and red blocks. Each block shows the restrictions that national governments have placed on their forces under his command. Red blocks represent tasks a country will not do, like hunting Taliban or Qaeda leaders. Yellow blocks indicate missions they are willing to consider after asking their capitals for approval.

In Washington, officials lament that NATO nations are unwilling to take the kinds of risks and casualties necessary to confront the Taliban. Across Europe, officials complain the United States never focused on reconstruction, and they blame American forces for mounting air attacks on the Taliban that cause large civilian casualties, turning Afghans against the West.

The debate over how the 2001 victory in Afghanistan turned into the current struggle is well under way.

“Destroying the Al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan was an extraordinary strategic accomplishment,” said Robert D. Blackwill, who was in charge of both Afghanistan and Iraq policy at the National Security Council, “but where we find ourselves now may have been close to inevitable, whether the U.S. went into Iraq or not. We were going to face this long war in Afghanistan as long as we and the Afghan government couldn’t bring serious economic reconstruction to the countryside, and eliminate the Taliban’s safe havens in Pakistan.”


But Henry A. Crumpton, a former C.I.A. officer who played a key role in ousting the Taliban and became the State Department’s counterterrorism chief, said winning a war like the one in Afghanistan required American personnel to “get in at a local level and respond to people’s needs so that enemy forces cannot come in and take advantage.”

“These are the fundamentals of counterinsurgency, and somehow we forgot them or never learned them,” he added. He noted that “the United States has 11 carrier battle groups, but we still don’t have expeditionary nonmilitary forces of the kind you need to win this sort of war.”

“We’re living in the past,” he said.

Among some current and former officials, a consensus is emerging that a more consistent, forceful American effort could have helped to keep the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s leadership from regrouping.

Gen. James L. Jones, a retired American officer and a former NATO supreme commander, said Iraq caused the United States to “take its eye off the ball” in Afghanistan. He warned that the consequences of failure “are just as serious in Afghanistan as they are in Iraq.”

“Symbolically, it’s more the epicenter of terrorism than Iraq,” he said. “If we don’t succeed in Afghanistan, you’re sending a very clear message to the terrorist organizations that the U.S., the U.N. and the 37 countries with troops on the ground can be defeated.”

Carlotta Gall contributed reporting.
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Private security guards held on murder charges
KABUL, August 12 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Officials of a private security company have been arrested for involvement in killing 10 civilians and injuring seven others in Shah Joy district of the Zabul province.

Guards of the private security company had opened fire on the civilians in Khaki village of Shah Joy, capital of the province, about two weeks ago, an intelligence official confided to Pajhwok Afghan News on Sunday.

Without naming the private firm, the official added the security guards were arrested three days back with the support of the Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers.

Jailani Khan, chief of the Zabul-Kandahar highway police, confirmed the arrest of the alleged outlaws. He said the detainees were also accused of robberies and other criminal activities.

Some of the 60 private security firms working in Afghanistan have already been suspended for different reasons.
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Iranian border forces shoot dead four Afghan youths
HERAT CITY/ISLAMABAD, August 12 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Iranian border police shot dead four Afghan youths in Kohsan district of the western Herat province, officials said on Sunday.

Col. Rahmatullah Safi, chief of the 4th Border Brigade Police, told Pajhwok Afghan News the slain youths were aged between 15 to 17 years. He added hundreds of infuriated residents of Kohsan marched from the district headquarters building to the Islam Qala border, closing the highway for several hours.

"The residents demanded the dead bodies from Iranian police but were yet to receive them," said Safi, who continued the protestors torched tyres, blocked roads and chanted anti-Iran slogans.

Meanwhile, our Islamabad-based correspondent reports that Taliban insurgents beheaded an Afghan refugee in North Waziristan Agency on the charge of spying for Afghan and American forces.

Government official Mian Ali said Abdur Rahmans headless body was recovered from a ditch in Miranshah Sunday morning. The victim, abducted three days ago, had tell-tale signs of torture on his body.

A letter found from the mans pocket said anyone spying for foreign and Afghan forces would face a similar fate.
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Local radio station torched in Maidan Wardak
KABUL, Aug 12 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Taliban have torched office of the Radio Yawali Ghag (voice of unity) in a last nigh attack Sayed Abad district of the central Maidan Wardak province.

Police chief of the province Muhammad Hussain told Pajhwok Afghan News the district centre was attacked around 11:30pm last night. The clash continued till 4:00am, said the police chief.

He confirmed the burning of a local radio station Yawali Ghag which was funded by Salam Watandar Radio of the Internews. He claimed four of the attackers were killed in the clash that continued for more than four hours while none of the police personnel were killed or injured.

Taliban spokesman Zabeehullah Mujahid, on the other hand, said their men had seized the district for a few hours. They relinquished control of the offices later.

Mujahid claimed a radio stationed was torched and an arms depot was also destroyed besides inflicting 'heavy casualties' on the government forces. The attackers had taken away large number of arms and ammunitions and secret documents from the district, he added.

