Making sense of Afghan policy

The Friday Times: Opinion
December 17-23, 1999
Vol XI, No. 42, Regd No. CPL-116

Ejaz Haider recommends a review of Pakistan's Afghan policy and says it must be pegged to Pakistan's larger interests

General Pervez Musharraf's two-day visit to Tehran on December 8-9 was pegged largely to Pak-Iran relations that have steadily soured because of Pakistan's support to the rabidly anti-Shi'ite Taliban militia in Afghanistan. For its part, Iran, along with the Russian Federation, the Central Asian Republics and India backs the Northern Alliance, a conglomeration of various anti-Taliban groups.

Reports in Pakistani press quoted Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar as saying the talks were "frank and sincere" and the two leaders agreed on the imperative of setting up a "broad-based representative and multi-ethnic government" in Afghanistan. However, opinion in Iranian newspapers during Musharraf's visit remained at best cautious, at worst anti-Pakistan.

There are two ways of looking at Iran's reaction to Pakistan's Afghan policy. One is the existing track, which seeks to push the traditional Afghan policy without regard for Tehran's sentiments. This track is pegged to the argument that (a) Pakistan's policy should be geared towards pursuing its own interests; (b) Iran's interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia necessarily pit it against Pakistan and therefore Pakistan cannot do much to change the situation; and, (c) Tehran can be dealt with after the final push in Afghanistan is complete and the other external actors have been given a fait accompli. These arguments are also strengthened by presenting facts on Iran's own flawed Afghan policy that seeks influence in that county beyond its legitimate concerns.

The second track is to view the policy in the larger context of Pakistan's interests. In fact, if Pakistan's Afghan policy is geared towards the country's interests, as it should be, then the planners must take a holistic view of other developments in and beyond the region to see if that policy dovetails into the macro picture. Moreover, while a certain degree of legitimate competition can be expected between Iran and Pakistan in Afghanistan as well as in Central Asia, it is not inevitable that competing interests between the two neighbours must develop into a zero-sum game. This can also be argued because both countries are founding members of the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation), which now also includes the Central Asian Republics. They can not only compete within the ECO framework but can also use the ECO to defuse any tension that such competition might occasionally generate.

For example, a good beginning could be made through the oil and gas pipeline that Tehran is interested in. General Musharraf was reported as saying he could not allow the pipeline to go through Pakistan into India. While some analysts might support that policy, the fact is the general must reconsider that statement because both in terms of strategic leverage as well as greater revenues, it would be more logical for Pakistan to agree to a pipeline going through it to India than having one end up in its territory.

Pakistan and Iran have traditionally had warm, friendly relations. Those relations were obviously based on mutual interests. It is impossible to believe that those interests have vanished overnight or can be sacrificed on a single issue. It should be common sense that a country locked in a zero-sum competition with a larger neighbour should seek peace and good relations with other countries in the region instead of getting into a nutcracker situation both militarily and diplomatically. An example of this clearly sensible course is Israel's quest for peace in the Middle East. It has made peace with Egypt and Jordan and now seeks to make peace with Syria. If its efforts are successful, it will have secured its borders and also ensured peace with Lebanon since Syria also holds the cards in that country. That would then allow Israel to get down to the more difficult task of working out a final deal with the Palestinian Authority. Conversely, if talks with Syria break down again, Israel would still have to merely contend with Syria having isolated Damascus by consolidating relations with Amman and Cairo.

The other obvious fact about a policy option relates to its life span or utility. There is nothing immutable about a policy. If it works fine and serves the purpose of fulfilling a country's interests, it may be pursued. Contrarily, if it loses its strategic value, sticking to it long after it has run its course can at best be called naïve. The point is that while Iran can be blamed for its Afghan policy on a number of counts, Pakistan's own options cannot be justified because of what Tehran might be doing. Any options should quite logically be exercised on the basis of Pakistan's own interests and must be pro-active rather than reactive. If countering Tehran is indeed in Islamabad's interests and the policy fits in with Pakistan's other, perhaps more crucial interests in a synergetic equation then it must be pursued. But if it is seen to be counter-productive at both the micro and macro levels then it is legitimate to argue for a review even if it means accommodating Iran to secure greater gains overall.

The point is not that Tehran should or should not be exercising certain options because they are either evil or go against Pakistan's interests but that Tehran is clearly going one up on Islamabad diplomatically. This has come about because of an agglomeration of interests among various countries. Since India, too, forms part of this anti-Pakistan equation, policy-makers in Islamabad have good reason to start worrying. Moreover, if it is accepted that India forms the main plank of Pakistan's foreign policy, and the issue of Kashmir stands at the heart of Pakistan's conflict with India, then it stands to reason that Pakistan should rehash its Afghan policy in light of clear evidence that India is attempting to highlight the nexus between Islamabad's Afghan and Kashmir policies in an effort to blunt Pakistan's diplomatic offensive against it on Kashmir.

The issue is also related to the very significant factor of the United States. Washington has had a poor record in terms of formulating policy on Afghanistan. It went along with the Taliban option not only because of the Pak-Saudi backing of the militia but also because of the involvement of the UNOCAL-led consortium for the oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. Since it downgraded Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal it left the strategic part of the game to Pakistan. The only US interest revolved around the UNOCAL contract and Washington's strategic compulsion to put Tehran down. That situation has largely changed since the election of President Khatami in Iran, the continued violation by the Taliban of the United Nations Charter on Human Rights and the presence of Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan.

There is also a convergence of interest between India and the US on the issue of Islamic militancy. In the post-Kargil scenario India's diplomatic posturing on the issue has become much more aggressive. This is a qualitative change since India had all but lost its cards in Afghanistan. It has not only regained some of that lost space by throwing its weight behind the Northern Alliance, but is using bin Ladin's and Taliban's notoriety to put a different spin on Pakistan's Kashmir policy. The credibility of its policy is also linked to events in Dagestan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and reports that Wahhabi dissidents have set up camps inside Afghanistan and might be using that country as jump-off ground to topple governments in Central Asia. The Indian policy, therefore, is woven into the warp and woof of this regional-global concern that is now cutting the ground from under Pakistan's feet.

These are evidently very sound reasons for Pakistan to rehash its policy. It has to evaluate that policy on cost-benefit basis. The cost factor has become obvious. What remains, therefore, is a cool calculation of gains. Trade with Central Asia is a pipe dream for various reasons, not least the economic condition of the CARs and Pakistan's own economy. The oil and gas pipeline project from Turkmenistan is all but dead. The social penetration of the Taliban in Pakistan has already thrown up a host of problems, including smuggling of drugs and other contrabands. The problem of sectarian violence has become all too menacing. Afghanistan has also become a safehaven for Islamist revolutionaries. While the Taliban keep denying that there are training camps inside Afghanistan, this is now an open secret and cannot be plausibly denied. What then are the gains? Most importantly, a rehash has to look at Pakistan's priorities. Could it be that Afghanistan is costing Pakistan its credibility on Kashmir?