Hazratuddin, head of the Yawali Radio, told Pajhwok besides the radio station, the district centre also partially damaged in the last night attack. He said a body was found in front of the offices of the district. Police said he was a Taliban killed during the encounter.

Spokesman for Maidan Wardak governor Abdul Wadood Pakhtoonzar confirmed the Taliban attack and burning of the radio station.

Afghanistan Independent Journalist Association (AIJA) has condemned the arson attack on the radio station and said they were investigating the incident. A statement from the Internews in Kabul said the radio was airing 10-hour transmissions on daily basis.

Quoting head of the Yawali Ghag Radio, the statement said the attackers set the station on fire after overpowering the security guards.

Commenting on the arson attack, Director Internews Afghanistan Jan McArthur said: "This reflects increasing insurgent activity in the district of Syad Abad and in Afghanistan in general. This is the second partner station of Internews to be torched in one year."

He said they would send a delegation in the area in a week to conduct an assessment. "We will also investigate 'repeater' options in this area to enable the community to have access to important local and national information via radio, without risking the lives of radio staff/volunteers, until the region is stable."

Habib Rahman Ibrahimi
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ICRC confirms facilitating direct talks on hostages
GENEVEVA, Aug 12 (Pajhwok Afghan News): The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has confirmed facilitating direct negotiations in Ghazni City between representatives of Taliban and a Korean delegation on 21 hostages in militant captivity.

At the request of the parties involved and in view of working toward the safe return of the hostages, the ICRC facilitates the direct talks between all parties concerned by providing a neutral venue - the Provincial Headquarters of the Afghan Red Crescent in Ghazni, the organisation said.

In a press release issued on Sunday, the ICRC said all parties concerned including those involved in the armed conflict in Afghanistan had previously agreed on the meeting and gave the necessary security guarantees.

Reto Stocker, head of the ICRC delegation in Kabul, said: "The ICRC as a humanitarian organisation is very concerned about the fate of the hostages and insists for them not to be harmed under any circumstances and to be unconditionally released as quickly as possible."

Not participating at any stage in the negotiations, the ICRC suggested that all hostages be allowed to write Red Cross Messages (RCMs) to their families. ICRC expatriate staff was present in the building during the direct talks.

The press release added the ICRC was ready in its capacity of neutral intermediary to provide other services as requested by the parties concerned, depending on the outcome of the negotiations.

The ICRC has been present in Afghanistan since 1987, where it has been delivering aid and carrying out other humanitarian work in accordance with its mandate under international humanitarian law.
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Pakistan-Afghan highway opened
Dawn (Pakistan)
KHYBER AGENCY, Aug 11: Transporters, traders and people from different walks of life breathed a sigh of relief after the Pakistan-Afghan highway was opened on Friday night for all types of vehicular traffic after three days of closure.

The highway was closed after the people of Naiki-Khel, a sub-tribe of Zakhakhel, blocked the road over a land dispute three days ago.

Officials said that the tribesmen who blocked the road had been handed over to the political administration in Landi Kotal.The administration after the dispute had closed the road for two days, demanding the handing over of the perpetrators.

The tribesmen of Zakhakhel assured the administration that after the return of their leaders from the Pakistan-Afghan grand jirga, problems of the road closure would be solved forever.

The closure of the highway had caused traffic jams and created a number of problems for commuters.—APP
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Laguna Hills couple helps people of Afghanistan
Ellen Mai and her husband form Developing Opportunity to help out.
By ALEJANDRA MOLINA Thursday, August 9, 2007 OC Register
For Ellen Mai, distance is not an obstacle. Even if it's thousands of miles.

Mai and her husband Evan have formed a nonprofit group called Developing Opportunity, which provides educational and vocational opportunities to people in developing countries, like Afghanistan and Colombia.

On Aug. 17, the Laguna Hills resident will travel to Afghanistan for 10 days to check up on various group-funded projects. These include visiting a school and a computer lab.

Developing Opportunity renovated a 38-year-old school so that it could better serve 1,400 students who range from 7 to 17 years old.

It also contributed about $20,000 to help convert old army barracks into a computer lab. Classes in computers, social sciences, geology and literature are held at the facility.

In addition, the organization is starting an English language school in Balkh Province of northern Afghanistan. While on her trip, Mai will meet with representatives of the Ministry of Education to discuss teacher salaries.

To Mai, it just makes sense to reach out to Afghanistan.

"I think there's a lot more programs available here (in the U.S.) already that are doing a lot of wonderful things," she said. "Things over there are so limited because it's a dangerous place and there are a lot of charities that don't want to go."

"So little money goes so far over there," she added.

Mai is an executive producer for Blue Field Entertainment. Her first trip to Afghanistan was six years ago while working on a documentary with CNN and the Travel Channel.

"I spent a lot of time with the local Afghans…they were such warm, generous and giving people even though they had nothing to give," she said.

Through her time spent there, Mai has built many friendships. Through those ties, Mai feels comfortable knowing that donation money will go to meaningful projects.

"All they want is just to be normal they just want a roof over their heads they want to go to school they want food on their tables," Mai said.

For more on Developing Opportunity, visit www.DevelopingOpportunity.org.
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